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CIVIL NO. 29552 
The Court has prepared a supplemental document entitled 
"Memorandum and Summation" as a part of its decision herein 
and based thereon, now submits these Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which contain its rulings on the issues involved. Each 
bit of relevant, admissible evidence may establish a fact that 
exists in this case. I have by my summation of the evidence 
endeavored to set forth the relevant content of all exhibits 
and oral testimony. Some of necessity contain opinion, hearsay 
and evidence for which no necessary foundation exists. I have 
tried to disregard such information in making the summation, 
yet I am aware that upon occasion such information may have 
been included in writing the summation. 
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Upon completion of the summary I began writing a commentary 
of the issues of fact and law and a discussion of the evidence 
with respect thereto. After so writing extensively, I reached 
a point where I came to believe that directing counsel on either 
side to undertake the preparation of findings and conclusions 
based thereon seemed a monstrous assignment. I had not undertaken 
my summation of the evidence as an exfercise in writing, but 
rather to produce a source of factual data gleaned from the 
mass of exhibits and testimony to which all concerned might 
turn to as a help in reaching a better understanding of what 
we have in this case. 
The more I wrote on my commentary of the issues and evidence, 
the more I became convinced that reason suggested that I rewrite 
what I had written and stated in the commentary in the form 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thus avoid passing 
such an assignment to counsel* I have done so, but in commencing 
this undertaking and reflecting thereon, I deemed it necessary 
to include in the findings and conclusions commentary on my 
views of the evidence as it related to the various claims and 
defenses raised in the pleadings and the law with respect thereto. 
Thus, of necessity, many findings and conclusions will be extensive, 
but hopefully the content thereof will help others to understand 
what I see in the evidence as to each point in issue and my 
reasons for ruling as I do. There will be times when matters 
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will be mentioned on more than one occasion, but bear in mind 
that I do so, not in a period of forgetfulness, but because 
such repetition seems important and necessary on a particular 
point under discussion. 
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
This case involves a claim set forth in plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint against defendants Richins, Richtron, Inc., and Richtron 
Financial Corporation (RFC) based upon a judgment entered against 
said defendants in the state of Oregon in favor of one Robert 
Osborn (hereinafter frequently referred to as the Osborn judgment). 
Osborn was a well driller and had been employed by defendant 
Richtron, Inc. to drill some water wells en farm property in 
the state of Oregon referred to as the Catlow Valley Farms. 
Richtron, Inc. was the sole general partner in seven Catlow 
Valley limited partnerships which defendant, Paul Richins, had 
created and set up. Defendant RFC was another Richtron corporation 
which Richins had organized. Richins individually and RFC had 
executed a guaranty agreement with Osborn a$ guarantors of Richtron, 
Inc.'s obligation for drilling the wel^s on the Catlow Valley 
Farm property. Osborn drilled the wellsl, was not paid for his 
work, and so filed suit against these defendants on the obligation 
owed, seeking also general damages and attorney's fees. Defendants 
were represented by Idaho counsel who, wit^ h defendants' approval, 
settled the action on May 13, 1980, the day set for trial, stipu-
2044 
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lating to the entry of a judgment for $27,683.16 (including 
all accrued interest to May 20, 1980 $t 12%), $30,000 general 
(plus interest thereon at 9% from Mayl 20, 1980) and for all 
costs and disbursements including a reasonable attorney's fee 
of $18,000 (with interest thereon at [the legal rate from May 
20, 1980). The total of the judgment was $75,683.16. 
John P. Sampson, an Ogden, Utah attorney, got involved 
in controversies leading to this laws^t on or about May 20, 
1980, one week after the entry of the olsborn judgment. In the 
months that followed many events occurred with respect to which 
Sampson was sued by defendants on a counterclaim filed in this 
action. The major portion of this lawpuit centers around the 
Counterclaim and most of the evidence presented and the Findings 
of Fact hereinafter to be set forth relajte to the Counterclaim, 
but some also have relevance to the issues raised on plaintiffs1 
Complaint. Likewise, evidence and Findings of Fact which deal 
primarily with the claim asserted against defendants in the 
Complaint also have relevancy to the claims asserted under the 
Counterclaim. While I will first deal with the Complaint and 
make findings particularly relevant thereto, it should be remembered, 
as stated, that findings relating primarily to the Counterclaim 
may have relevance to the issues on tfye Complaint and should 
not be overlooked in considering the sufficiency of the findings 
of fact to support the conclusions and| rulings on the issues 
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raised by the pleadings relating to the claim set forth in the 
Complaint. Otherwise, many findings would have to be restated 
with respect to both sides of this lawsui|t. 
The Complaint commencing this lawsuit was filed on February 
11, 1981. On March 11, 1981 an Amended Complaint was filed. 
By stipulation of counsel time to answer was extended and no 
Answer to the Complaint was filed until July 20, 1982 which 
included the Counterclaim. On September 11, 1982 another Answer 
and an Amended Counterclaim were filecj. The defendants filed 
a further Amended Answer and a Second Amended Counterclaim on 
September 6, 1985, which together with the Amended Complaint 
filed March 11, 1981 formed the pleadings upon which this case 
was tried. 
The plaintiffs1 Complaint was simply a claim upon the Osborn 
judgment entered against defendants in the state of Oregon. 
In answer, defendants admitted the entry of the Osborn judgment 
against them, but asserted as affirmative defenses that (1) 
the judgment was fully paid and satisfied; (2) the judgment 
was subject to a constructive trust or equitable lien; (3) offset; 
(4) estoppel based upon improper dealing, misrepresentation 
and deceit in satisfaction of the obligation which gave rise 
to the judgment, including improper conduct and unfair advantage 
in connection with obtaining an interest in the judgment. 
204 
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As to these issues raised by these pleadings, the following 
are: 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
1. In May, 1980, and for years prior thereto, Richins 
was president of Richtron, Inc., which company was the general 
partner of each of seven limited partnerships known as Catlow 
Valley Farms 1 through 7, which Richins had organized on April 
1, 1977 (5) and January 1, 1978 (2). 
2. Under the limited partnership agreements and the laws 
of the state of Utah, Richtron, Inc. as general pjrtner had full 
management control and Richins as its president contracted with 
Osborn to drill wells for water on the Catlow Valley Farms. 
3. Osborn was not paid for the well drilling work he 
did on these farms, but did not record a mechanic's lien on 
the property. 
4. He instituted his lawsuit against the three defendants 
and on May 13, 1980, he obtained and h^d entered a stipulated 
judgment for $75,683.16, the details of which are set forth 
supra under the General Findings of Faqt. By agreeing to the 
stipulated judgment defendants were benefited because Osborn 
reduced the total amount he was seeking in his Complaint. 
5. Satisfaction of the obligation which gave rise to 
the judgment was the responsibility and under the control of 
Richtron, Inc. Sampson did not get involved until May 20, 1980, 
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and neither he nor other plaintiffs (identified supra) were 
involved in any improper dealing, misrepresentation or deceit 
with respect to satisfaction of the obligation upon which the 
judgment was based. 
6. On or about May 20, 1980, Sampson was retained by 
two Catlow Valley limited partners, Milt Goff and Rex Kohler, 
to make inquiry concerning reported difficulties that had arisen 
with respect to the Catlow Valley partnerships and Sampson contacted 
Richins and learned of the entry of the Osborn judgment and 
also concerning the entry of another judgment in favor of Minter-
Wilson on April 30, 1980, who had alsp done drilling work on 
the Catlow Valley property, and who by May 20 had a sheriff's 
sale scheduled for June 6, 1980 to execute on its judgment. 
7. Richins had a telephone discission with Osborn, who 
agreed to settle the judgment upon payment of $26,000.00 and 
$9,000.00 attorney's fees, but nothing wa$ then paid. 
8. On May 29, 1980, Richins held a meeting of Catlow 
Valley limited partners and advised theft, among other existing 
difficulties, of the existence of the Osborn judgment and of 
the fact that Osborn would settle it u$on payment of the sums 
mentioned in Finding 7. 
9. As a consequence of the May 29, 1980 meeting, those 
present, acting upon Sampson's recommendation, voted to have 
RFC immediately file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding to stay 
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the Minter-Wilson sale. At the first meeting of creditors on 
July 1, 1980, with regard to that bankruptcy, Richins and Sampson 
jointly had a discussion with Osborn about settling the judgment, 
as previously discussed, at which time Osborn said he had not 
filed a mechanic's lien on the Catlow Valley property and thus 
his judgment was not a lien upon it, and in view of RFC's bankruptcy 
and Minter-Wilson1 s judgment lien, he did not think he would 
then settle for anything less than the face amount of his judgment, 
Richins claimed Sampson's participation with him in holding 
this discussion with Osborn placed Sampson in a position of 
having undertaken in some degree, of Representing Richins and 
his companies as counsel, concerning which other findings will 
be set forth relating to that contention. 
10. At a meeting of limited partners having large partnership 
holdings held on June 26, 1980, Sampson, acting as counsel for 
certain limited partners, reached an Agreement with Richins 
to buy out all of his and his corporations' interests for 
$700,000.00. A settlement and compromise agreement was drafted 
in the months that followed, but when certain limited partners 
refused to accept and sign it, the settlement failed. 
11. At a meeting of Catlow Valley limited partners, held 
on August 5, 198 0, it was determined th|at $150,000 in capital 
contributions would be assessed and pai<(i, part of which would 
be used to pay off the Osborn judgment. This was not achieved, 
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but at this time funds were being paid to Sampson by the limited 
partners with the understanding and agreement that he would 
transfer funds to Richins as needed for us£ by the general partners. 
12. When the settlement negotiations failed, Sampson began 
a vigorous effort to take over controll of all of the limited 
partnerships, some of which activitiels will be covered later 
in these findings, but one of the things Sampson did was to 
contact Osborn and his attorney and reached an agreement whereby 
for $40,000 Osborn would assign his judgment to Sampson, $20,000 
to be paid immediately and the balance on stated dates in the 
near future. To obtain control, Sampqon had solicited voting 
powers of attorney from all limited partners, together with 
funds, doing so with the intent and purpose of using such voting 
powers to elect his newly created professional corporation (PC) 
new substitute general partner of each limited partnership. 
Before any such goal was achieved, Sampson received several 
thousand dollars from various limited partners, including funds 
from those who were not Catlow Valley partners. Using these 
funds Sampson sent Osborn's attorney 4 $20,000 check as the 
down payment on their agreement. The attorriey, Cramer, acknowledged 
receipt of it, confirming that $10,000 more was to be paid in 
two weeks and the remaining $10,000 in thtee months. On January 
23, 1981 Cramer wrote Sampson enclosing copies of the summons 
on the Oregon lawsuit, the answers filed b^ the three defendants, 
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the judgment and cost bill, an Assigilment of Judgment which 
stated that in consideration of $40,000 Osborn thereby assigned 
and transferred to Sampson personally all of his right, title 
and interest in and to the Osborn judgment of May 13, 1980, 
Sampson did not advise Richins he had done so. 
13. Armed with this assignment of judgment, Sampson retained 
attorney Blackburn to commence an action against the three defendants 
upon the Oregon judgment. The Complaint was filed on February 
11, 1981 with Osborn being named as plaintiff, the action being 
on the Oregon judgment with no mention being made of its assignment. 
14. As set forth in the Conclusipns of Law that follow, 
such action by Sampson constituted a violation of state law, 
but none of the penalties provided for therein were pursued. 
After the Complaint was filed in Osbornfs name Richins contacted 
Osborn, who did not know the action had £een filed in his name, 
and learned of the assignment of the judgment to Sampson. Upon 
filing a Motion to Dismiss because Osborn was not the real party 
in interest, Blackburn as counsel of record, moved to amend 
the Complaint and did so by showing Sampson as the plaintiff 
in an Amended Complaint filed March 11, 19$1. The Oregon judgment 
remained as the claim for relief for which a judgment was sought. 
Blackburn's stated reason to amend was that Sampson was in fact 
the assignee of the judgment. 
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15. Sampson failed to pay the remaining $20,000 due Osborn 
for the assignment and Osborn's attorney wrote Sampson saying 
if the money was not paid by April 23, the assignment would 
be rescinded and the judgment taken back. Sampson responded, 
saying they were then in the middle of a compromise settlement 
which he hoped would go through, as he would then have his money 
supply reopened and would take care of the obligation. On June 
9, 1981 Cramer sent Sampson a Revocation of Assignment of Judgment, 
reciting that the $40,000 had not been paid and so the assignment 
was void for failure of consideration and the judgment was reinstated 
in Osborn1s name. On June 17, 1981 $ampson replied, saying 
he was still working with Richins to resolve the matter and 
if not successful, they would have to work out some kind of 
arrangement. 
16. On December 31, 1981 Cramer wtfote Sampson, confirming 
his telephone report, that Osborn had had a sheriff's sale fore-
closing on his judgment on defendants1 interests in the Catlow 
Valley property, and as the only bidder, Osborn had bid $50,000 
at that sale. Cramer confirmed that Osborn would sell the judgment 
to Sampson for $45,000, plus the $20,000 payment made one year 
before, if payment were made by January 7, 1982. Sampson sent 
a check for $45,000 on January 29, 19$2, drawn on Sampson's 
PC Trust Account and directed that thd assignment be made to 
Milt Goff, Trustee. 
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17. The property sold to Osborn at the sheriff's sale 
was RFC's interest in its purchase of the Catlow Valley property 
from the Glenns and its resale to the partnerships, as well 
as any interest Richins and Richtron, Ihc. had in the property. 
On December 28, 1981 the county sheriff of Harvey County, Oregon, 
executed a certificate of sale on all the interests the defendants 
had in the land described therein, which description was the 
legal description of the Catlow Valley farms property for which 
Osborn was shown as having bid $50,000. The court confirmed 
the sale and on January 4, 1982, Osborn executed a warranty 
deed conveying said property interests to Milton R. Goff, Trustee, 
(c/o John Sampson) for a stated consideration of $65,000, subject 
to defendants' statutory rights of redemption. On March 2, 
1982, Cramer, as attorney for Osborn, executed an assignment 
of Osborn's judgment (as originally entered) to Goff as trustee 
(c/o Sampson) in consideration of $65,000, The $65,000 consisted 
of the $20,000 originally paid in January, 1981 and the $45,000 
sent by Sampson in January, 1982. 
The $45,000 was furnished by the following limited partners 
for the amounts shown and are the persons for whom Goff is trustee: 
Sawaya $ 2,646 
Boyer 2,969 
Simmons 914 
Condon 3,050 
Huber 5,569 
Gritton 2,959 
0 & M 28,882 (Goff & Kohler) 
E. F. Hutton 2,000 (for several partners) 
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Although the assignment was executed on March 2, 1982, 
the status of this case was not changed until December, 1982, 
when Blackburn withdrew as counsel. Attorney Handy, who officed 
with Sampson, filed an appearance and requested the court to 
substitute Goff, in his role as trustee, as party plaintiff. 
The court so ordered, but no Amended Complaint was ever filed 
reflecting the change in circumstances or for what amount Goff 
was seeking in the complaint. On February 23, 198 3 Sampson 
filed an appearance as co-counsel with Handy in this case. 
No mention was made in the assignment that Goff had been 
given a warranty deed from Osborn conveying all interests Osborn 
had acquired at the sheriff's sale of whatever interests Richins, 
Richtron, Inc. and/or RFC had in the Catlow Valley property. 
18. During the trial plaintiffs asserted that Osborn acquired 
at the sale RFC's right to receive money from the partnerships 
on the purchase of the farm properties from RFC and also whatever 
right RFC had in the buyer's role in the purchase of that property 
from the Glenns. I find that these were among the rights Osborn 
purchased at the sale and that they wetfe also included in the 
rights which Osborn conveyed to Goff by the warranty deed. 
Also, during the trial plaintiffs contend the purpose of 
this transaction was to preserve the property and protect the 
investment. But Osborn had no judgment Against the partnership 
nor a judgment lien against the partnership's interests in the 
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property. Any right Osborn acquired (and then conveyed to Goff 
by deed) to collect RFC's payments due from the partnerships 
had to take into consideration the Glenns1 right to be paid 
on their contract of sale to RFC or t0 repossess the property 
if not paid. If the plaintiffs1 concern was to preserve and 
protect the property, they could during 1981 have paid another 
$2 0,000 to Osborn and his judgment wc^ uld have been paid off 
as agreed, and would have offered no threat to the property. 
That not having occurred, under Osborn1s deed to Goff, Gcff 
could have asserted the right to receive the contract payments 
from the partnerships and make certain they were used to pay 
what was owed to the Glenns under th^ir contract. There was 
no evidence that this was done by Goff. During 1981 and 1982 
only $6,000 were paid to Glenn en a $00,000 contract balance. 
I thus find that the main purpose in paying Osborn $45,000 was 
not to protect the property, but to acquire an assignment of 
the judgment in the belief that the ba|lance due thereon would 
be sufficient to help persuade Richins to agree to a settlement 
that was more favorable to Sampson and hisi group. By then Sampson 
was asserting control over the partnerships — the legality 
of which will be considered elsewhere in the findings and conclusions 
— and a judgment against Richins and his companies would have 
enhanced Sampson's advantage in his adversary role against them. 
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19. Also, with respect to the Osborn judgment controversy, 
defendants asserted that since Sampson had represented them 
as counsel in various matters after June, 1980, including negoti-
ations with Osborn — findings with tfespect to which will be 
set out elsewhere — he had violated legal ethics standards, 
creating a constructive trust situation when he obtained the 
first assignment of the Osborn judgment as well as the second. 
As to the first assignment, I find that any trust created would 
have become moot when Osborn rescinded the assignment and re-entered 
his judgment. Defendants contend that the sums paid to obtain 
the $45,000 were recorded by Sampson as capital contributions 
to those advancing the money and that Sampson also listed the 
Osborn judgment as a partnership asset. Defendants contend 
the money used to pay Osborn did in fact belong to the partnership 
entities, and that the Osborn judgment, when assigned, became 
an obligation owed only by the partnerships and this was an 
obligation upon which only the partnerships could sue. But 
— as will appear elsewhere in these findings — neither Sampson, 
nor his PC, nor his Ag Management were ever legal general partner 
for any Catlow Valley (or other) partnerships and thus had no 
legal authority to make such decisions concerning partnership 
assets. The legal effect of illegal and invalid acts are determined 
by law and not by the wrongful assumption of (control over partnership 
assets by one who, though he may have believed he was acting 
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properly, was doing things he had no authority under the law 
to do. While Sampson's efforts on obtaining the assignment 
to Goff as trustee placed Sampson in violation of Section 78-51-27, 
he was not the assignee. Goff was, and Goff was not under that 
statutory prohibition, which applied bnly to lawyers, and the 
fact that Goff was acting under the illegal advice of counsel 
did not, in my opinion, create a constructive trust in favor 
of defendants and I so find. While Gof£ is named as a trustee 
as plaintiff, the fact is that he and Kohler owned 0 & M, and 
together put up the $2 8,000 out of company assets. These two 
were Sampson's original two clients in May, 1980, and had taken 
an active role in settlement negotiations. Under partnership 
agreements capital contributions were to be assessed upon a 
pro rata basis when assessed by a valid general partner, and 
I do not find the collections made to obtain the $45,000 constituted 
capital contributions. 
The provisions of Article VII (3) of the partnership agreement 
gives general and limited partners rights to possess an interest 
in other business ventures of every naturte and description inde-
pendently or with others, and owning an interest in a judgment 
against at least Richins or RFC would not Appear to be in conflict 
with this provision. 
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20. When Osborn received a certificate of sale from the 
sheriff following his bid of $50,000 f0r the property offered, 
he received compensation on his judgment of the amount of his 
bid. His bid was a payment on the judgment. As noted in the 
other document, under Oregon law a deficiency judgment need 
not be obtained if a judgment is not fully satisfied on execution 
sale. 
21. Another fact to be considered with respect to the 
Osborn judgment is how the first $20,000 paid to Osborn should 
be considered and treated. On the 13th and 20th of October, 
1981, Sampson and Richins discussed the Osborn judgment at which 
time Sampson told Richins Osborn's attorney, Cramer, had stated 
the $20,000 would be applied on the judgment. As already found, 
the assignment to Sampson upon payment of the $20,000 was illegal 
and contrary to law. The money paid was not Sampson's money, 
nor are any of the partners whose money was so used parties 
to this lawsuit asserting a claim thereto. It came from Catlow 
Valley limited partners and others, the payment of which would 
normally be entered in the partnership books as capital contribu-
tions. As such, it was funds over which the general partner 
should have had complete control. Osborn was willing to accept 
the $4 0,00 0 in full satisfaction of his $75,000 judgment. The 
$20,000 was given to Osborn because of the judgment. Sampson, 
in engineering the matter as he did, was seeking satisfaction 
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of the Osborn judgment and to rid th£ Catlow Valley partners 
of the problem created thereby, but he was trying to do so in 
a manner which he thought would satisfy Osborn, but preserve 
a claim against defendants for the face amount of the judgment. 
Sampson, in fact, admitted such intent. Had Osborn rescinded 
the assignment as he did for failure to pay the remaining $20,000 
and then sued on his judgment in the Utah court, he would, in 
my opinion, have been required to acknowledge that he had been 
paid $20,000 on his judgment and would hafve had his claim reduced 
by that amount. Are not defendants entitled to have the $20,000 
payment considered as a credit on the judgment, further reducing 
the deficiency by that amount? The capital contributions of 
partners used to make that payment were at that time partnership 
assets subject to the complete control of the general partner, 
Richtron, Inc., payment by whom would have been a credit on 
the judgment. I find that under the facts and circumstances 
of this case, the $20,000 was a credit that should be applied 
towards the total due on the judgment wjiich, together with the 
$50,000 credit, provides a $70,000 offset on the Osborn judgment. 
I find no reason why Goff and the beneficiaries of his trust 
should benefit from the $20,000 illegally paid by Sampson one 
year before. The judgment provided that interest on the judgment 
ran from May 20, 1980 at the rate of 13% on $27,683.17, 9% on 
the $30,000, and the legal rate on the attorney's fee of $18,000. 
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I find the $20,000 payment mailed January 23, 1981, should be 
credited on the amount bearing the highest interest rate. Using 
a 10% legal rate, I compute interest to May 30, 1986 to total 
$13,257.13, plus $1,557 per day on a deficiency of $5,683.13, 
or a total still owing as of May 30, 1966 of $18,875.26, should 
judgment be granted to plaintiffs. 
22. Goff and the limited partners for whom he serves as 
trustee in this case put up $45,000 to acquire something from 
Osborn. What did they get? First they got a warranty deed 
from Osborn transferring all of the defendants' assets in the 
Catlow Valley Farm Properties for which Osborn obviously was 
willing to bid at the sheriff's sale. Th£y also got an assignment 
of the Osborn judgment. The partners putting up the $45,000 
did not owe anything to Osborn. They had no obligation to pay 
any part of it. But they had a statutory right to lend money 
to and transact other business with the partnership, so advancing 
the $45,000 was not per se an illegal act (Section 48-2-13). 
The inferences are clear that Osborn wanted to be paid off on 
his judgment with money and would not have otherwise assigned 
the judgment over. Plaintiffs knew they had to pay off the 
judgment to obtain an assignment thereof. They were following 
Sampson's advice -- albeit given contrary to law — intending 
to utilize the judgment so assigned to get their own judgment 
against the defendants to use, no doubt, ^ s a weapon in Sampson's 
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ongoing conflicts with Richins. The issues do not leave us 
with a concern as to whether the $45,000 was paid to get the 
warranty deed or the assignment. No evidence was presented 
to show what use plaintiffs made of the interests conveyed by 
the warranty deed, Osborn's bid at the sheriff's sale fixed 
the legal consequences of that action, and defendants themselves 
made no effort to bid at the sheriff's sale. 
I do not see that the evidence establishes any unfair advantage 
to plaintiffs in connection with their obtaining an interest 
in the judgment insofar as Richins and RFC are concerned as 
they allege in their affirmative defense. Nor do I see that 
the plaintiffs acting upon the advice of counsel in obtaining 
an interest in the judgment as constituting improper conduct 
where the statutory law did not bar lay persons from acquiring 
such an assignment. So I find that the defense of estoppel 
on the grounds asserted by defendants in their Answer has not 
been proven by any preponderance of the evidence. 
23. In asserting various defenses commonly used in pleadings, 
such as estoppel, counsel frequently allege phraseology of one 
sort or another and suggest it constitutes such defense. This 
appears to have been done in this case. In Conclusion of law 
16 is set forth a statement of our Supreme Court as to the circum-
stances under which the doctrine of estoppel has application. 
In the evidence presented in this case I find none that could 
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be said to show by a preponderance thereof that Goff or those 
for whom he took as trustee did any act, made any misrepresentation, 
or engaged in any conduct, or remained silent when there was 
a duty to speak, that induced Richins to believe that certain 
facts existed on which Richins relied to his detriment. 
Richins individually, and as president of RFC, knew the 
legal consequences of the guaranty by them of the general partners1 
obligation to pay Osborn for his well drilling activities. 
They raise no defense that liability as to them did not arise 
under any guaranty agreement and indeed jfio evidence with respect 
to that agreement was ever tendered into evidence. Richins 
knew long before May 13, 1980 that the obligation to Osborn 
had not been paid, knew an action thereon had been filed, and 
knew that judgment had been entered on that date, and yet had 
in fact kept hidden from the Catlow Valley partners that such 
troubles confronted them. 
Richins knew of the assignment of the judgment to Sampson 
shortly after the action was filed under Osbornfs name on February 
11, 19 81, and yet, through stipulation, did not file an Answer 
to the Complaint until July 20, 1982. Richins learned of Goff's 
role as assignee by December, 1982, and of his substitution 
as plaintiff, but did not require Goff to file an Amended Complaint 
and did not raise as an estoppel defense any such conduct by 
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Goff when he filed his last amended pleading in this case on 
September 6, 1985. 
Also, Richins has raised no defense that his and RFC's 
liability for any deficiency was subject to exhausting of any 
collateral which came to Goff by Osborn14 warranty deed. Indeed, 
the absence of any information as to the content of the guaranty 
agreement, precludes speculation that any such defense might 
have been available to them. 
Thus, I find that neither Richins, nor RFC have proven 
any facts that constitute an estoppel of plaintiffs' claim against 
them for the remaining deficiency found to be due under the 
j udgment. 
24. Another element of defense as far as Richtron, Inc. as 
general partner is concerned comes to mind although not specifically 
alleged in the pleadings, but so evident in the evidence as 
to justify amending the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
if need be. I see an element of defense arising from the fact 
that as to the Complaint the limited partners are suing their 
general partner because they obtained an assignment of the Osborn 
judgment after it had been entered against their general partner. 
The partnership agreements bar limited partners from suing the 
general partner for losses resulting from errors in judgment 
or any acts or omissions not based upon willful misconduct or 
gross negligence. The entry of the Osborn judgment may not 
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have been a loss to the limited partners under the circumstances 
because it did not give rise to a judgment lien against partnership 
property, no£ did it create a personal liability against limited 
partners. The work out of which the obligation arose conferred 
a benefit upon the partnership property, for what farm is worth 
anything without water, and it was the general partner who engaged 
Osborn to do the work. Had the limited partners of Catlow Valley 
all paid all capital assessments made upon them by their general 
partner, the Osborn obligation may long before have been paid. 
But Richtron, Inc. omitted paying the Osborn obligation and 
the Osborn judgment was a significant If actor that the limited 
partners found disturbing in May, 1980. But from my review 
of all of the evidence the obligation went unpaid because funds 
that should have been available did not become so. Such evidence 
does not lend support to any finding that any loss to the limited 
partners, if one existed, was caused by reason of gross negligence 
or willful misconduct of the general partner and I so find that 
there was none. 
The partnership agreements state the general partner shall 
have full charge of the management, conduct and operation of 
the partnership affairs in all respects and in all matters. 
This certainly includes the control of lawsuits. In addition 
to precluding liability of the general partner to a limited 
partner as elsewhere noted, the partnership agreement also provides 
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that if the general partner shall be made a party to any action 
or proceeding by reason of the fact that it was a general partner 
of the partnership, the partnership shall and agrees to indemnify 
and hold harmless the general partner against any and all judgments, 
liabilities, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable 
expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee actually and 
necessarily incurred by it as a result of such action or proceeding 
if the general partner acted in good faith for a purpose for 
which it believed to be in the best interest of the partnership. 
(Article V (4)). But, again, a partnership is not a party to 
this action, and thus in this case the general partner is not 
entitled to such relief in this action. Partners, both general 
and limited, are members of a partnership, they are not the 
limited partnership which exists as a separate legal entity, 
but a limited partner suing a general partner about a partnership 
matter or obligation is committing an act contrary to the spirit 
and letter of the partnership agreement and I so find. 
25. With respect to the Osborn judgment transaction Sampson 
by letter of March 17, 1982 advised the Catlow Valley investors 
that by so using the $45,000, $28,000 of which he said was paid 
by Goff and Kohler, the Richtron interests in their property 
were purchased from Osborn for that amount and defendants had 
until December 17, 1982 to redeem it for $50,000. He did not 
say that if the property was not so redeemed, the sale became 
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final and the bid and resulting transfer of property interests 
entitled the defendants to a $50,000 Credit upon the judgment 
liability. Counsel for defendants suggested at trial that the 
RFC equity in its purchase contract With Glenn was $190,000; 
that in RFC's sale of the Glenn property to the partnerships 
it had an income flow of $175,000 (as Set out in Richins1 memo 
of May 30, 1980) and that based upon Richins valuation schedule 
as of June, 1980, the fair market value of the Catlow Valley 
Farms was at least two million dollars (although such value 
was set at $360,327 in the bankruptcy schedule with total debts 
as fixed by Richins reaching $995,633). Thus, says defense 
counsel, the property had an equity of at least $385,000, that 
Osborn got such a bargain for his $50,000 bid that the conscience 
of the court should be so shocked as to render the sale invalid. 
One wonders how much mark-up is in the alleged $190,000 and 
how much of the alleged income flow was flowing in, and how 
much is the equity figure inflated. The judgments; the unpaid 
debts, particularly on the sprinkler system equipment; the unpaid 
assessments concerning which Richins did Nothing over an extended 
period of time; the unsuccessful operation of the property as 
farms; the serious discontent of the investors; the failure 
to submit reports required in the agreement; Richins1 expressed 
willingness at the May 29, 1980 meeting to step out as general 
partner of Catlow Valley partnerships so the partners could 
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put someone in as general partner in whom they had more confidence; 
his failure to press for settlement of the Osborn judgment for 
$26,000 and attorney's fees as first offered by Osborn; his 
failure to bid at the sheriff's sale; or to redeem the property 
from sale during the year following the sale; all add up to 
a sufficient easing of the Court's conscience to make a finding 
that the sale should not be invalidated for the suggested reasons. 
26. In his letter of March 17, 1982, in which Sampson 
set forth the details of the acquisition of defendants' property 
at the sheriff sale, he advised Catlow Valley investors that 
$110,000 was owed in bills, $400,000 was owed to the Glenns, 
$700,000 was owed to Valmont, but it had agreed to accept $450,000, 
and that Sampson thought the property could be sold for $1-1/2 
million. Sampson said that a new partnership was to be formed 
and that any investor could come in by paying past assessments 
in full and come in pro-rata on current cash contributions currently 
paid and their existing capital contributions in former Catlow 
Valley partnerships. Sampson said 33 investors owed $135,182 
and that a meeting had been set for March 20, 1982, and those 
not in attendance would lose all, from which the Court finds 
that Sampson was continuing to exercise control over the various 
partnerships with an increasing assertion of authority. 
27. In summary from the foregoing findings, I find that 
a deficiency exists on the Osborn judgment in the amounts set 
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forth in Finding of Fact 21 in favor of plaintiffs and against 
Richins individually and RFC, but for the reasons set forth 
in Finding of Fact 24 I find the issues on plaintiffs1 Complaint 
in favor of Richtron, Inc. and against the plaintiffs of no 
cause of action. But entry of judgment against Richins and 
RFC must await a ruling in this decision on the counterclaim 
asserted by Richins and RFC against Goff and the named limited 
partners for whom he is trustee. 
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM 
As I have previously noted the defendants' claims for relief 
are set forth in their Second Amended Counterclaim which was 
not filed until September 6, 1985. Two prior Counterclaims 
had been filed, the first on July 20, 1982 when defendants first 
filed a responsive pleading to plaintiffs' Complaint, which 
had been filed on February 11, 1981. Defendants filed an Amended 
Counterclaim on September 1, 1982. This trial began January 
27, 19 8 6 and thus it can be seen that defendants' claims for 
relief set forth in their Second Amended Counterclaim were asserted 
less than five months before trial. Counsel for plaintiffs 
raised no objection to such late amendment of the pleadings, 
promptly filed a responsive pleading and were ready for trial 
when the trial date arrived. As with the findings and conclusions 
on the plaintiffs' Complaint, so here, because of the extensive 
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nature of the record, I believe it necessary to include in the 
findings and conclusions comments which, while they may appear 
as comments on the evidence or facts and circumstances related 
to the particular finding or conclusion under consideration, 
may also nevertheless explain or clarify the facts or conclusions 
reached which, in turn, hopefully will justify the extended 
comments on those findings and conclusions. 
The defendants set forth general averments relating to 
the parties which were previously identified at the beginning 
and will not be related here, except as such may be helpful. 
The names of 2 5 limited partnerships are set out as mentioned 
many times in the Summation, before which partnerships were 
created at various dates between October 15, 1973, and March 
1, 1980 in which Richtron, Inc. or its then subsidiary/ Richtron 
General, acted as the sole general partner of each respective 
limited partnership. 
Limited partnership agreements were prepared for each separate 
entity, provided in general terms for the purchase by various 
properties of the various partnerships for development and/or 
resale for the benefit of each limited partnership and the particular 
investors therein. The terms of the 25 partnership agreements 
were substantially identical. 
In my Memorandum and Summation submitted as a separate 
document herewith, I have set forth under separate headings 
information contained in the limited partnership agreement which 
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I believed would have a bearing on the relevant facts and circum-
stances of this case, the contents of which I will incorporate 
herein by this reference to avoid needless repetition. However, 
some of the provisions of the agreement set forth therein may 
be repeated in my comments, findings or conclusions on the counter-
claim issues, and I will do so because of the relevancy thereof 
to the matter being considered. 
Also in that document I have included a section discussing 
what I considered to be sections of the State Limited Partnership 
Statutes which I believed would have relevant use and application 
to the issues of this case. Here, also, I incorporate that 
section as a part hereof by this reference with the same caveat 
that I may further discuss them in my comments. 
The Counterclaim sets forth six claims for relief which 
I will try to briefly summarize with the expectation that more 
details thereof will be considered when I consider the findings 
and conclusions that may have a bearing thereon. While this 
may be repetitious to my summary of the pleadings set forth 
in the other document, I believe it will state and help to keep 
in mind the issues that were to be tried. 
The first claim alleges that from about June 11, 1980 until 
about October 7, 1981 Sampson acted as legal counsel for defendants, 
who in the first claim are identified as Richins, Richtron, 
Inc., Richtron General and RFC, in various stated matters but 
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also undertook to represent partners and partnerships in matters 
adverse to defendants; endeavored to obtain interests in various 
enumerated judgments or debts owed by defendants for the purpose 
of using them to defendants' detriment; utilized confidential 
information received while representing defendants to their 
detriment; alleging that all such conduct constituted conflicts 
of interests, fraudulent attempts to injure defendants, breach 
of fiduciary duty and trust on which the attorney/client relation 
is based, and gross overreaching. It is in this first claim 
that defendants assert a claim for relief against Goff and the 
beneficiaries of his trust, asserting that Goff's acquisition 
of an interest in the Osborn judgment and their manifest intent 
to acquire an interest against the general partner to whom they 
as limited partners allegedly owed a fiduciary duty constituted 
a conflict of interest, a fraudulent attempt to injure defendants, 
gross overreaching and a breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants 
allege that as a direct and proximate result of plaintiffs' 
conduct, including Sampson's, defendants had suffered damages 
and injury of a character and amount to be ascertained at trial. 
They also allege malice and bad faith for which they seek $1,000,000 
in punitive damages. 
Defendants in their second claim for relief allege Sampson, 
in addition to the allegations made under the first claim, while 
legally representing defendants and after, failed to timely 
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or in any manner prepare or file responsive pleadings on defendants' 
behalf with respect to certain civil complaints filed by third 
parties against them and certain limited partnerships, and thereby 
breached his duty to them with respect to an attorney/client 
relation in that he failed to exercise that degree of reasonable 
care or skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members 
of the legal profession; that he acted far beyond the scope 
of his expressly and impliedly delegated duties; and that he 
utilized confidential information acquired during his course 
of representation of defendants to his own unfair personal advantage, 
for which they seek damages of a character and in an amount 
to be ascertained at trial. (At trial defendants abandoned 
their third claim for relief). 
In their fourth claim for relief defendants incorporated 
prior allegations and asserted that by reason thereof and by 
reason of conduct included in this claim, Sampson, knowingly, 
intentionally and maliciously interfered with and invaded Richins1 
right to earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership 
interests; and with Richtron's ability to effectively discharge 
the general partner duties and functions imposed upon it by 
the limited partnership agreements and by law; and further interfered 
with defendants1 existing contractual relationships, anticipated 
opportunities for employment and/or beneficial economic expectan-
cies. The additional alleged wrongful conduct of Sampson which 
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defendants assert as grounds for this' claim involve Sampson's 
wrongful endorsement of two Blackfoot Farms checks and delivery 
thereof to Clark Wangsgard and the fact that between June, 1980, 
and November, 1981, Sampson solicited an4 received capital contri-
butions, assessments and other monies in an amount of at least 
$702,000 from numerous limited partners of various partnerships, 
the specific details as to name, partnership, date and amounts 
of which are all set forth. Defendants allege Sampson converted 
at least $670,000 of these monies to ltiis own use and benefit. 
Defendants further allege that since November, 1982, Sampson 
has solicited and received from partners additional monies rightfully 
belonging to defendants and assert tliey are entitled to have 
a constructive trust or equitable lieift against such monies on 
the products or proceeds thereof. Other than two or three specific 
items, defendants do not set forth in thife claim what uses Sampson 
allegedly made of such funds, assertimg generally their claim 
of damages of a character and in an Amount to be determined 
at trial, together with $1,000,000 in punitive damages. 
In the fifth claim for relief defendants allege that between 
June 14, 1980 and January 15, 1981, the general partners withdrew 
as general partners of 2 4 named limited partnerships, thereby 
causing a dissolution of each partnership in accordance with 
Section 48-2-20 of our Code, and placing defendants under an 
obligation to wind up and terminate eacli partnership and settle 
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their accounts. They allege that nothwithstanding these statutory 
obligations, Sampson had unlawfully continued to manage and 
operate the limited partnerships by purporting to act as successor 
general manager, and has deliberately interfered with the rights 
of defendants to properly wind up partnership affairs, and have 
substantially damaged limited partnership assets by inducing 
limited partners to transfer the assets to a newly formed entity 
known as Western Farms, whose sole purpose is to receive all 
such assets; have commingled crop proceeds and assets of all 
the partnerships; have purchased and attempted to purchase judgments 
and debts of third parties against the limited partnerships 
and defendants; and have converted partnership assets to their 
own use and excluded defendants therefrom for winding up and 
termination; for which defendants seek ai* accounting with respect 
to all dealings with such assets and damages as may be established 
by such accounting. 
In their sixth claim for relief defendants assert by reason 
of all conduct alleged in the other claims they have received 
irreparable injury for which there is no adequate legal remedy 
and thus seek injunctive relief. 
In their response to defendants1 claims as set forth in 
their Second Amended Counterclaim plaintiffs generally deny 
each and every allegation and assert as affirmative defenses: 
(1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
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which I summarily rule upon as having no merit; (2) barred by 
illegal, inequitable and malicious conduct; (3) (goes to defamation 
claim which was abandoned); (4) laches; (5) waiver; (6) estoppel; 
(7) breaches of duty and trust; (8) a combination and conspiracy 
to defraud the limited partners; and (9) unjust enrichment from 
the limited partners for which defendants are barred from seeking 
relief from plaintiffs. 
As I have stated elsewhere, the Counterclaim is almost 
completely an assertion of claims against Sampson. Neither 
the limited partners of the partnerships nor the partnerships 
are parties to this action, and I view it beyond the scope of 
this case for me to consider issues involving the partners and 
partnerships or any rights or obligations they may have against 
or to the general partners or other defendants. A discussion 
of relationships and duties and obligations existing between 
the general and limited partners and the partnerships may be 
a basis of comment in my summary of findings and conclusions 
on the Counterclaim issues, but in no way are my rulings in 
here intended to determine rights or obligations of those not 
parties to this action. In his opening statement counsel for 
defendants stated the evidence would show what happened to each 
partnership. I note a paucity of evidence with respect to what 
happened to the partnerships, their investors, the farm properties, 
and debts and obligations owed by them or the general partners. 
2074 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -35- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Of necessity, specific findings of fact relevant to the 
issues involved will require comments of evidence leading to 
a basis for facts as found. Hopefully, such comments can be 
minimized and I can only endeavor to do so as my ability may 
allow. It should be remembered that in my prior comments regarding 
plaintiffs1 Complaint that I said that findings as to one side 
may have application to the other. If that occurs, I hope to 
do so without unnecessary repetition. My consideration of the 
issues raised in the various claims for rdlief will not necessarily 
be treated in the same order in which they are alleged in the 
Counterclaim. Numerical numbering of findings will continue 
on from those numbers in the findings on the Complaint. 
FINDINGS OF FACT RE: COUNTERCLAIM 
28. In the general findings set tforth at the outset, the 
dates upon which the respective pleadlings were filed are set 
out. Notwithstanding the fact, as shoWn by the evidence, that 
Sampson's activities with respect to partnership affairs began 
immediately after the May 29, 1980 meeting with Catlow Valley 
partners, defendants pleading seeking permanent injunctive relief, 
as requested in their sixth claim, wa|s not filed until July 
20, 1982, almost 18 months after this action was filed. Thereafter, 
other than continuing asking for injunctive relief in the Counter-
claim, the record does not reflect an^ affirmative action in 
the Court seeking a restraining order or preliminary injunctive 
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relief against Sampson up to the time of trial at which no evidence 
of any need for present injunctive relief was presented. Generally, 
it can be said that at trial neither side produced any evidence 
as to what finally happened with respect to the partnerships 
or their properties other than Richins' schedule showing foreclosure 
dates. Upon closing argument defense counsel stated that Sampson 
and twelve people ended up with all the Richtron assets, but 
I have carefully searched the record in vain for evidence to 
support that statement. I have no evidence before the Court 
that shows any partnership activities u#on which any injunctive 
relief can be based. 
29. Defendants1 allegations under their first claim relate 
to a claim that for a period of about 16 months beginning in 
June, 1980, Sampson represented defendants as counsel in various 
cases affecting partnership matters, and nevertheless undertook 
to represent interests adverse to defendants to their injury. 
Sampson claims to have only represented individual limited partners. 
He first got involved in the partnership affairs in May, 1980, 
when he, as counsel for Goff and Kohler, first questioned Richins 
about Catlow Valley partnerships in which t^ hose two had an interest, 
and then appeared with them as their counsel at a meeting of 
Catlow Valley partners held on May 29, 1980. His actions there 
were a bit more than just privately courtseling his two clients, 
for he not only orally recommended to those at the meeting and 
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got started the movement to have RFC f'ile for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 11 proceedings, but he also expressed the legal opinion 
to all present that he did not think RFfc could keep the mark-up 
equity arising from RFC's resale of the farm property to the 
Catlow Valley partnerships for an amount in excess of what it 
paid for it, which was a theme which Sampson repeatedly expressed 
in the months and years ahead. Whil0 these comments are not 
found as constituting a representation Of defendants as counsel 
at this time, it began a series of negotiations to carry out 
a scheme he had suggested to Richins the very next day — that 
of Sampson and his clients buying out all of the Richtron interests 
in the 25 partnerships. 
During the month of June, 1980, Sampson pressed this matter 
up to and at a meeting held on June 26, 1980, of limited partners 
with substantial interests at which tjoth Richins and Sampson 
were in attendance. Prior to the meeting Sampson called Richins, 
said he desired to attend the meeting, stating he would rally 
support for Richins, but not unless Ricthins agreed to sell out 
to him and his group on their terms anc} allow him to take full 
control. Although Sampson's right to be at the meeting was 
questioned by one investor, Sampson said he was there to advise 
Goff and Kohler about their investment, and speaking further 
at Kohler!s request, Sampson stated that in his opinion the 
basic problem was mismanagement; said that the investors would 
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be very angry about Richins claiming a return for advances; 
that if given a list of 40 of the largest investors, he would 
contact them and get $60,000; that he wanted a power of attorney 
to vote the Richtron stock; and that he thought $650,000 at 
12% interest was a fair price to buy out the Richtron interests. 
Richins requested a recess to think itj: over during which time 
Sampson and Kohler intruded upon Richins, and after a heated 
discussion, Sampson said the settlement would be $650,000 at 
13% or nothing. Richins told Sampson it was none of his business, 
as he was not a limited partner. Kohler then convinced Sampson 
the offer should be $700,000 which was agreed upon when the 
meeting reconvened. Richins said he wanted David Day, his attorney, 
to draft the settlement agreement. These facts to this point 
do not establish the allegations of defendants under their first 
claim, but are important facts becausie what occurred at the 
meeting constituted a basic foundation and understanding of 
events that followed in the months and years ahead, as well 
as leading up to facts concerning an attorney/client relation 
between Sampson, Richins and his companions. For at that meeting 
Richins said he anticipated that durifrg the drafting time on 
the agreement a couple of creditors may file a lawsuit, to which 
Sampson told Richins to send him the complaints and he would 
answer and stall them off. Sampson then further stated that 
once the settlement agreement was consummated, he would like 
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to take over as legal counsel for Richtron, for which expressed 
desire he obtained the support of the investors at the meeting 
over Richins1 objections. 
30. Shortly after the June 26, 1980 meeting the first 
meeting of creditors on the RFC bankruptcy proceedings was held. 
Sampson and Richins were there and together they had separate 
discussions with Glenn, the original owner of the Catlow Valley 
Farms property, the payments on which were in substantial default; 
with Osborn about his judgment; and with attorney Knov/les, who 
represented Valmont, who had a very large contract balance owing 
for sprinkling equipment purchased for the Catlow Valley Farms 
payments on which were delinquent, who stated Valmont and its 
Chicago bank were pressing for payment. 
31. While the certainty of the existence of an attorney/client 
relation between Sampson and Richins during discussions with 
Glenn, Osborn and Knowles was by no means clear, Sampson soon 
became involved in handling certain legal matters for Richins 
and his company. Attorney George Mangan of Roosevelt, Utah 
wrote concerning payments for farm property due his clients, 
the Feltons, then in default by one of the partnerships, and 
also concerning the release of a portion of Young Farms sold 
to Mangan1s clients, the Macks. Sampson got involved with Mangan 
in handling these claims for Richins and his companies. 
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r i t t e n s t i p u l a t i o n which Sampson s i g n e a ^ a t t o r n ^ : ^ i 
u**cse d e f e n d a n t s , 
34 . (:i in i Il II in I v" II ' . i t o r n e y Davi d Gi l 1 pt4- ~ h i m s e l f 
an i n v e s t o r who had beer, r e q u e s t e r r -. e r i : / . Val .PV n a r t n e r s 
a t t e n d i n g t h e May •-9 ' "" ~ -* 
1
 "-.MI I r n n ' in | I 11 -. i s. *•' t„. .* . t . . ,«* . ^  - p ^ i r e . , ^ ^ ^ . *-. 
M i n t e r - W i l s o n judgment e n t e r d Apjm . * : abo ,t i\ 
o n, w h i c h C a t- "1 o w ^ ! a 1 * * • - r o TO e r t y had h -- *  
SLI ! in II H I . II in in -I. , I n i :. . .: 
was redeemed by the Glenn -seks late: *-o*-- ^ ~ 
a COpy 0f the report tu D«) V -
•J 
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. ,^_: "n Qayinq he a n t ^ ^ d t e d 
. p a n : - i : i . i : : ; ] e s .:or;t i i t -u tec r„y u : r e r s and p a i d >;. l e t t e 
,^ss Y-- ~ fr^x wouia ue uu ; 
. „ _ - - a r ^ j s o n s e n t » -r. . i i 
V a l l e y i n v e s t o r s r e q u e s t i n g t . i e i r * r e s e n t ~* " r ^ August 5 r* *=-*" -*: 
a n ? ^ 3 f c ' 
n e e a e a immedia te*-
At t-.e Augus** . , I9.l:r: "seating trie ralmont a c t i c i \*-- ~*-i * ^^ed 
aiiu w * a rned c 
a n v ,
 l r , . . n t S t o Lu i* . t h e m v . ^ c . - J . L , . : e t 
:.T.U a n s w e i t . .^ _e d i d n o t want any R i c i i t r o n p a r t n e r s h i p ^ i t i jc i t^w:* 
^5 , . . i v / . r ^ comply ing w i t v l a r p s c r , ' s 
d i r e c t i o n , g a v e Sampson f i v e * l a w s u i t s - - t . t l e d A-* - ^ r v i c e s 
again**-
Grange ^liwsnone l-a^ia^ -i-.c w -ngsgar : 3iv"r::rcn ; 
i S a n p s ; , ^ J . : answer a * • * - "* a ^ t i r - -
w o 
ae* ::. : , $15,0C paviutnt t ; ,en s u t i r / ; . e s c : ^ 
*•' B3,; * ; ' •* c*a ~  t s *•-;""* n - ** i udc*^ p^** c. 
A s i u - ' L -
two ciiecivfa made p a ^ ^ B i a c k f o o t Farms and Wangsgard, one 
on ui abou t Decembet : 580 f o r $12,H60, ind nnp nn Apri J 11 
I fJM 1 l i 111 ) |.n,ii i r SHI J "HI ni k i I 
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de I iveioi.l t.lium l..u Wanqsccar'l T- ' +"1,° knowledge or consent 
of Richtron, the general partner evidence shows that Sampson 
i * 
u q . . s -
E j U U w * 4. ' * J i 
L e t : . e s e n t Sampson .* che rK f ^ r 
:
 i 11 r 
r -ir s a i d f a r m s =SM we:» b e r e l e a s e 1 
- d l i O w 
he i t - t-.ar.cr * * i 
t h e i r a r r a ; ^ L « ^ . 
* c * u s i v e l y 
cjs a ^ p ^ ; " ^ +*ner 
r ;p* -. i , s r s e d 
l u i h 
I *- >•_ R i c h t r 
g a v e "* -
B a n k 
*, r a y F i r s ^ T h r i f t L e a b a n t a l l e y 
- r - - » l l e r - * - + - o r e ^ . S a m r s o n 
h e 
.*, . *a; J I I . r a y i n g ^ ^ es t *: r s ' nor.ey 
i * t h e i r . r t e r e s t . Lew - .-»v^ a i e e • - ,«•,,
 r . r ^ ^ « e 
LO x\ iCf i t i .<- . 5« - ; '.a;':.:< 
a s ^ a V p r a s c a n ^ c ~,< <-,.- j i . t i ~.v o Sampson , wmc:r d o c u m e n t s 
S a m p s o n K e p t ana r e f u s e - ; t , t a, - o-i r-v* <• ~c- * - n u q h 
~ *•? a a e s t e i j p 
-. . - ^ \ o .1 no : * i l i z e d b e l o n g i n g 
t D ' inot :> ' a r t n e r s h i K ., *~^ - ^ i ^ ' * - "ison 
may den" t 'pp? I'• c»on t" eel f 111 , 11 • v t L d i n I > a i:i i d a s 
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i nut,->t-I I I '•.'iiitioui.1 iiMiyiiiy ,. I, l a L i c h t r o n , I n c . ... 
g a t i o n . 
38 , on S e p t e m b e r II I 9 8 0 Sampson wont wi t l i II-1 11 In i n , In 
mi leu t i mi iij.1 r e i; u i J 1™ at i *»e ol hi 11 11 u i r n e r r e g a r d i n g Rich L i o n , 
l n c . ' s d e l i n q u e n c y on an e q u i p m e n t c o n t r a c t , They t o i n nim 
t h e compromise aqreement ca I 1 eri f-i pr/nTiimif I I In 0»»i MI WI « i 
" i i ' i i j l ' i H ' U I i , l i "J |J«.' ,'ineii1 a t t h i s t ime bough1 M'^noe lves 
some more time on this obligation, 
1C) In '* epf ember I inn i l l n i i n , I i in Rnion Minir ,' oimpni HI 
r e g a r d i n g n l i c i i L i o n o b l i g a t i o n on I In-.1 Rand ie t t -PCA c o n t r a c t . 
Sampson was t o rjot- s i x loan a g r e e m e n t s and n o t e s s i g n e d hy s i x 
p a r t n e r s and t h n i 1 w i v ,j » Ramf s • " '" 
as . Lclitron payme;, . . . ,^ .* 1-« 'e p a y a b l e t o PCA and s i g n e d 
Din "Sampson's a t t o r r t • * a c c o u n t . 
4 0 , i in n in i I In ,u j n JUJH i MI I in i«} ni i 
s e n t a t i o n n R i c l K . v
 4 Sampson , W i t n e s s Smolka c o n f i r m e d 
Gi l L e t t e r s t e s t i m o n y and w i t n e s s ! .1MM t e s t i f i e d i ' MC< h i s 
r e c o l l e c t i o n inropni mi W I n toi i v\i Ml I I In I1 i lit* i m DIU|I m ,MS 
I 11 h e l p i n i i f J q at i u-n . 
4 1 . Some of t h e f a c t s a l r e a d y s e t f o r t h and many of thnae 
t h a t wi ] l f o l l o w do ami iu i i I Mippni I tin fetid iiil « i iml MIM iiin » 
'i h i' tjjf ii J l i h s t a n d i n q such a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p Sampson 
d i d i n f a c t u n d e r t a k e I u r e p r e s e n t p a r t n e r s and p a r t n e r s h i p s 
i n m a t t e r s a d v e r s e tn defendant* mil i I i in i 11111 n lei it i ji 1 i in I UJ* in. 11 jmn 
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in n u n c 1111 unjhi HI in IMI I I I unrnh J y \u I nu i i do t L ijiiunt , and cb t axued 
i n t e r e s t s a d v e r s e t o d e f e n d a n t s , muich \*I t h e Osbor'n il u I intent 
and used i t a g a i n s t thpm mhr a l l pqaf i ons t h a t Sampson pndt . / • 1 
I i | l in in im i il IM in |ii I jiiieiil.-j, 'Lit inn v d e b t s a g a i n s t le 1 u i d a n t s 
d o e s not: give* q r o u n d s f o r " e l i P t > lien sn "h e f f o r t s were not 
s u c c e s s f u l and d e f e n d a n t s havo provnn nu i r 11 u i ^ , h,1 i pa sun tin roni 
Based upon I In.' i c n e g c i n i j , J i n n I Illicit IMI .1 p e r i o d ol t i m e 
in 1980- and in v a r i o u s m a t t e r s rim, r , i , , e s c i t e d , Sampson did 
r e p r e s e n t t h e d e f e n d a n t s in an a t t o r n e y / ' M ill n- ' 11 
1
 ', i i bubsequen1 .itl . MIC n oppos ing d e t e n d a n t i j , jh 1 in some 
r e s p e c t s u t i l i z i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e had o b t a i n e d from surh 
r e l a t i o n s h i p aq-i i n s t dpfendin* •• '^ MHJM, n 1 n:»tu'h'.jd +' < h' id-n ' 
in 1 1 Mi in in in ijuide (in I c o n t r o l t lm conduc t of counse l But 
such a b r e a c h when a l l e g e d a s a c l a im fo r r e l i e f r e q u i r e s proof 
by
 t\ p r e p o n d e r a n c e nf tin < vi ipnci " " (1«1 n- ir I * * s uu,,i 1 
l Hereby JIM i'i in I 1 I l.hal IN I he f i r s t ; c l a i m t o r r e i s e r d e f e n d a n t s 
a l l e g e d t h a t a l l sue h c o n d u c t c o n s t i t u t e d c o n f l i c t s v n t e r e s t s , 
f r a u d u l e n t a t t e m p t s I o i n j 11 n-» IIM f f- ml 1 in 1 in 1 
I -i J 1 L 1 u I 11 i I i 1 In 1 ii lii uf I i d u c i a r y du ty and t r a s t Anic:-, ~:-e 
a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t r e l a t i o n i s b a s e d and a r o s - e r r e a c h i n g . 
Whatever p h r a s e i s i t t a c r 
o I |J 1 1 HI i I 11 I 1 n 111 1 1 JI . j i n a g e s iw-. j.i.b v. ; e r p r e s e , : . 
such matters as allow. r;n ic-fau. ia:r,er.ts - enters- ^ * 
constitute iniurv ma -
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,r ,i i") a i n s I i in mi "i J -I i mi "I 1 1 I ii in ii iii» -i" "> 1 1 1 i n < i " ' | >'" •" i I "i in •' ' I i | 11 <»i'id 111.11 11;, iS i , i n i p s o n 
would noire properly arise under defendants1 second claim for 
relief against him, Ac to the Osborn judgment, Kichins, ^irhtron, 
I i in in i Il III' I I in I i I  in i i t \ n 1 i I mi I I i i ( ( d ' | 1 1 11" I I -I i I I f i n I I ' I ' I i S O L I d t e S , 
inut Sampson . rhuu . t h e showing of <m a t t o r n e y / c l i e n t - r e l a t i o n 
and some-1 b reach t h e r e o f , s t a n d i n q a l o n e tlo< « not q i v p t h e c o u r t 
spi-oif in i i I ill III i nil! in MIII in III in iwtiil id monetary damages may 
be made a q a m s t Sampson. 
Howevoi , such c o n d u c t IIMH*- c o n s t i t u t e in p a r t t h e t y p e 
nil!" I'lirniin if I |IIIII Willi Ii i In 1 lendfiiiiil s an* IISM <i t uiq a c l a i m t o r r e l i e f 
under t h e n t o u r t n claim,, innl ^i»i"*« ' " T . ».. i - •] =um i s r e s t a t e d 
a s i pa r t n f t h e f o u r t h c 1 a i in * t ,' u oamps oim men ( i <, 1111 •«1 
J i ' L i . ' i 11 Mi i i . i1 11 I '" - I i . v: . oi*:ion and c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of t h e f o u r t h c l a i m . 
a? it "^ "» + h* f i r s t c l a i m ^f +•(• r* > ' m " \ "" J| 
def eni I iii 11 i -sot I I I i i 1 11 in lot r e l i e t a y j i n s L Goff and t h o s e 
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s named in t h e t i t l e loi ylhiiuii iloff w«i Irii'.tH*-
The c l a i m i s t h a t by t h o s e p l a i n t i f f s " icqn i s i f i nn Ih1, i s s i liniment" 
of I In I In ii n j iiiJqiiiHiil
 ( I hu'j ;.sliowed a main tos t i n t e n t t o a c q u i r e 
an i n t e r e s t a g a i n s t t h e i r g e n e r a l p a r t n e r , R i c h t r o n , Tnc, t o 
whom t h e y , ao l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s , owed I f i d u c i a l , 1I111I , , iml III I 
; I 1 I i in i ii II ion I i u n f i i c t ol i n t e r e s t , .1 1 r a u a u l e n t 
a t t e m p t I, i n j u r e d e f e n d a n t s and a b r e a c h of f i d u c i a r y d u t y , 
As I n t h e s e p l a i n t i f f s and Sampson dpfpnrlAiil •• 11 k 1 M m! ,1 , 
ci d.i.rec'i nn-.1 pioox n n a t e r e s u l t o l t h e a l l e g e d f r a u d u l e n t and 
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unethical conduct, defendants have suf'fered injury and damages 
of a character and in an amount to be ascertained at trial. 
Defendants also assert a punitive damage claim of $1,000,000 
against plaintiffs for what defendants allege was conduct actuated 
by malice and bad faith. 
The Osborn judgment was against Richins, Richtron, Inc. and 
RFC and its acquisition could not and did not constitute any 
injury to Richtron General or Frontier upon which any claim 
for relief can be asserted and I so find4 
43. As set forth in Finding of Fact t24, plaintiffs' relation-
ship with their general partner, Richtron, Inc. was not identical 
to or the same as their relationship tq Richins or to RFC, for 
although Richins was president of these two Richtron companies, 
his office gave him no special rights or claims to, or duties 
from, the limited partners. The latterfs rights, duties and 
obligations arise from statutory law and from agreements in 
the partnership certificate not in conflict with law. RFC's 
contract on the sale of the farm property Was with the partnership, 
not the limited partners, and Section 48-2-1 states the limited 
partners, as such, shall not be bound by the obligations of 
the partnership. Wherein lies Richin£' and RFC's claim for 
relief against these plaintiffs? The evidence established no 
fiduciary duty as to the Osborn judgmjent between plaintiffs 
and Richins or RFC. Acquisition of thel judgment does not show 
2U3o 
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a conflict of interest, breach of fiduciary duty nor a fraudulent 
attempt by these plaintiffs to injure those defendants. There 
was no pleading of such alleged fraud with particularity, nor 
is the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence 
met by the evidence. What character of injury by Goff was estab-
lished by the evidence? Other than defending against the Goff 
claim I find none. Neither Richins nor RFC produced any evidence 
that they were injured by the assignment of the judgment to 
Goff, which carried only the deficiency owing therein. They 
both had liability as guarantors on the judgment and the assignment 
to Goff did not increase their liability above the deficiency 
that remained. Osborn proceeded according to law and when his 
judgment against Richins, Richtron, Inc. and RFC remained unsati-
sfied, he was entitled to levy upon and sell at sheriff's sale 
whatever interests those three defendants had in the Catlow 
Valley partnership properties. The sale was not a sale of the 
farm real estate, but only of whatever interests the defendants 
had therein. 
RFC had an interest in the real property because it had 
solD the Catlow Valley property to those respective partnerships 
under an installment sale contract. Furthermore, RFC was a 
limited partner in three partnerships - Catlow Valley Farms 
#2 ($7911) and #6 ($2301) and Richfield Farms ($20,960.50). 
In September, 1982, Marilyn Brown sent incomplete partnership 
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returns for 1980 to the IRS and the statue tax commission showing 
Ag Management as general partner for ^ach of the seven Catlow 
Valley partnerships. Attached were forms containing the name 
and capital interest of each limited partner. The return for 
#2 showed RFC was a limited partner with a capital account of 
$7f911 and that for #6 showed RFC's Capital account in it as 
$2,301. Section 42-2-18 states that a limited partner's interest 
in the partnership is personal property. Thus, I find that 
RFC's limited partnership interests were not affected by the 
sale. The real property is the asset OJ6 the partnership entity, 
not that of the limited partners. RFC's contract interest as 
seller of the real property would have been included in its 
interests sold in the sheriff's sale. 
Richtron Inc.'s interest was that of a general partner. 
It also had a limited partnership interest in Pleasant Valley 
Farms in the amount of $4222.50. On July 23, 1981, Marilyn 
Brown telephonically advised Richins th4t while assessing other 
limited partners in Pleasant Valley, she had not sent an assessment 
to Richtron for its portion as a limited partner because she 
believed Richtron would not have paid it, aind that she had pro-rated 
Richtronfs portion to the other limited partners. Its right 
to continue on as general partner was ndt affected by the sale, 
for it existed by reason of Richtron'$ partnership agreements 
with the partnerships. The Osborn judgment was a money judgment. 
The assignment to Goff on March 2, 1982, as$igned only the judgment. 
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The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff on December 
28, 1981, stated the judgment and decree of foreclosure commanded 
him to sell all the interests which the defendant had on May 
13, 1980, and all the interest which the defendants had thereafter, 
in the real property therein described, setting forth the legal 
description in all the Catlow Valley properties. The Certificate 
recited the sale thereof to Osborn for $50,000 subject to the 
statutory right of redemption. The seven Catlow Valley partnerships 
each had purchased 1/7th of said land| from RFC. The court's 
"order confirming sale of real property," dated January 10, 
1982, confirmed the sheriff's sale of "all of the defendants' 
interest in the real property." Osborn's warranty deed to Goff 
as trustee executed January 4, 1982, conveyed only Osborn's 
interest in the real property. Thus, I do not believe that 
the sale included Richtron, Inc. 's right it|had under the partnership 
agreement, such as its right to 10% of profits remaining after 
final sale, nor in Richtron Inc.'s limited partnership interest 
in Pleasant valley Farms of $4222.50. tfor did the sale include 
the respective partnerships' obligation to repay to the general 
partner any and all advances made to any particular partnership 
which was a debt of the partnership repayable as provided in 
the partnership agreements. 
Richins, as president of the general partner, Richtron, 
Inc. and of RFC had no individual interests in the Catlow Valley 
real estate. 
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Osborn's bid of $50,-000 at the sale for defendant's interests 
in the real property reduced Richins^ and RFCfs liability on 
the judgment by that amount. No doubt Ojsborn gave both the 
deed and assignment to Goff as trustee because of the $45,000 
payment they made to him in 1982 ovet and above the $20,000 
he had received in 1981. 
This action is based upon the judgment so assigned to Goff 
and his associates, and defendants assfert their claim in their 
Counterclaim against Goff and his associates upon the assignment, 
not the deed, asserting that it was wrohg for them to sue their 
general partner, Richtron, Inc., and such is the basis of defendants' 
claim against said plaintiffs. I hav£ elsewhere resolved the 
claim as to Richtron, Inc., but I fijid no compensable injury 
to Richins or RFC by reason of the assignment, nor proof of 
any valid claim for relief against Go^f and those for whom he 
sues as trustee, nor proof of damages therefrom, and thus no 
offset to those plaintiffs' claims against Richins or RFC. 
44. Remaining for determination is fcichtron, Inc.'s Counter-
claim against the plaintiffs upon the grounds asserted as set 
forth in finding 42. I have already determined that plaintiffs 
had no claim for damages against their own general partner, 
Richtron, Inc. The fact that plaintiffs asserted a claim against 
Richtron, Inc. on the assigned Osborn judgment does not constitute 
a fraud against Richtron, Inc., nor an actionable breach of 
fiduciary duty. Such action may constitute an actionable conflict 
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of interest because I have found supra that the partnership 
agreement precludes an action by limited partners against the 
general partner under facts and circumstances found to exist 
here. The only injury I can find support for in the evidence 
is that arising out of the need to defend against this case 
and the damages arising from costs and attorney's fees for having 
had to do so. But the fact that a p^rty has a legal defense 
to a claim for relief does not necessarily give that party a 
right to recover for attorney's fees spent in asserting the 
defense. Defending an action on a foreign judgment does not 
normally include an allowance for attorney's fees, and I find 
no conduct upon the part of Goff and his associates as to justify 
an award of attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56. 
45. Plaintiffs filed this action upon the advice of counsel 
with respect to a judgment already entered against the defendants. 
I find no evidence that this action was actuated by plaintiffs 
by malice or bad faith such as would support any claim against 
them for punitive damages under this claim for relief. This 
finding relates to the limited partners for whom Goff is trustee, 
and is not intended as a finding at this time as to Sampson 
with respect to any such claim. 
46. As to the Counterclaim against Sampson, each claim 
for relief incorporates by reference tt^ e allegations set forth 
in the prior claims. The purpose of such pleading seems to 
be that if one's prior allegations are riot sufficient to assert 
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a claim upon which relief may be granted, adding a bit more 
fuel to the fire may enhance the claim f0r relief. 
By the second claim defendants assert that Sampson's breach 
of the attorney/client relationship in bailing to timely prepare 
or file responsive pleadings on defendants' behalf with respect 
to certain civil complaints filed by third parties against them 
(as identified in prior findings) constituted negligence in 
that he failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care or 
skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal 
profession; that Sampson acted far beyond the scope of his expressly 
and impliedly delegated duties; and that he utilized confidential 
information, etc. as alleged in the first claim. This second 
claim is, in effect, another way of setting forth a claim for 
relief as was done under the first claita. As previously noted, 
Sampson did fail to respond in those cas$s on defendants' behalf. 
Such handling of lawsuits constitutes a failure to exercise 
the reasonable care required of the leg&l profession. The fact 
that such failures may have occurred 4fter it became apparent 
that the Settlement and Compromise Agreement, then acceptable 
to both Sampson and Richins, failed of confirmation or consummation 
may have been a reason for Sampson's negligence in these matters, 
but it was not a justification therefore. He did not, but should 
have, advised Richins and the opposing counsel in those cases 
with whom he had been dealing that he could not or would not 
further be representing the defendant$ therein and arranged 
for time for defendants to obtain new counsel and respond. 
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However, with respect to the default judgments so entered, 
defendants offered evidence only with re$pect to damages incurred 
in the cases of Valmont v. Richtron, Inc. and Richins and Interlake 
Thrift v. Richtron, Inc. With respect thereto defendants' evidence 
showed that attorney Gary Kennedy was employed to set aside 
the default judgments entered against the named defendants in 
those cases. Exhibit 236 shows Kennedy1 Is firm charged Richtron, 
Inc. $161.30 for legal fees on the Interlake case and charged 
Richins and Richtron, Inc. $2,027.40 for legal fees on the Valmont 
case. Said defendants were thus damaged in these amounts by 
Sampson's allowance of default judgments to be entered against 
them. Richins thus established proof of damages by Richins 
for $2,027.40 and Richtron, Inc. did |so for the total of the 
two amounts under their second claim for relief. 
As set forth in my general findings on the Counterclaim, 
the fourth claim for relief includes a claim by Richins that 
Sampson's conduct interfered with and invaded Richins' right 
to earn a livelihood as a syndicator of limited partnership 
interests; a claim for the Richtron General partners that Sampson's 
conduct interfered with their ability to effectively discharge 
the general partner's duties and functions imposed upon it by 
the limited partnership agreements and by law; and a claim for 
the defendants generally that his conduct interfered with the 
defendants' existing contractual relationships, anticipated 
opportunities for employment and/or beneficial economic expectan-
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cies. The allegations thereof are broad enough to cover andd 
include the basics of the claims for relief set forth in the 
fifth claim for relief in which defendants assert a right to 
and request an accounting from Sampson. 
The fourth claim for relief will require a broad and extended 
consideration of facts established by the evidence that should 
be sufficient to cover Sampson's conduct with respect to all 
claims for relief. 
The main thrust of this claim ca^ i be found in language 
contained in paragraph 25 of the claim to the effect that Sampson 
interfered with defendants' existing contractual relations, 
anticipated opportunities for employment ahd/or beneficial economic 
expectancies. 
48. Discussions between Richins and Sampson concerning 
the limited partnerships began about May 20, 198 0, but that 
date did not mark the beginning of Richins' problems relating 
to the partnerships. The evidence clearly established that 
long before that date Richins was confronted with substantial 
problems in the overall operations. Indeed, I think that as 
of May, 1980, the evidence suggested a bleak outlook for the 
future. I see, among others, two major developments that had 
created the problems then existing in May, 1980. One was the 
failure of many limited partners to pay their assessed capital 
contributions which they had agreed td do in their respective 
partnership agreements. Section 48-2-2^1)(a) (7th) of the Code 
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states that the certificate of the parties forming a limited 
partnership shall sign and swear to must state, "The additional 
contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner 
and the times at which, or events on the happening of which, 
they shall be made." The Certificate of Limited Partnership 
contained various provisions with respect to what each limited 
partner would contribute as his pro rata share (based upon his 
capital interest) of the necessary funds determined by the general 
partner to pay the annual expenses of the partnerships. Plaintiffs 
contended that in his efforts to finance the purchase of farm 
equipment Richins had altered the language of Section 2 of Schedule 
B of certain limited partnership agreements to change the purposes 
and maximum amounts for which assessments could be made by the 
general partner from the limited partners, and did so without 
the knowledge and consent of the limited partners affected thereby. 
Plaintiffs1 main contention is that the words "irrigation equipment" 
was added to the enumerated purposes for which assessments could 
be made. To support such contention plaintiffs pointed to three 
Catlow Valley partnership agreements, copies of which were placed 
into evidence by plaintiffs1 exhibits 153 (#6), 328 (#1) and 
329 (#4). 
An analysis of all the partnership agreements reflect that 
the following language of Section 2 reading "Each limited partner 
agrees to contribute his pro rata share (based upon his capital 
interest) of the funds determined by the general partner to 
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be necessary to pay the annual expenses of the partnership, 
including without limitation payments on the purchase price 
of the property, irrigation equipment and any lease payments, 
annual property taxes, accounting expenses ... as may be incurred 
by the partnership* 1:he estimated maximum annual amount ... that 
a limited partner shall be required to contribute shall be ..." 
is contained in the agreements for the following partnerships: 
Springfield Properties dated 4/1/78 
Catlow Valley #1 dated 4/1/77 
Catlow Valley #2 dated 4/1/77 
Catlow Vallley #3 dated 4/1/77 
Catlow Valley #4 dated 4/1/77 
Catlow Valley #7 dated 1/1/78 
Moreland dated 5/15/78 
*East Taber dated 3/1/78 
*North Taber dated 1/1/79 
+West Taber dated 10/15/78 
+Taber dated 10/15/78 
+Shosone dated 11/8/76 
Wixom dated 5/1/79 
(* these two agreements also include the word "advances11. + 
these three agreements omit the word "maximum"). 
In the partnership agreements for the following limited 
partners the language of Section 2 reads "Each limited partner 
agrees to contribute his pro rata share (based upon his capital 
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interest) of the funds determined by the general partner to 
be necessary to pay the annual expenses of the partnership, 
including without limitation payments on the purchase price 
of the property, annual taxes, accounting expenses (and reasonable 
reserves for premiums and all other such out of pocket expenses) 
as may be incurred by the partnership. The maximum amount that 
... shall be required to contribute ..•", 
Catlow Valley #4 dated 4/1/77 
Blackfoot dated 4/15/76 
Burley dated 8/20/76 
Kanosh dated 7/30/76 
North Bear Lake dated 5/15/75 
Randlett dated 7/18/74 
Pleasant Valley dated 4/8/76 
Richfield dated 1/1/77 
Richtron A-13 dated 10/15/73 
Also falling into this group are the three Catlow Valley 
partnership agreements for #6 (Ex. 153), #1 (Ex. 328), and #5 
(Ex. 115) which three also contain different language than that 
set forth above for either group in that for those three the 
second sentence of the quoted language reads "the maximum annual 
amount that . . . may, under certain circumstances, be required 
to contribute, shall be ...". The foregoing sets forth language 
differences in two partnership agreements for Catlow Valley 
#1 and #4. While the two partnership agreements for #1 and 
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the two for #4 reflect the indicated differences, the significance 
of such evidence is lacking. A copy of the agreement for Catlow 
Valley #3 was sent to one Kelly of Rainier Bank Leasing Company 
of Seattle, Washington, by letter dated February 10, 1978, but 
no evidence was presented that it achieved any reuslt. I note 
that prior to the Catlow Valley partnership agreements of April 
1, 1977, the only agreement including the words "irrigation 
equipment" is the Richfield agreement of November 8, 1976, and 
that said words are included in all agreements executed after 
April 1, 1977, and none others before. 
Richins denied generally that he altered any partnership 
agreements and gave no explanation for the language differences 
noted above. However, no evidence was presented as to how such 
alterations, if made, affected the issues in this case, and 
the only relevance thereof goes to the credibility of Richins, 
as did many other exhibits, and I do find. 
By statute, limited partners as such shall not be bound 
by the obligations of the partnership (Section 48-2-1) and Article 
VI, Section 1 states no limited partner shall be personally 
liable for any debts of the partnership or any of the losses 
thereof. But Section 2 of Schedule B of the agreement provides 
that in the event that a limited partner fails to pay his percentage 
share of subsequent installments of cash contributions to the 
capital of the partnership, the general partner shall have the 
right to cancel the portion of the defaulting limited partner's 
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interest in the partnership for which payment was not made, 
and also as agreed, as liquidating damages to reduce the portion 
of the defaulter's investment for which payment was made by 
20% of the total dollar amount contributed to the partnership 
by the limited partner. Further guidelines as to distribution 
and disposition follow in said Section 2, 
49. The frequent and repeated failures of many limited 
partners to pay such needed funds resulted in the general partner, 
who was under no obligation to make any capital contributions 
to the partnership (Schedule B, Section 3) lacking the necessary 
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funds to meet the partnership obligations such as installment 
payments on partnership property, irrigation equipment and well 
drilling expenses. Thus, such failure to pay was an important 
factor leading up to the judgments obtained in the spring of 
1980 such as the Minter-Wilson and Osborn judgments. 
50. Such failure to pay such assessments also led to the 
necessity of Richins making advances of funds to various partnerships 
to meet such necessary payments or expenses, which such advances 
had by June, 1980, exceeded $300,000. ffhile the general partner 
was under no obligation to make any capital contributions to 
the partnerships and could not have capital interests therein, 
Article V of the agreement specifically provided that the general 
partner, acting for itself or with otfters, had the discretion 
to advance monies to the partnerships for use in the operations, 
the aggregate amount of such advances becoming an obligation 
of the partnerships to the general partner to be repaid in accordance 
with the loan instrument out of gross receipts of the partnerships. 
The agreement further provided that such advances were not to 
be deemed a capital contribution, but that any and all advances, 
together with interest, should become immediately due and payable 
upon sale of the property or the termination and dissolution 
of the partnership unless otherwise agreed upon. 
Notwithstanding these express provisions Sampson, as early 
as June 9, 1980, told the limited partners at a Blackfoot Farms 
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meeting that the general partner was not entitled to the repayment 
of any advances. He thereafter frequently and repeatedly made 
such statement regarding advances to other limited partners, 
as well as to Richins, both orally in meetings and through letters 
sent to all investors. 
51. The evidence clearly shows that the second development 
which led to problems confronting Richins, his companies, and 
the partnerships by May, 1980, was Richins' own failure as president 
of the general partners of each partnership to fulfill the duties 
and responsibilities he had to the limited partners under the 
partnership agreements. He of all people knew having made the 
advances just mentioned, that many limited partners had not 
and were not paying the assessments made by the general partners 
of each partnership pursuant to the partnership agreements. 
He also knew that under the express provisions of the agreements, 
upon failure of any limited partner to pay his pro-rata share 
of subsequent assessments of cash contributions to capital, 
the general partner had the right to cancel that portion of 
the defaulting limited partner's interest in the partnership 
for which payment was not made, and to forfeit as liquidated 
damages up to 50% of capital contributions already made. He 
further knew that the resulting consequence would be a reversion 
to the partnership of the cancelled interest with the general 
partner having the authority under tlfie agreement to buy that 
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forfeited interest or to sell it to any eligible purchaser who 
would then become a limited partner. This Richins did not do, 
stating he did not wish to offend defaulting investors, and 
his failure to do so, as it became known and spread among the 
limited partners, became a source of irritation to those limited 
partners who had faithfully paid their assessments. It appears 
Richins was reluctant to stir up trouble with such defaulting 
investors, hoping time would take care of the problem, and that 
the advances made by the general partners, though unknown to 
have been made by the limited partners until the bubbles began 
bursting about May, 1980, would take care of the debts and expenses 
until better times evolved. 
52. Under the agreements the general partner had a duty 
to keep the limited partners informed of partnership operations 
through written reports at such intervals as the general partner 
deemed appropriate; to deliver to each limited partner on or 
before March 15 of each year a statement or audit prepared by 
a CPA of all income and expenses of each partnership; and, beginning 
in the third year of operation following formation, to annually 
obtain an independent appraisal of partnership properties and 
report to each limited partner the value of his net share based 
upon such appraisal. These things Richins did not do, although 
he wrote numerous and lengthy letters to the limited partners, 
but without such specific details and generally assuring them 
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that all was well. The result was that as the existing problems 
began to surface in May, 1980, *£»^1 imited partners began to 
lose trust and confidence in Richins to the point that those 
limited partners who were still actively concerned about their 
investments refused to pay over to Richins any further funds 
either on past or current assessments and began to consider 
the need to seek the advice of counsel with respect to their 
various partnership interests. 
Such attitude surfaced at the May 29, 1980 meeting of the 
Catlow Valley partnerships at which Sampson appeared as counsel 
for Goff and Kohler and there began to assert his influence 
in the future courses of action that were taken. It was through 
his suggestion at that meeting that the decision to file a Chapter 
11 petition in the bankruptcy court for RFC, the immediate purpose 
of which was to try to delay an execution sale on the Catlow 
Valley properties scheduled to take place on June 6, 1980, by 
Minter-Wilson. The Minter-Wilson problem had had an early start. 
A construction lien had been recorded on May 25, 1978 for $199,143 
for well drilling work at Catlow Valley. A foreclosure action 
was filed August 22, 1978 by which it obtained its $137,000 
judgment, entered on April 30, 1980, for well drilling work 
on the Catlow Valley farm properties. The judgment was reduced 
to $57,519 on appeal and Richins was eliminated as a judgment 
debtor. Thereafter Sampson's role as counsel for various limited 
o 5 ( ) •:• 
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partners and partnerships began to grow. Also, it appears from 
the evidence that the partnerships through the limited partners 
began to more affirmatively assert themselves in the courses 
to be followed, although the partnership agreements expressly 
provided that no limited partner shall take part in the conduct 
or control of the affairs of the partnership and no limited 
partner shall have power to sign for or to bind the partnership. 
(Article VI). 
53. The evidence established other problems Richins and 
the partnerships were experiencing prior to May, 1980, some 
of which will be set forth here. They w£re as follows: 
a. On June 22, 1979 Richins was advised by 
attorney Baker for Agricultural Services that notice 
of nonpayment on installment contracts due on irrigation 
contracts for Shoshone, Randlett and Young at the 
Idaho State Bank had been issued and that if the bank 
returned them under its recourse rights, Ag intended 
to immediately initiate its claims for possessory 
rights to the equipment, regardless of the condition 
of the crops. On August 29, 19^9 Richins advised 
the bank it would be receiving a check for $12,847 
on the three agreements, but it had not had cash on 
hand to make the total payments $nd must await crop 
funds. 
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b. On September 12, 1979 notice was given that 
a $300,000 loan by Utah Mortgage to RFC and assigned 
to Nortwest National Life and guaranteed by Paul and 
Shari Richins, was in default and if payments were 
not made in full by September 25, a foreclosure proceeding 
would be started. 
c. On November 20, 1979 two lien claims were 
filed by the Sages against Shoshone, RFC and Richins 
for over $30,000 which had gone to judgments later. 
d* On January 4, 19 80 an Idaho Bank reported 
payments due on Randlett and Shoshone totaled about 
$62,000 and if not paid by January 10, 1980, the balance 
in full would be demanded which totaled $278,000 on 
the two properties. 
e. Loans from Shari Richin^ ($32,000) and the 
Richins Family Trust ($50,000) were made in January 
and February, 1980, made necessary because RFC had 
no funds to meet its current obligations. 
f. On March 18, 1980 Richins sent attorney 
David Day a list of addresses for the Catlow Valley 
limited partners as requested by the state securities 
commission, but suggested it would be wise to delay 
giving it as long as possible. 
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g. At a Taber partnership meeting on April 
3, 198 0, it was reported that some RFC checks to PCA 
had been returned for insufficient funds. 
h. On April 18, 1980 the state of Oregon issued 
a Certificate of Revocation of RFC's Certificate of 
Authority to do business in Oregon because of its 
failure to file statements and pay fees due for 1978 
and 1979, which totaled only $219, with Richins saying 
he never told the Catlow Valley partnerships of the 
revocation and didn't know if its certificate had 
ever been reissued. 
i. On April 29, 1980 Richins told Jerry Hayes 
he had not told his partnership about the RFC contract 
going into default because he did not want to create 
a panic situation and his main concern was to get 
the contract reinstated. 
j. I mention here the summaries of problems 
set forth in the Hurd memoranda summarized in the 
summation of evidence, but will not restate them. 
k. Two judgment liens were made of record, 
one on August 17, 1979 by Rex Clemmons for $2,340 
and one on October 5, 1979 by Lemmon White Drilling 
for $3,264. 
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54. As previously found, May 29, 1980, was a significant 
date in the history of the conflicts, some of which we are trying 
to resolve in this case. The findings of fact with respect 
to the plaintiffs1 Complaint on the Osborn judgment substantially 
covers most of the important facts disclosed by the evidence 
from the May 29, 1980 meeting up through all of the factual 
matters relating to the controversy over the Osborn judgment. 
Many of the facts found with respect thereto have a bearing 
on the issues raised by defendants1 Counterclaim. Mention was 
made of that fact earlier in these documents, so that the findings 
of fact set forth supra on plaintiffs1 complaint become by this 
reference and my prior comments findings to be considered on 
the Counterclaim. Some matters with respect thereto that had 
little to do with the Osborn judgment controversy should now 
be considered in some further detail and hopefully without much 
repetition. 
At the May 29, 1980 meeting the evidence established that 
mention was made that the $17,600 payment due Glenn in September, 
1979 had not been paid; that from $30,000 to $50,000 would be 
needed to complete the Minter-Wilson wells; that a total of 
$240,000 was needed to meet current Catlow Valley obligations 
and that as Richins did not have such money, the limited partners 
were the only source for it; that if the limited partners contributed 
the $240,000, RFC would eliminate its $190,000 mark up on its 
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resale of the property to the Catlow Valley partnerships; and 
Richins said he would step out if the limited partners wanted 
that. 
At the meeting it was also disclosed that the contract 
of June, 1978 with Valmont Credit for a sprinkler system at 
a cost of $932,530 required annual payments of $118,338.70 beginning 
June 25, 1979 which installment had not been paid. 
55. The limited partners present at that meeting agreed 
that $17,000 be raised for attorney's fees and expenses, but 
voted that such funds would be placed in the custody of Ken 
Hanson (suggested by Richins) . We thus see here for the first 
time as far as this case goes, the limited partners exercising 
some control over partnership funds and affairs contrary to 
Article VI (2) of the Certificate of Limited Partnership. On 
May 30, 1980, Sampson called Richins and stated he and his group 
wanted to buy out the interests of the Richtron companies but 
Richins said he was not interested. 
Also on May 30, 1980 the Snowville investors met, decided 
they wanted an audit, wanted to employ Sampson as legal counsel 
for the partnership and to have him take the necessary steps 
to relieve Richtron, Inc. as general partner and to liquidate 
in an orderly manner. They also decided they would not pay 
contributions requested by Richins until after an audit but 
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would make contributions to meet the July 1 payment if Sampson 
advised them to do so. 
56. On June 2 and 5, 1980 Richins, acting on his own and 
without advising any investor or partnerships, executed as president 
of the Richtron general partner quit-claim deeds which purported 
to convey to RFC all partnership properties held by Catlow Valley 
Farms 1-7, Springfield, Kanosh, Pleasant Valley, Randlett, Richfield, 
Shoshone and Taber. Such deeds were not recorded until December, 
1980 and January, 1981. One deed purported to transfer property 
to the Leo H. Richins Family Trust that Ri|chins stated had advanced 
$100,000 toward payment of partnership expenses and another 
to Shari Richins for a $32,000 advance she allegedly had made 
for a similar reason. The apparent bases for such deeds was 
the failure of such partnerships to keep current the payments 
due RFC on the real estate contracts by which said partnerships 
had purchased their farm lands from RFC. 
57. On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and signed as president 
of Richtron, Inc., the general partner, 18 promissory notes 
which obligated the limited partnership of the note issued to 
pay Richtron, Inc., Richtron General, or RFC, or their respective 
successors or assigns, the greater amount of the principal sum 
named therein or the total of the aggregate advances made to 
the partnership by the holders as defined in an agreement of 
even date therewith and as shown as due and payable to the holders 
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at any time in the financial records and accounting books of 
the maker. The specific amount listed for each partnership 
was as follows: Blackfoot $25,000; Burlejf $20,000; Kanosh $22,000; 
Moreland $6,000; Pleasant Valley $10^,000; Randlett $85,000; 
Richfield $90,000; Snowville $32,000; T&ber $29,000; West Taber 
$5,000; and for Shoshone and each of the seven Catlow Valley 
partnerships $100 or the total of the advances as reflected 
on the books. 
58. Other documents executed were formal minutes by the 
three Richtron companies authorizing in separate minutes for 
each document the execution of the notes and quit claim deeds. 
59. On June 5, 1980, the board of directors of Richtron, 
Inc. authorized its officers to execute any necessary papers 
or documents to effect the withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. as general 
partner for Blackfoot, Kanosh and Snowville. 
60. On June 9, 1980 the Blackfoot directors had a meeting 
attended by both Richins and Sampson. Again Sampson stated 
his position that the mark-up on the property purchase was a 
breach of fiduciary duty and that Ricbhtron was not entitled 
to the repayment of advances made to Blackfoot. Dee Hanson 
took the lead in voicing dissatisfaction of Richins1 performance, 
so Richins stated that if they were not satisfied therewith, 
they could repay the advances, agree to pay in full for the 
personal property and could elect a new, more compatible general 
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partner to take Richtron, Inc.'s place, but that if they refused, 
he might withdraw Richtron, Inc. as general partner and effect 
a dissolution and liquidation and force settlement of accounts 
and would not consent to the election of a new general partner. 
On June 10, 1980 Richins sent a letter to the limited partners 
of Blackfoot which stated he was filing notice of Richtron, 
Inc.'s withdrawal as general partner; that the limited partners 
repay the advances ($25,000); that they *'now elect" a new general 
partner to fill the vacancy, but also stated that the partnership 
was then terminated, that its affairs were to be wound up, the 
debts paid, its assets distributed and \Wien done the partnership 
would be dissolved. 
61. The Snowville partners had a meeting on June 11, 1980 
at which Ralph Wright showed a telegram he had from Richtron, 
Inc. resigning as general partner. Richins wrote a similar 
letter to Snowville partners as he had to the Blackfoot partners, 
stating the advances totaled $30,000. 
62. On June 12, 19 8 0 the Kanosh partners held a meeting 
with Richins and Sampson both there. Sampson restated his views 
about the partnership not being liable to repay Richtron fs advances 
($22,000) , and about Richins1 mismanagement and breach of fiduciary 
duty. The limited partners decided %hey would not repay the 
advances. Richins told them they weij'e obligated to pay and 
he would assess them for their pro-rata Share. 
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63. Following the service of notice of withdrawal of the 
general partner as such upon the BlackfOot, Snowville and Kanosh 
partners, the meeting of June 26, 1980 took place and finding 
with respect to developments at that meeting have elsewhere 
been set out. With the probability of an amicable settlement 
existing following that meeting, at the insistance of active 
limited partners and with Richins' consent, Sampson became the 
recipient of partnership funds paid tyy some limited partners 
for assessments, past and present, primarily for the purpose 
of maintaining some control over how such funds were to be spent, 
with such initial arrangements including an agreement for Sampson 
to pass the funds through to Richins for payment on pressing 
obligations. 
64. On October 2, 1980 Sampson sent to all investors for 
signing a copy of the then completed Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement, urging them to sign it and return it immediately 
to Richins. This agreement as drafted fyad received the approval 
of both Richins and Sampson and afforded the gateway through 
which the controversies could be resolved. However, although 
many limited partners signed it, others did not and so this 
agreement was never consummated. A mgijor stumbling block was 
the insistance of a few partners that nothing should be paid 
to Richins which factor, I believe, and so find, was based in 
part upon Sampson's early and repeated statements that the partner-
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ships were not obligated to repay advances. However, I note 
here that prior to the June 26, 1980 meeting Sampson had suggested 
to his clients that the best solution to the controversy was 
to work with Richins and agree upon a settlement rather than 
to take a course that promised extended litigation. 
65. Following failure of having the settlement agreement 
consummated, Richins, on November 13, 1980, drafted and executed 
a Notice of Withdrawal of the General Partner which he then 
sent to the limited partners of six partnerships, three of which 
were to Blackfoot, Snowville and Kanosh which set forth dates 
in June, 1980 as being the effective dates of such withdrawals, 
as noted supra. On January 6, 1981 identical notices were mailed 
to the limited partners of eighteen other partnerships. Copies 
of all such notices were recorded in clerk's offices, some in 
November, 1980, and some in January, 1981. By separate letter 
Richins advised the limited partners that the general partner 
had withdrawn, the partnerships were terminated, and affairs 
would be wound up as indicated in the partnership agreements. 
It is noted that in the withdrawals sent to the three partnerships 
in June, 1980, Richins told the limited partners to elect a 
new general partner. This suggestion was not followed, nor 
restated in the subsequent notices of withdrawal in late 1980 
which had been immediately followed up with notices that the 
partnership affairs would be wound up. 
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What steps Richins took, if any, to so "wind up" the affairs 
of each partnership does not clearly appear in the evidence. 
There was evidence that Richins1 attorney, David Day, had prepared 
complaints to file in court to effect such wind up, and testimony 
that they were never filed upon Richins1 instructions not to 
do so. Richins wrote volumes to all the investors, but we search 
in vain for evidence of any affirmative action by Richins to 
have the general partners undertake the promised wind up of 
partnership affairs. Richins1 course of action, or lack thereof, 
may have been influenced because further settlement negotiations 
were in the wind. Further settlement negotiations during 1981 
were mentioned periodically and it is recalled that although 
this lawsuit was filed on February 11, 1981, by written stipulation 
defendants filed no responsive pleading thereto until July, 
1982. But Sampson's actions were more than passive at the time 
and no doubt his activities were a stumbling block to Richins 
as to such wind up actions, but the Courts were always open 
for him to get judicial assistance in bringing the "wind up" 
to a head. 
Article V of the partnership agreement sets forth the rights 
and obligations of the general partners. In paragraph 5 thereof 
we find the statement that the general partner may at any time 
withdraw from the partnership, sell, or assign all or any part 
of its interest as a general partner to a qualified party, by 
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giving notice to all the limited partners, and such action shall 
be effective upon the receipt of the last partner of such notice 
of withdrawal, sale, or assignment. Nothing is said in this 
article about a withdrawal dissolving the partnership. In fact, 
the provisions with respect to sale or assignment suggests either, 
coupled with the withdrawal, does not bring partnership affairs 
to a halt. 
Section 48-2-9(2) of the Code states that a general partner 
of a limited partnership cannot, without the written consent 
or ratification of all limited partners "do any act which would 
make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a partner-
ship." This statutory provision may preclude a general partner 
from withdrawing in an effort to terminate the partnership if 
such act would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business 
of the partnership. 
Article VII (a) provides that the partnership shall terminate 
upon the prior occurrence of any of the following, which include 
the withdrawal of the general partner or the affirmative vote 
of not less than a majority in interest of the limited partners, 
a right specifically granted to them by Article VI (6) (b) , 
which also provides that the limited partners have the right, 
by vote of a majority in interest, to remove the present general 
partner and elect a new general partner (which shall not affect 
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the removed general partner's r i g h t t o share i nt. p a r t n e r s h i p 
prof i t s ) . 
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.-> ; - jations, the revocation ;. . . •. => ^vr.ificate 
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: Author. , , Oregon, the failure of many limited partners 
: ;> pay tneir assessments and Richins' failure to do anything 
about 
at zhe Ma> <*?. . • ^ meeting replace r added 
Dmpella reason for partnerships r so act as provided ,n 
any partnership ever followed that provision and exercised ' 
clear authority granted r«e oartners A H uue «^~: --* 
(-r (in, 11 (i , 11 y . * ever* advised counsel 
to do so, To haw . would have avoided the expenditure 
of great time and expense by Sampson and Richi ns t ::> effect that 
i"»=iS'!lt , Sue"i .'a I ni i:epl,dceineivi ot the general partner would 
not have resulted in a dissolution and terminaticr :- ?: . partner-
ships - -v severance of friendships, c 
1 in record an . \ „ . J, , , \. . - . -
It termination of the partnership either withdrawal 
of the general partner affirmative v o ^ 
i n i ntei: « - . ^kes ;.J.C ^ u c ^ 
provides the partnership's <\\ fairs shall be woundup, i^ s 1 . abil ities 
and obligations to creditors s-iall be paid (or adequate* 
for . - . : : . manner 
provided . article . v - ^ ru ihe partnership;shall then be dissolved. 
Dissolution of * partnership does not take place unti. I III1!*" 
re ;-.- are met. Both the general 
2i ..\ 
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avc . aited partners also had the statutory right to have dissolution 
and winding up by a decree of court. (Section 48-2 : 
/ * withdrawal 
the general partner as to all partnerships, stating the withdrawal 
would become effective when, written notice was receive" 
1.3 s t- I • • HE .] : c s the agi: eeme i it so requires. There - .-
an absence >. i evidence as to when and whether any limited partner 
received such noti ce of withdrawal and particular" 
.1 imit.p.ri f>artni > t • i in C.JCII i iin1; partnership did so, => , 
when tlu" ! t".t notice was received as to any partnership. 
we are left to speculate . ^o whether any such 
:i ri fii ,f" M " I..'. "i «: 1 I t . 
66. Under the partnership agreement the general partner 
had full charge •>*• management 
I * respects . . _ matters (Article 
\ 1/.. .fc agreemer urther provided tha^  -v, : imited partner 
shall take part - ^7t — . ui uonauc' 
t • ' partner had ;. •- power 
f^ *. . - * partnership. /tide VI) Under Section 
43-- - . ed ; artner •- granted iipau 
a~ .imited partner takes part in 
the ^<^,x\ . * rus;r.ess I* Harline v. Davies. 567 P,2d 
112« Supreme Cour^ tated that nit lenni'.n i hi i i iit«i' 
ii • ... ; power to conduct the business 
2x18 
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of a I united partnership Tn Harline the limited partnership 
brought i i action against 1 he 1wu general partners. h\\ Hit m 
ousted, inl thPir i nf' orpst- in N M | 11 t* n o r s h J | li i m i • . • • 
to ettect the ouster it took court action and until that proceeding 
was begun inil concluded, the general partners remained n *i 
control. In M M IM^ I H m flu1 0111 t, Ihen* is 11 » 1 n i 1 , > . on 
that any partnership brought in action into court to oust the 
general partner. 
6n . Uui wi t fn t in 11 n i ( IK •>( it nl ui in 1 \\ 11 t in i hip agreement 
provisions just cited, Richins was faced with the rebellion 
of many limited partners who st 1J] cared enough about their 
investment 1 u 1 1 1 - •••... 11 1 ( June., no they refused 
to pay tuiiLL. directly to Michins with n strings attached an i 
with Sampson appearing in t!"e action, Richins appeared to hd\n 
become r< I M P PI! M M I 1 hit iM I lemenl 1 the controversies 
through negotiations was t reasonable way to go, and, as already 
noted, st Jid Sampson However, if not earlier, certainly ill 1 
the settleme? 1 ironm* M f a L 1 L 1 1 1 e a n f uiiion in October 
and November, 1980, Sampson began a significant effort In cbtain 
control of all the partnerships *n<i to exclude Rirhins therefrom. 
68, i'he Mr I f 1 liiuft . n roi)nr i lioii'tn t obtain control 
occurred when he tent out forms for granting him the noting 
rights b. -.* power of attorney to all limited partners telMn 
them t\. .; ; ; ,^\\\^\ ! !i •: ! : ; 1 !:• ! rin I M*quested each to sign ind 
2119 
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return If to him There was a, dispute as to how m -•> limited 
partners executed the form and whether they representee - - ority 
i n interest |>d r111Pr '.11 111 I >111 i ml i,.-,L J111" i a lumuer, i f 
' arrre ma ; cr . i did so, 
The power cf attorney prepared by Sampson stated in substance 
that uii " 11"'1 e .-I'.vl appoint Sampson the 
true ar. iCtorney for the undersigning partner, to act 
in the undersigned's name, place and stead for the limited purpose 
of unconditional ._ . jigned may have 
w i till regard tc named partnership as ..;-i r : ;r,t w- utlined 
in the limited partnership agreement ers statec -• 
were to be - - Le i n ";. IIU1 month1,.. . continue c 
otherwise • .. . . . led. I;. ^e^-iing out: this form Sampso-
that such was necessary • remove Richins and his comr -
as genera 1 pan tin iei : , =; ai inn ea f I or commence legal act*or. 
against him and his companies to retain the properties and preserve 
their legal remedies against him. This activity marks the beg.i i in inn 
of Sampson* -* -. rre in each partnership 
businebs ' • - control thereof to the exclusion 
of Rico - i r ^ companies, - * <= asserted legal a nth - " 
for doinc * - Issues in this case. 
. . About this time Sampson incorporated the John Sampson 
Professional Corporation ; •y uie ; 
received * +-h<? Richtron companies 
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out as general partners and voting his own professional corporation 
as the new substitute genera1 partner -1 -* - partnership. 
in . . - .ocument both 
individually ana ^ president ^; n.^ reciting that the limited 
partners representing r ::r^+ *-•-* imited partners ot 
eacn - *• , •- tnership agreement, 
vote, sustain and ratify Sampson's PC as the successor and substitute 
general partner, stating the same was subscribed and ! 
by LX: • ' h Sampson -:
 r Sampson 
signed t.. .- documen I: 
On January 28 , 1981 Sampson recorded N o t i c e s of Si xbst i tii i t i ::)i i 
o f h i f f Pi < \ i f iMipr nl fih in l'in ii M i n t . P H I | che p a r t n e r s h i p s . 
Again only his signature appeared • r :s re- .; e -.nd 
was . r. tended *- amendment • ueicificatp 
Agrees . .iws as .<~,L ^ Secticr.n 
48-2 i . ,. . . . . ., i cu . tie thereafter prepared another document 
dated Marc; which *-* * - •» — - — 
and <a» j. virtue 
powers c ^nc: i^ r .i. . .imited partners, which he 1 
in fact have, \- *atify -^1 tf *e *- •-•*.;-., ., ^ 
general r . partnerships - t ~vities 
pursuant I: o Section 48-2-. : -. n * ode. This document 
also stated that -. *• w=*<=; -* unanimous vot;e of rill pat hmoi' ., 
effect ^ amendment was made pursuant 
2 i ^  i 
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.Cvt.^s 4Q-0-0/ ^~* oc ~.c 4-^ Q code. This document appears 
t ;• have teen intended amendment certificate 
still wa Sectior; * 
apply +"r March ; . -.,, Sampson purported to 1 ; 
his powers of att.*rnt- meeting ^ *" :r:': -:he limited > * 
tor ea:1 purported J*. L .; * 
and cont,..u Lut substitution *. : nis PC as the new general partner. 
Sampson alone signed the minutes o f e a ch s a I d m e e t i n n ;,- h :i :: I i 
minutes iini I i e i- I w\. I Mi« jf tendance thereat of; any limited 
partner. 
70• At this time the RFC bankruptcy proceedings W P T P sr.iij 
alive and Sampsoi I \ i .v. mil i f ieil hy I I'm bankruptcy court that 
a professional legal corporation was not authorized to become 
a general partner i n an agricultural enterprise Oi I i n ; 1 *, 
1981 Sampson i no.:,) ;r [,,. i:a t .;;. I ,."\ i H.j nagementf i nc . of whi ch he was 
one of it's? Incorporators, directors and the president thereof, 
After doing so Sampson took steps * substitute ftq I-Iri narjcinierii 
f o r h j _ s _ , partnership• To do so 
Sampson sent an authorization form,, to al 1 investors on November 
1 2, 1981, which substituted Ag Management *•« --f^ n^ ra1. - \ 
On Januai - * president ,:: Ag Management 
documents entitled "Notices of Substitution of General Partner,11 
stat;:;j -^  ...-.- -. genera- r»r\ner ef* 
2' 1981, ' n was in accordance with 
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the limited partnership agreements and Certificates c ~'~ 
The acknowledgments these notices stated they were executed 
by author!« "proper 
authority wi limited partners aa oersonally 
signed sue ' ocument T : n; .* partnership ^ required Y iw 
for* any . : - . * . above. 
As to tlii J effort ' • make Ag Management the general partner, 
the evidence indicates that no amended Certificate was 
with any e. 
7 , - -ri:* ui J9R A and i: \.> ""8" when Sampsor efforts 
to obta: -- ^ attempts to 
new to acquire - Osborn 
judgment, he had begun to repeatedly solicit tu :: frc- r-*-
limited partners, directing that surh be sen* 
L o i m i j'u.'i I t.liu1 mid i ine i i n w h i c h * - --= 
usee .. ,
 x thereafter did so in the ~t rtns 3nd years 
ahead. A:: t^ forNi in the summary of evider * 
that "••;--'•• - " i \ \y i u< U I M rvember- . received 
and disbursed at U:aA, $645, OOu from i . *" ;. *'*-* limited partners 
and their partnerships, 
. i ' :: **. i records 
receipts and disbursements, s, r i* *re\ r.r* court ordered 
Sampsoi * -. i - r records available * Richins- - y 
procrr
 t- _ i^hpr detai.au summaries 
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as to the specific source of all funds and disbursements that 
had been made therefrom. Based upon all of the evidence, I 
find to my satisfaction that Sampson honestly believed that 
the powers of attorney authorized him to exercise the vote of 
each partner that signed the power and returned it to him and 
to thereby authorize him by majority vote to remove the Richtron 
general partners and to substitute fi^st his own PC and then 
his Ag Management as general partners, Richins and Sampson 
debated this issue in meetings with each other, with investors 
and in the many written letters which eabh wrote to the various 
limited partners and to each other. What Sampson did he, in 
my opinion, did believing in the validity of his own stand. 
The fact that it seems so clear to me that the statutes required 
the signature and oath of each limited partner to amend a certificate 
as to show a change of a general partner, or otherwise, does 
not stamp Sampson's legal opinions and the advice he gave his 
clients as knowledgeable fraud. Certainly, such was not proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. There was no direct proof 
that Sampson was aware of the provisions of Section 78-51-27, 
which rendered his acquisitions of thq Osborn judgment, as a 
lawyer, a serious violation of law. 
73. In a case filed in the District Court in Davis County, 
entitled "Blackfoot Farms, et al v. Paul H. Richins, Richtron, 
Inc., RFC, et al.,M (Case #2-30994), Judgfe J. Duffy Palmer after 
2124 
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a hearing held on November 19, 1982, Entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on November 24, 1982 wherein he ruled 
that Ag Management was not the generaj. partner of any of the 
partnerships; that either Richtron, Ihc. or Richtron General 
were the liquidating general partners, that notwithstanding 
their withdrawals they were still in control of the partnerships; 
and that the partnership certificates were never amended to 
admit Ag as general partner. It appears that Judge Palmer's 
ruling was an embarrassment to Sampson after two years of control 
of the partnerships with either Sampson's PC or Ag Management 
purporting to be the general partner, and particularly when 
Richins had during that two year period contended continuously 
that their assumption of that role wa$ illegal and contrary 
to law. In so ruling Judge Palmer al$o ruled that attorney 
James Brown, counsel for plaintiffs therein, was without any 
authority whatsoever to prosecute and file such action on behalf 
of any limited partnership. However, this Court is without 
knowledge as to what additional actiort Richins ever took, if 
any, to proceed with the winding up of th£ affairs of the limited 
partnerships. 
74. Any such action was probably affected by the fact 
that prior to Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson, as counsel for 
Goff and certain limited partners, attended an IRS tax sale 
held on October 29, 1982, relating to Richins and Richtron interests, 
212 b 
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and as the only bidder, bid in for $40,400 the interests being 
sold and paid that amount to the IRS* By that sale the IRS 
purported to sell all of Richins' claims in the partnerships, 
the Richtron entities, the purchase and resale contracts, claims 
for repayment of advances, and stock in the Richtron companies. 
These assets the IRS had purportedly taken by some 35 IRS seizures 
and levies. Thus, notwithstanding Sampson's set back in the 
face of Judge Palmer's ruling, Sampson continued to lay claim 
to and hold for his clients all of the Richins and Richtron 
rights and interests in the partnerships and their properties, 
including, as noted, all stock in the Richtron companies, doing 
so by reason of the procedural consequences of the IRS tax sale. 
75. Emphasis was added to the legality of Sampson's claims 
by two subsequent court rulings made by Judge Cornaby in the 
District Court of Davis County, one on December 27, 1982, and 
the second on July 21, 198 3, in both of which Judge Cornaby 
ruled that the IRS sale was valid, that Goff, as trustee under 
the IRS sale, was the purchaser of all Richins and Richtron 
property interests, as evidenced and described by the IRS's 
Certificates of Sale, and that such sa|.e covered all property 
interests, all causes of action, and all rights to wind up the 
affairs of the limited partners of which the Richtron companies 
had been general partners. Riding the saddle of the tax sale 
and these two legal rulings, Sampson continued to exercise his 
2 i Z o 
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control over the partnership entities and properties, advising 
all investors by letter of December 27, 1982 that since Judge 
Cornaby had ruled the IRS sale valid, Goff as trustee for the 
investors who had put up the $40,400 owjied all of the Richtron 
assets and that he, Brown and Blanch had been elected directors 
and officers of the Richtron companies. Sampson further expressed 
the opinion that any efforts to challenge the IRS tax sale in 
the federal court would be fruitless. Nevertheless, Richins 
continued to maintain that the IRS sale was invalid and urged 
the investors to turn to him instead of Sampson. 
This debate continued until May 16, 1984 when, contrary 
to Sampson's prior prediction Judge David Winder of the United 
States District Court for Utah entered an Order which fully 
and unequivocally voided the IRS tax sale, declaring that Goff 
had no interest in the capital stock of the Richtron companies, 
nor in the right of those companies to wind up partnership affairs; 
nor the right to institute causes of action, nor in any of the 
specifically described real estate contracts and partnership 
interests (which could not have excluded Gc^ ff from his own limited 
partnership interests acquired by purchase prior to and exclusive 
of the tax sale). 
Based upon Judge Winder's decision, Judge Cornaby on February 
15, 1985 made a ruling vacating his prior two orders because 
they had been based upon his assumption that the IRS sale was 
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valid, noting the federal court had ruled otherwise. I note 
here that the record of this case reelects that prior to his 
first ruling, Judge Cornaby had in fact expressed some doubt 
that he had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the IRS 
sale. Also, it is noted that although Judge Winder's ruling 
was made on May 16, 1984, Richins took no action to vacate Judge 
Cornaby1s prior orders until January 3, 1985, when he finally 
filed a motion to do so. I note that Judge Winder's ruling 
stated, among other things that Goff had no interest in the 
right of the Richtron companies to wind up partnership affairs. 
Defendants1 counsel may have assumed that the federal court 
ruling vacated any authority given Goff, as trustee, under Judge 
Cornaby's prior orders. Reference is ijaade to Finding of Fact 
118 wherein, while considering the matter of punitive damages, 
I make further comment concerning this de^ay. 
76. Richins prepared and placed iifito evidence a schedule 
of property foreclosures in which he states, without showing 
any foundation therefor, that the properties had all been foreclosed 
on the following dates: 
Burley 12/18/81 
Catlow Valley 1-7 5/7/82 
Kanosh 8/21/81 
Moreland 10/5/82 
North Bear Lake 12/12/82 
Randlett 3/9/83 
Richfield 1/29/82 
Shoshone 4/27/84 
Springfield 12/21/82 
Taber 12/7/83 
2.128 
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North Taber 11/7/83 
East Taber 8/8/84 
West Taber 11/7/83 
Wixom 6/25/82 
Blackfoot, Pleasant Valley and Young Farms are also mentioned 
as having been foreclosed, but no dates are shown. No other 
details appeared on this exhibit. Richins stresses that all 
foreclosures occurred while under Sampson's management, but 
that as to the Richtron B-10, A-11 and A-13, partnerships, they 
were sold or liquidated after December 2, 1980 by him and that 
in those cases the limited partners received liquidating cash 
distributions in excess of their capital contributions. 
On August 28, 1984 Sampson wrote a letter to Richins acknow-
ledging receipt of Richins1 letter of August 21, 1984, in which 
Richins had stated that Sampson's organization had no interest 
in the partnership farms. The foregoing list indicates all 
farms had been foreclosed upon by the dates of this letter exchange. 
Sampson termed Richins' statement as crazy and false, stating 
the farms were foreclosed on and they had made purchases directly 
from the individual sellers after the individual owners had 
taken them back, that he and his group h&d every right therein, 
and for Richins to please not interfere. 
No evidence was presented on the specifics of any foreclosure, 
and the identities of any properties on which such repurchases 
had been made was not disclosed. Nor was any evidence presented 
2 i<l 0 
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as to whether any necessary steps were taken to wind up the 
affairs of any partnership including the payment of debts, liqui-
dation of assets, distribution of profits, if any, and to bring 
about the final dissolution and termination of any partnership. 
After trial and the Courtfs review of all the exhibits and testimony, 
I found myself left to wonder what had become of the partnerships, 
their properties, and the investments of the limited partners, 
although during the trial Richins, in response to the court's 
question, testified that none of the limited partners had to 
his knowledge ever received any return on their investments, 
77. It is a reasonable inference that payments due to 
the original owners as sellers were not made; that those contracts 
fell into default; that a substantial reason therefore was that 
no money was available to meet such payments, and that the probable 
reason was the failure of many limited partners to pay the assess-
ments necessary to obtain the funds to meet those payments, 
and that foreclosure was thus inevitable. As set forth in the 
summary of evidence, of the sum of $645,101.38 shown as having 
been received and disbursed by Sampson between June 27, 1980 
and November 30, 1982, $185,668 was shown as spent for payments 
on real property and sprinkling systems. It was noted, too, 
that one exhibit dated June 20, 1980, showed that on real estate 
contracts some $3,462,010 was carried as a liability. 
Z j o 0 
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78. Judge Cornaby's Order of July 21, 1983 contained a 
provision that stated that neither attorney John T. Anderson, 
nor any other counsel were entitled to represent Richtron entities 
in legal proceedings. The case file suggests that this particular 
provision was related to a hearing before Judge Cornaby on December 
27, 1982 regarding the effect of the tax sale. After an order 
on such hearing was drawn, attorney John T. Anderson as counsel 
for defendants filed objections to the wording of the proposed 
Order. A hearing was held on February 1, 1983 following which 
the Court stated it did not find its position any different 
than at the prior hearing, directed that the ruling remain as 
before and that the Order be set out exactly as on the IRS Certi-
ficates. Judge Cornaby then signed the Order of February 2, 
1983, the details of which were set forth in Finding of Fact 
75. 
On February 2, 1983 Anderson addressed a letter to Judge 
Cornaby advising him that several hours after the hearings before 
him on February 1, 1983, John Sampson, counsel for the consortium 
of investors who had made the purchase at the tax sale, called 
Anderson for the purpose of "warning" him that unless he ceased 
all representation of the various Richtron entities, including 
prosecution of his recently filed federal court case, further 
prosecution of motions and direct appeal to obtain modification 
or reversal of Cornaby1s recent rulings, Sampson would seek 
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"sanctions" and "other" relief against him, suggesting that 
Sampson had been laboring under the assumption that Judge Cornaby's 
recent rulings had that effect. Anderson requested an opportunity 
to file objections to the proposed order under Local Rule 2.9, 
and was using the letter as the only me^ns he knew of to advise 
the Court of Sampson's bizarre interpretation. 
A reason is not apparent from the ca$e file, but on February 
3, 1983, Anderson filed a Notice of Withdrawal as counsel for 
defendants and Richins entered his Notice of Pro Se Appearance. 
Thereafter, a flood of subpoenas and requests for discovery 
were issued by Richins, leading attorney Handy, then counsel 
for plaintiffs, to file a motion on April 21, 1983 requesting 
the court to enter an order directing Richins to obtain competent 
counsel to represent him in various cases pending in the Second 
District Court. The motion was granted and Richins filed a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal £rom the Court's Order 
to that affect. The Supreme Court accepted the petition which 
related to six separate cases, one being 29552, the case at 
bar. The other cases were 28349, the Vatlmont Credit Corp. suit 
against Richins and his wife, Richtroh, Inc., and RFC, into 
which Sampson, Marilyn Brown, Blanch and Sampson's corporations 
were brought in as third party defendants; 33526 which was an 
action by Richins as trustee of the Leo H. Richins Family Trust, 
against 23 limited partners seeking declaratory judgment relief 
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respecting the family trust's right, title and interest in certain 
assets in which those 23 named defendants, as limited partners, 
claimed ownership rights; 33527 which was an action by the Richins 
Family Trust against nine named limited partners, Sampson's 
PC and Ag Management to enforce terms of a promissory note evidencing 
an obligation for $22,067.46; 33528, a similar family trust 
obligation for $16,533.37 agianst five limited partners and 
Grandview Properties; and 29700 involving a suit by Young Farms 
against Richins, Richtron, Inc., the Allreds and the Bank of 
Utah, in which Richins filed a Counterclaim seeking dissolution, 
winding up and termination of the partnership. 
The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's rulings 
which had granted Handy's Motion on these cases, but only 29552 
is before this Court in this lawsuit, and while the Supreme 
Court's ruling also extended to the other cases, I have no infor-
mation as to the disposition of those other cases or their present 
status and I want to make it clear that in my decision herein 
I do not purport to make any rulings with respect to those other 
cases. The fact that John T. Anderson later re-entered his 
appearance as counsel for defendants took care of that problem 
and rendered it moot as far as this case is concerned. 
79. As I have earlier indicated the main thrust of defendants' 
Counterclaim lies primarily within their fourth claim for relief 
which among other things asserts a claim for relief based upon 
£±oo 
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Sampson . ,. " and a l l e g e d ma l i c i o u s i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 
R i c h i n s i q h t rn a l i v e l i h o o d , w i t h R i r . h t r o r ' " a b i l i t y 
t o e f f e u L "iai'|i« MIH I1!1 1111 ui I I 'm. ' 1 ii: "r jfejneidl 
p a r t n e r s and wi th e x i s t i n g economir r e l a t i o n s , a n t i c i p a t e d oppor -
f.ui ~:e-- - -c loyment an 1/or b e n e f i c i a l economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s , 
Other -r "Miii1 Mil1 u>u IM'I ' .•*!...MI n| ' ' 111,11 ."li 1 I" 1 J i u u . ' 
t ime durinc.
 k . I l i v e y u a i s , I am no t impres sed t h a t R i c h i n s 
h a s by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e cf I IIP e v i d n r p shown «iii i n t e r f e r o n s -
w i t h R i c h in •• |l I I I 1 m I J u n ^ l ui «illi a n t i c i p a t e d 
o p p o r t u n i t i e b toi employment and 1 30 fiinl At c l o s i n g argument 
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c i t e d t h r lit nh Supreme Cour t dec i , " in 1 of Leitjh 
F u r n i t u r e Lm_ CLXLU^I 0 U P V • 1 fc> U l i t 1 "I I ' j l" I"' i l l l" * J I 1 I I I I! I l i k l I t I 1 I I I 
a u t h o r i t y in s u p p o r t of d e f e n d a n t s ' " cLaims a g a i n s t Sampson, 
p a r t i c u l a r v H^ a s s e r t e d in *"hrt f o u r t h r i a i m 1. 
i r i i i ' l '"1 l ' | ^ S P ^^^ *.*-,* <_v . i i i r , . 
r u l i n g s • :-• more p r o p e r l y be - - o r d e r e d a s r e . r,:r.a 
t.0 C o n c l l i o n s - ' »*-* * j idutb dDU .* 
concerned 
80. . iupreme Court: s 
'We recogn 1 ze a o^sun-1 aw cause 
action for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations and adopt 
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under 
this definition, in order to recover damages, 
the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant 
intentionally intefered with the plaintiffs1 
existing or potential economic relations; 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff• 
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Privilege is an affirmative defense (case-
cited) which does not become an issue unless 
•the acts charged would be tortious on the 
part of an unprI.vileged def endant, ' " 
(case cited) 
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other activities of his business included such things as numerous 
letters of complaint, continued threats to cancel the contract 
and sell the building, his refusal to pay the contracted share 
of bills, and his suit for repossession, termination and injunction. 
The Court noted that taking "in isolation" each named activity, 
such activity might be justified as an overzealous attempt to 
protect its interests under the contract of sale, but as such 
no isolated activity would establish the Intentional interference 
element of this tort, though some might give rise to a cause 
of action for breach of specific conttact provisions, or of 
the duty of good faith performance which inheres in every contractual 
relation. But, said the court, in total and cumulative effect, 
as a course of action extending over a period of three and one-half 
years and culminating in the failure of Isom's business, Leigh's 
acts "cross the threshold beyond what is incidental and justifiable 
to what is tortious." The court notecj Leigh's argument that 
Isom's lossess resulted from his inadequate working capital, 
or from his unilateral decision to close the store after being 
immediately served with Leigh's complaint ar^ d taking out bankruptcy, 
and responded that there was substantial evidence of causation 
to support the jury verdict, and suggested the jury could have 
found that the initiation of this lawsuit Was but another instance 
of Leigh's ongoing pattern of harassment. 
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81. In the case at bar the plairttiff Sampson is indeed 
the defendant on the Counterclaim, and thus the Supreme Court's 
use of those terms in its Leigh decision becomes easily recognizable 
in its application to the parties in this case. While we are 
not here invovled with a contract between Sampson and Richins 
or his companies, as Leigh and Isom were, we are involved with 
a claim of Sampson's alleged tortious interference with economic 
relations between the defendants and the limited partnerships 
in which a Richtron company was the general partner. Some of 
the significant facts noted by the Supreme Court in the Leigh 
case reminds one of many facts seen in the voluminous summary 
of the facts established by the evidence in this case. 
82. We come to the question as to whether Sampson intentionally 
interfered with the defendants' existing and potential economic 
relationships with each of the limited partnerships under their 
respective partnership agreements. It is my opinion, and I 
so find, that the preponderance of the evidence, indeed over-
whelmingly so, answers that question in the affirmative. I 
think the summary of the evidence and the Findings of Fact support 
that finding. It is not my desire nor my intent to try to again 
summarize all of the evidence that brings me to that determination. 
But some significant facts stand out that in summary demonstrate 
that over a period of at least four and one<-half years, culminating 
in the end, if not the destruction, of defendants' businesses, 
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Sampson's acts "cross the threshold be|yond what is incidental 
and justified to what is tortious." Some such facts I will 
attempt to summarize as briefly as possible. 
83. However, before doing so and because such summary 
may have relevance to the second element our Supreme Court put 
into its definition of this tort, I think it would be well to 
first further note that court's comments about the required 
elements of "improper purpose" or "improper means." 
As to the former the court said: 
The alternative of improper purpose 
(or motive, intent, or objective) will support 
a cause of action for intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations even 
where the defendant's means were proper. 
The court goes on to note a statement by Prosser that there 
has developed a general agreement that a purely malicious motive, 
in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff 
for its own sake will make the defendant liable for interference 
with a contract. Prosser's comment as referred to by the court 
concludes with the suggestion that the ^ourt may well look to 
the "predominant purpose" underlying the defendant's conduct. 
Our court goes on to say that bec&use it requires that 
the improper purpose "dominate," this alternative takes the 
long view of the defendant's conduct, Allowing objectionable 
short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic 
motivation. Further, that problems inherent in proving motivation 
9 - O Q 4±oO 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -95- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
or purpose make it prudent for commercial conduct to be regulated 
for the most part by the improper means alternative, which typically 
requires only a showing of particular cponduct. The court then 
said: 
The alternative of improper purpose 
will be satisfied where it can be shown 
that the actor's predominant purpose was 
to injure the plaintiff. 
and goes on to quote the Alaska Supreme Court as saying (604 
P. 2d 1090) that "If one does not act in a good faith attempt 
to protect his own interest, or that of another but, rather, 
is motivated by a desire to injure the contract party, he forfeits 
the immunity affordable by the privilege" which in that case 
was to compete. 
As to the alternative requirement of "improper means," 
our Supreme Court said this requirement. 
. . . i s s a t i s f i e d where the means 
used to in t e r fe re with a p a r t y ' s economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations 
of s t a t u t e s , r e g u l a t i o n s , or recognized 
common-law r u l e s . Such ac ts are i l l e g a l 
or t o r t i o u s in themselves ahd hence are 
clearly 'improper' means of interference. 
The court goes on to say that the me^ns may also be improper 
because i t violates an established standard of trade or profession. 
A further explanation appears from our court 's statement 
that : 
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A deliberate breach of contract even 
where employed to secure economic advantage, 
is not, by itself, an1improper means.1 Because 
the law remedies breaches of contract with 
damages calculated to give the aggrieved 
party the benefit of the bargain, there 
is no need for an additional Remedy in tort 
(unless the defendant' s conduct would constitute 
a tort independent of the contract). 
Neither a deliberate breach of contract 
nor an immediate purpose to inflict injury 
which does not predominate over a legitimate 
economic end will, by itself, satisfy this 
element of the tort. However, they may 
do so in combination. This is so because 
contract damages provide an insufficient 
remedy for a breach prompted by an immediate 
purpose to injure, and that purpose does 
not enjoy the same legal imntunity in the 
context of contract relations as it does 
in the competitive marketplace. As a result, 
a breach of contract committed for the immediate 
purpose of injuring the other contracting 
party is an improper means that will satisfy 
this element of the cause of action for 
intentional interference with economic relations. 
I mention one other point our courti discusses in reference 
to a California case (145 P.2d 305) which sustained a verdict 
for damages for tortious interference with the plaintiff's business 
wherein the California court said a breach of contract is a 
wrong and itself actionable and that, "It is also wrongful when 
intentionally utilized as a means of depriving plaintiff of 
his employees." 
83. Throughout the Memorandum and Summation and these 
Findings and Conclusions I have frequqntly had the occasion 
to mention the names of Marilyn Brown and Keith Blanch as working 
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with Sampson on matters involving thfe partnership affairs. 
The evidence reflects and I so find that in May, 1980, Marilyn 
Brown was working for Richins and his companies but quit upon 
two weeks notice to go to work for Sampson for whom she did 
a substantial amount of bookkeeping and letter writing concerning 
partnership matters. When Richins1 CPA - Hurd - wrote his memo 
of resignation he offered an apology for giving such short notice 
particularly where Brown had already given notice of her intent 
to quit. 
As to Keith Blanch he had worked as a field manager for 
Richins and his companies on partnership matters, but he was 
hired by Sampson almost immediately after Sampson got involved 
in controlling partnership matters. 
Richins had been involved in establishing the limited partner-
ships since about 1973 and in the years that followed he established 
the 25 we have herein so often referred to. As to each, a Richtron 
corporation was the general partner, RFC (but sometimes Richtron, 
Inc.) was usually the Richtron company that purchased a farm 
property under contract and resold it to the partnership at 
a mark-up, and the partnership agreements were substantially 
identical. About 130 investors had bdcome limited partners 
in one or more of the limited partnerships. As stated in prior 
findings, by May, 1980, Richins and his companies had become 
confronted with substantial financial problems, as well as others 
o * < i 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -98- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
likewise mentioned elsewhere, which were of such magnitude that 
success in overcoming them seemed doubtful. But important at 
this point are Sampson's activities and the]Lr affect upon defendants 
then existing or potential economic relations with respect to 
those partnerships. 
84. Sampson was never an investor in any of these limited 
partnerships, but began his activities in this case in May, 
19 8 0 as counsel for just two limited pattners, Milton Goff and 
Rex Kohler, who had a right to seek legal advice as investors 
in some partnerships. Their concerns were real and based upon 
the problem facts and circumstances then confronting Richins 
and his companies for which Richins, not Sampson, was responsible. 
As counsel for Goff and Kohler, Sampson attended the May 
29, 198 0, meeting of the Catlow Valley limited partners. His 
actions there were a bit more than ju$t privately counseling 
his two client investors, for he not only recommended and got 
started the movement to have RFC file fo£ Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings because of an impending foreclosure sale then set 
for June 6, 1980, but he also expressed the legal opinion to 
all present that he did not think RFC could claim and retain 
its mark-up equity arising from RFCfs resale of the Catlow Valley 
property to the partnerships for an amount in excess of what 
it had paid for it, which Sampson stamped as a breach of fiduciary 
duty, a theme which Sampson repeatedly expressed in the months 
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and years ahead. Nowhere in the record do I find a statement 
by Sampson as to what fiduciary duty was thus breached. RFC 
purchased land and resold it to a limited partnership under 
a real estate contract which created no fiduciary duty regarding 
price. Also, at this meeting the idea of possibly employing 
Sampson as counsel occurred to others and spread to investors 
in other partnerships not involved in the May 29, 1980 meeting. 
On May 30, 198 0, the very next day following the Catlow 
Valley meeting, Sampson told Richins he and a group of investors, 
whom he refused to identify, were interested in buying out the 
Richtron interests in all the partnerships and taking over the 
whole operation. 
On or about June 1, 1980, the bankruptcy of RFC under Chapter 
11 as recommended by Sampson was begu$ by attorney Leta, as 
counsel for Richins. However, at the first meeting of creditors 
on this bankruptcy Sampson was there and, along with Richins, 
had individual discussions with Glenn, the original owner and 
seller of the Catlow Valley property; with Osborn about his 
judgment; and with Knowles as attorney fot Valmont. As elsewhere 
noted, in the months that followed Sampson represented Richins 
and his companies in other lawsuits as counsel, many of which 
went to default judgment. The RFC bankruptcy did not stop the 
foreclosure sale and in due time was dismissed. 
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During June, 1980 Sampson pressed his discussions about 
taking over the Richtron interests in the partnership and a 
meeting was called for and held on Jiine 26, 1980, of limited 
partners considered to be substantial investors from various 
partnerships, the number or identity o|f whom Sampson was then 
representing had not been fully made Iknown. The major point 
of discussion at this meeting was the purchase of the Richtron 
interests in which Sampson played a leading role. An offer 
of $650,000 was made and Richins requested a recess to think 
it over. However, his thinking time was intruded upon by Sampson 
and Kohler and a heated discussion followed. Sampson told Richins 
the settlement would be $650,000 at 13% or nothing. Richins 
told Sampson it was none of his business as he was not a limited 
partner. Kohler convinced Sampson to meet Richins1 suggested 
figure of $700,000, so when the meeting continued, that amount 
was agreed upon as the sum for which the Richtron interests 
would all be sold. Richins said he wanted David Day, his attorney, 
to draft the settlement agreement. Richiris also said that during 
the time it would take to complete drafting of the agreement, 
a couple of creditors may file lawsuits * Sampson said to send 
him the complaints and he would answer tl(iem and stall them off. 
Sampson further stated at the time th^t when the settlement 
agreement was consummated, he would like to take over as legal 
counsel for Richtron and exclude outside counsel, but Richins 
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objected, notwithstanding which the investors supported Sampson's 
request and voted for it, and this, notwithstanding the partnership 
agreement gave the general partner full, and the limited partners 
no, control over management and control Of partnership affairs. 
One continuing contention and conflict that surfaced quickly 
and remained in the forefront in negotiations, as well as in 
the numerous writings Richins and Sampson each sent to investors, 
as well as to each other, was Richins' claim that his companies, 
and indeed his wife and his father's family trust, had continually 
over the years made advances of monies to the various partnerships 
to help pay obligations and land purchase contract payments. 
Richins claimed such advances were made necessary by the failure 
of many of the limited partners to pay their pro rata shares 
of the assessments that were made by the general partners period-
ically in accordance with the express authority granted to the 
general partner in Article V(l) (c) and the probable necessity 
for which is mentioned in Article VII (13). 
Richins prepared a schedule dated April 30, 1981 (Ex. 158) 
which contained a column entitled "Net Advances" for each named 
partnership, the total of which was $585,03 6 with interest due 
thereon of $151,678, which Richins testified was prepared about 
that date for the purpose of being an exhibit upon a settlement 
agreement which they were at that tim$ endeavoring to reach. 
However, the original settlement agreement drafted by Attorney 
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Day pursuant to the June 26, 1980 meeting contained an exhibit 
summarizing the "overall equity position" of the Richtron companies 
which included in column III thereof the net advances "to or 
from" the respective limited partnerships, which reflected a 
"net" indebtedness to defendants of $393,840 (without interest). 
The information contained in that column reflected that 12 partner-
ships were indebted to the Richtron companies on advances made 
to them and that the Richtron companies were indebted to eight 
partnerships for "advances" made to the Richtron companies by 
said eight partnerships, it being noted that Article VII (13) 
provides that not only could the general partner make advances 
to the partnerships as needed, but that the general partner 
would be entitled to receive advances from a partnership in 
return. Article V (1)(c), which discusses in more detail advances 
made by the general partner to a partnership/ states such advances 
shall be repaid in accordance with the termls of the loan instruments 
out of gross receipts, and that any and all unpaid advances, 
together with accrued and unpaid interest, shall become immediately 
due and payable upon the sale of the property or the termination 
and dissolution of the partnership unless otherwise agreed upon. 
The evidence did not contain anything about loan instruments 
having been prepared when such advances toere made or repayments 
being made out of gross receipts in accordance with the "terms 
of the loan instruments," it being no^ed here and I so find 
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that the promissory notes which Richihs prepared on or about 
June 5, 1980 and signed for the partnerships as president of 
the general partner, did not constitute the "loan instruments" 
as that term was used in the partnership agreement. Nor was 
there any evidence that there was a sale of a property or the 
termination or dissolution of a partnership that made any advance 
immediately due and payable. 
However, since this lawsuit does not constitute a claim 
for such advances against any partnership, the partnerships 
"to whom" and "from whom" such advances w^re made and the amounts 
thereof are irrelevant here, and the net figure of $393,840 
mentioned above only has relevance as it relates to whether 
or not such net advances should be an item or measure of damages 
as to the claims asserted against Sampson l^y reason of his conduct, 
which included his oft repeated assertions to the limited partners 
and to Richins that any such advances were not valid obligations 
owed to defendants. 
Sampson almost from the beginning Expressed the view that 
the advances claimed were not valid and did not constitute partner-
ship obligations. In letters to the investors, to Richins, 
and in oral discussions Sampson repeatedly reiterated that view. 
There was evidence the Leo H. Richins Family Trust furnished 
$100,000 toward such advances and that Sh^ri Richins contributed 
$32,000. There was some evidence that some of the limited partners 
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refused to sign the settlement agreemdnt because it purported 
to acknowledge indebtedness for such a<$vances. Throughout all 
the documentary evidence when advances were being discussed, 
Richins1 position that they should be Repaid remained adamant, 
while Sampson's position that advances were not valid debts 
to be repaid to defendants by the partnership seemed just as 
adamant, and he repeatedly told limited partners either orally 
or in letters that such was his opinion and advice. However, 
other than a suggestion that such claims were self-serving, 
Sampson never told the Court why advances so made did not become 
partnership debts under the partnership agreements that were 
repayable as provided therein. I find that such advances were 
made under the partnership agreement and were repayable as provided 
therein. 
I stress that my finding here is limited to just that. 
The limited partnerships are not parties to this action and 
I need not, and do not, make any ruling that any partnership 
is indebted to a general partner in any amount. Those advances 
were made before May, 1980, when Sampson first became involved. 
But the advances so made become of concern to the Court in this 
lawsuit because one of the facts that became a part of Sampson's 
conduct was his very early and oft repeated statements to all 
limited partners, both orally and in writihg and over an extended 
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period of time, that such advances were not partnership obligations 
that were subject to repayment to the defendants. 
My finding set out above with respect to the advances is, 
in reality, a finding that Sampson was wrong in so stating and 
is a part of Sampson's overall tortious conduct which I have 
found caused injury to defendants. As I have repeatedly stated, 
the burden of proving damages and the amount thereof is upon 
the defendants and to do so by a preponderance of the evidence. 
I do not find that the evidence preponderates in proving that, 
but for Sampson's statements to the investors that such advances 
were not debts owed to the partners, the partnerships would 
have in fact repaid the amount of such advances in full as shown 
in the partnership books and records, or indeed any part thereof. 
The evidence does not preponderate in showing that any of the 
circumstances mentioned in the partnership agreements as triggering 
the repayment requirement was proven to have occurred. The 
total amount of advances owed, whatever they may be, does not 
herein give us a yardstick for determining damages, but Sampson's 
conduct with respect thereto would be a factor to consider with 
respect to the damage issue. 
85. One of the problems Richins faced in May, 1980, was 
the distrust of JLimited partners, as mentioned in detail elsewhere, 
and the payment of capital contributions assessed by Richins 
became a matter of controversy and one over which limited partners 
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active in the negotiations were not willing to further place 
under Richins1 exclusive control as in the past. Since an agreement 
for settlement had been agreed upon on June 26, 1980, relations 
between Richins and Sampson were then generally amicable, so 
Sampson became involved in the collection of funds from the 
limited partners who refused to deliver them to Richins. Sampson 
was then to pass them on to Richins for distribution as needed 
to meet debts and expenses. That plan was not followed to the 
letter and Sampson began placing and retaining partner contributions 
in his trust accounts at his bank, and particularly so when 
the settlement agreement was not approved. 
As early as July 18, 198 0, when Murray First Thrift had 
scheduled its foreclosure sale on the Pleasant Valley property 
at Roosevelt, Utah, Sampson took it upon himself to attend the 
sale and work something out. He obtained $30,000 from Olsen, 
a partner in Pleasant Valley and took $10,000 from the funds 
of another partnership he already had in his trust account, 
went to Roosevelt where he talked to Kay Lewis, attorney for 
Murray, who was handling the sale, told him it was investor's 
money and paid the $40,000 to Lewis, about $1,800 of which was 
in excess of what was owed which Murray later returned to Sampson. 
Lewis gave Sampson a reconveyance deed for the general partner, 
who was of course the obligor to Murray, stamped the note paid, 
and gave them to Sampson who thereafter refused to deliver those 
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documents to Richins though requested several times to do so. 
86. When attorney Day finished drafting the settlement 
agreement Sampson sent copies to all the investors with a request 
that they sign it and return it directly to Richins. Many did 
so but several did not, so the settlement agreed upon was not 
thereafter consummated. 
Although Richins had stated at the May 29, meeting he would 
withdraw his company as general partner and let the Catlow Valley 
partnerships elect someone else; and although during June, 1980, 
Richins gave formal notice of withdrawal of the Richtron general 
partner to three partnerships (Blackfoot, Snowville and Kanosh); 
and although the partnership agreement expressly provided that 
a majority of the limited partners in interest of any partnership 
could by such majority vote, remove the general partner and 
elect a new one, it appears that Sampson never suggested to 
his clients, whoever they were, to follow that simple course. 
87. Instead, as previously noted, when it became apparent 
that the settlement agreement had failed, Sampson sent out a 
letter to all limited partners, together with a power of attorney 
form, requesting each to sign, which form when signed gave Sampson 
a total irrevocable right to vote their interests in the various 
partnerships, which he said, would enable him to remove Richins 
as general partner, rather than noting that it was a Richtron 
corporation that held that position. in his letter Sampson 
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told the investors that since settlement was not possible, they 
must remove Richins and his organizations as general partner 
and thereafter commence legal actions against them to retain 
the properties, roll back the contract prices and pursue other 
legal remedies. Sampson further stated they had to raise $400,000 
for payment on the properties and present litigation costs; 
and that to get some consensus and order along with a united 
front, he was forming a management corporation and it would 
become the general partner of all partnerships. He requested 
all contributions be sent to him, it being noted here that he 
was then neither a limited or general partner and had never 
established that he was counsel for all limited partners. Sampson 
said that each would be given proper credit for the money sent 
and he would vacate Richins1 forfeitures of the capital investments 
of those limited partners who had failed to pay their assessments. 
A substantial number of the powers of attorney were signed 
and returned to him and using them and relying thereon, he elected 
his own professional corporation, which he had by then formed, 
the general manager of each limited partnership and prepared 
and filed amended partnership certificates which he alone signed 
— individually and as president of his PC — allegedly doing 
so under authority of the powers of attorney. Even if it be 
assumed that a valid voting right was transferred to Sampson 
by each limited partner so signing, enabling him to vote the 
2152 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -109- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Richtron general partner out and his own PC in, the law required 
that an amended certificate be filed and that it be signed and 
sworn to by each member of the limited partnership. Such amended 
certificate was not so signed and sworn to by even one limited 
partner, and thus constituted a complete failure to comply with 
the explicit requirements of state law and was not valid. 
88. In January, 1981 Sampson obtained an assignment of 
the Osborn judgment ($75,683.73) from Osborn, under an agreement 
to pay Osborn $20,000 immediately, $10,000 more in two weeks 
and another $10,000 in three months. Sampson sent the $20,000 
using partnership funds then deposited in his trust account. 
Upon the $20,000 payment Sampson obtained an assignment of the 
judgment from Osborn to himself in his own name, which act was 
a direct violation of Section 78-51-27 of the Utah Code. Within 
three weeks after receiving the assignment, Sampson had another 
attorney file this lawsuit on the Oregon judgment showing Osborn 
as plaintiff. Why Sampson took the assignment in his own name 
but filed the Complaint in Osborn's name was never explained, 
but when the assignment came to light and a motion filed, Sampson 
was substituted as party plaintiff. 
The Osborn judgment assignment ran into further complications, 
triggered by the failure of Sampson to pay the remaining $20,000 
as agreed. Osborn rescinded the assignment for failure of consi-
deration, had it reinstated in the Oregon court, and near the 
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end of 1981 levied execution on his judgment through a sheriff's 
sale purporting to cover all of the defendants' property interests, 
whatever they were, in the Catlow Valley Farms. Osborn bid 
$50,000 at the sheriff's sale, obtained a Certificate of Sale, 
and consummated a further deal with Sampson pursuant to which 
Sampson collected $45,000 from Goff and the other plaintiffs, 
paid it to Osborn, obtained a warranty deed from Osborn conveying 
to Goff as trustee for those who put up the $45,000 all the 
property interests Osborn had acquired through the sheriff's 
sale, reciting a $65,000 consideration in the deed. Sampson 
thereafter also obtained, in Goff's name as trustee, an assignment 
of the Osborn judgment which also recited $65,000 as the consider-
ation. Sampson had Handy come in as new counsel for plaintiff 
who then got a court ruling substituting Goff, trustee, as plaintiff 
in the case. Such action by Sampson as an attorney was another 
violation of Section 78-51-27. This case thus remained alive 
with Goff as plaintiff, but with no amended complaint being 
filed to allege these new facts or what relief Goff was seeking. 
89. It also became known that it was contrary to law for 
a professional legal corporation to serve as a general partner 
in a limited farming partnership, so Sampson then incorporated 
Ag Management and proceeded by use of the powers of attorney 
previously obtained to substitute Ag Management for the Sampson 
PC as general partner of each limited partnership. Although 
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Sampson prepared documents giving notice of such change to all 
investors, no amendment to the Certificate reflecting such change 
was ever filed as required by law, not even one with Sampson 
as the lone signator thereon as had been done for the change 
to Sampson's PC as general partner. Sampson advised all limited 
partners that such change in the general partner had been made, 
directed that all payments were to be made to Ag Management 
through him and he thereby continued to control the operation 
of each partnership, 
90. By this time Richins had sent a written notice to 
all limited partners in all partnerships that the Richtron general 
partner had withdrawn and would proceed to wind up the partnership 
affairs and terminate the partnerships. Again, notwithstanding 
such notice, no action was taken by the partnerships, as provided 
in the agreement, to meet and by majority vote remove Richtron 
as general partner and elect a new one. Instead they, together 
with Sampson, were all apparently willing to let Sampson use 
the powers of attorney as he saw fit to achieve such a change. 
Also, it appeared that no action was taken by Richins to further 
wind up the affairs, notwithstanding his written notice that 
he would do so. 
91. Meanwhile, things went along on that state of affairs 
until Judge Duffy Palmer (as detailed in Findings of Fact 73, 
74, and 75) entered an Order in the District Court on November 
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24, 1982 declaring that Ag Management was not the general partner 
of any of the partnerships; that the Richtron general partners 
although having withdrawn, remained in control as such to wind 
up the partnership affairs; and stated that partnership certificates 
had never been amended to show Ag Management as general partner. 
92. Notwithstanding this unexpected set back, Sampson 
contended that he and his clients were still in control of all 
partnerships and owned all Richtron interests by reason of the 
fact that Sampson had about three weeks before, on behalf of 
Goff as trustee, purchased all the Richtron interests at the 
tax sale held by the IRS on October 29, 1982, for the sum of 
$40,400. 
Although the IRS had been investigating the partnership 
affairs for several months and held such tax sale to collect 
taxes allegedly owed by Richins and his wife and his companies, 
Richins had repeatedly contended that what the IRS had done 
was contrary to law. When the sale was held with Sampson appearing 
as the only bidder for Goff as trustee, Richins wrote to the 
investors stating the sale was illegal and they should think 
about coming back to him in the conflict with Sampson. Sampson 
responded by letter to all investors dated December 28, 1983, 
advising them of Judge Cornaby's first ruling that the IRS sale 
was valid, and of the significance of the IRS sale, stating 
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that Richins1 contentions had no substance and no federal court 
was going to void that sale. 
93. Sampson's prediction lost to Richins1 contentions 
when, on May 16, 1984, Judge David Winder of the United States 
District Court entered an Order as previously noted, which un-
equivocally voided the IRS Tax Sale of October 29, 1982, stating 
Gof f had no interest in the capital stock 0f the Richtron companies 
nor in the rights of these companies to wind up the partnership 
affairs, nor the right to institute causes of action, nor in 
any of the real estate contracts and partnership interests. 
(See Conclusion of Law 44) 
Notwithstanding this ruling Sampson by letter to Richins 
dated August 28, 1984, advised Richin£ his contentions that 
Sampson's organization had no interest in tfye partnership properties 
was "crazy and false" because after th£ original land owners, 
who had originally sold the farm land to tjie various partnerships, 
had foreclosed on the defaulted contracts * his clients had repur-
chased lands from these owners directly and for Richins to not 
interfere. From Richins1 schedule setting forth the dates on 
which each property had been foreclosed, it appears that all 
foreclosures had occurred prior to the date Sampson wrote Richins 
this letter. It also appears therefrom that all foreclosures 
had occurred, except East Taber (August 8, 1984) prior to the 
date of Judge Winder's Order invalidating the tax sale, and 
2 * %mm *•«-* 107 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -114- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
all had been foreclosed after Sampson took over control of the 
partnerships by the manuever of votin|g, by use of the powers 
of attorney, to replace his PC as general partner in place of 
the Richtron general partners. 
At Finding of Fact 83, I began a summary of Sampson's conduct 
for the purpose of setting forth why I thought, and so found 
in Finding of Fact 82, that Sampson's conduct over the years 
had in fact "crossed the threshold beyond what is incidental 
and justified to what is tortious." I recognize and regret 
that what followed Finding 83 was repetitious in many things, 
but I believe the summary sustains my referenced Finding. 
94. The record in summary thus shows that in May, 1980, 
Richins and his companies had control of at least 25 limited 
farm partnerships with assets and liabilities of such a nature 
that they had serious financial problems in May, 1980, when 
Sampson first became involved. It further shows that when Sampson 
first got involved he had nothing in th^ 25 partnerships except 
two clients that wanted advice. By Saitjpson's acts and conduct 
by the end of 1980 — within seven months — Sampson had taken 
over and assumed control of the 2 5 partnerships, that he was 
receiving all of the funds, disbursing them and using them in 
whatever way he determined. He continued such control for five 
years, yet produced no evidence as to whit had happened to those 
25 partnerships. 
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95. Sampson suggested from time to time that his sole 
objective was to salvage the partnership assets for the limited 
partners to the point of at least getting back their investments. 
The evidence does not show that all investors joined in retaining 
Sampson as their attorney or their proxy, but the evidence does 
make clear that Sampson's main goal and effort soon became one 
of getting rid of Richins from all partnerships and obtaining 
control thereof for himself and his clients whom he never fully 
specifically identified. I think the evidence shows, and so 
find, that his self-declared benevolent motive soon changed 
to one of greed and a vendetta to oust Richins and take complete 
control. 
I thus find as facts that in May, 1980 the defendants had 
existing economic relations with at least 25 limited partnerships; 
that Sampson quickly and intentionally interfered therewith; 
that he did so for an improper purpose, including a desire to 
do harm to defendants for its own sake, a mere officious inter-
meddling for no other reason than a diesire to interfere, and 
such a showing of facts as to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence to a substantial degree that the improper purpose 
predominated any other purpose; and thatf he did so by improper 
means, which included means that were contrary to statutory 
law relating to limited partnerships and the required means 
of amending a certificate; and to statutory law controlling 
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the conduct of attorneys set forth in Section 78-51-27 from 
which it is clear that Sampson's handling of the Osborn judgment 
on two separate occasions both constituted a misdemeanor punishable 
as such or conduct justifying suspension or disbarment. Further 
improper means are to be found in Sampson's assumption of the 
role of counsel for defendants in certain cases and then taking 
serious actions against defendants and making use of facts obtained 
while involved in an attorney-client gelation in violation of 
the ethical standards adopted as a guide to the conduct of lawyers. 
The examples I point to as being illustrative of both improper 
conduct or improper means are not intended to state that no 
other such conduct pointing to improper purpose or improper 
means can be found in the record for I believe that many other 
stated facts as disclosed by the evidence could be looked to 
as supporting the build up of evidence clearly preponderating 
in finding the presence of both alternatives of the second element 
of the tort as defined by our Supreme Coutrt. 
96. It is to be remembered that in Leigh v. Isom, supra, 
our Supreme Court included in its definition of the tort of 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations 
as a necessary third element that the tortious conduct "caused 
injury to the plaintiff." From the evidence the injury seems 
self-evident. Recognizing some repetition, I again note that 
in May, 1980, notwithstanding all of the problems heretofore 
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noted as confronting the general partners, Richins and RFC, 
either Richtron Inc. or Richtron General was the one general 
partner in each of the 2 5 existing limited partnerships, each 
of which was buying their respective farm properties under contract 
with RFC or Richtron Inc., each had assets and each had existing 
obligations. By the end of May, 1980, Sampson was already beginning 
to throw his weight around and by the ^nd of 1980, through the 
use of his collected powers of attorney, he had assumed and 
obtained control contrary to law of most, if not all, of the 
partnerships; had all assessed funds coming his way; had control 
thereof; had allowed default judgments to be entered against 
Richins and/or his companies; and had for all practical purposes 
reduced Richins control in partnership affairs to a letter writing 
role. He had in violation of state and penal statutes acquired 
the Osborn judgment and commenced this lawsuit thereon on February 
11, 1981. 
Sampson had in effect acquired and asserted control of 
the limited partnerships by substituting first his own PC and 
then his Ag Management as purported n|ew partners, but doing 
so illegally because it was not done in compliance with state 
law. From the evidence it does not appear that Richins ever 
again gained actual control over any of tl}e partnerships, although 
he had successfully reversed Sampsonf£ procedural tactics in 
the state and federal courts and in the Supreme Court of Utah. 
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On the other hand Sampson had during patft of this time received 
a favorable ruling in the district court supporting his efforts 
in the IRS tax sale until the sale wafe voided in the federal 
court. Regardless of Sampson's apparent belief that what he 
did was legally proper, the facts were otherwise, and his violation 
of express statutory provisions to achieve his results hardly 
measures up to a standard of performance expected from the legal 
profession. 
97. Thus, I find that Sampson by his tortious conduct 
caused injury to the defendants. 
98. The main problem, here now btecomes, from the Court's 
point of view, having found an actionable tort and injury to 
the defendants caused thereby, the question as to what damages, 
if any, the defendants have suffered as a proximate cause thereof. 
The burden of proving damages and the amount thereof, if any, 
on the Counterclaim is upon the defendants. The standard of 
proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. The credibility 
of evidence and testimony in this caste is a matter that the 
Court must decide. 
99. In their Counterclaim defendants allege and seek recovery 
of millions of dollars in damages, both actual and punitive. 
As stated in their Counterclaim the prayers for damages in each 
claim for relief are jointly stated, as a combined claim for 
all defendants together, as though thte defendants, although 
each in a different status, were each entitled to base their 
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claims all on the same bases. This they cannot do, as their 
claims for relief are based upon different rights. 
Richins individually had no interest in any of the partner-
ships. He was president of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General, 
one or the other being the lone general partner in the partnerships. 
He was also president of RFC and Frontier Investments, both 
corporations organized by him. The office of president of each 
of these four corporations gives him ho additional rights or 
claims for relief that he does not haVe as an individual, if 
any. Richins did assert an individual claim for relief in the 
third claim of the Counterclaim which claim he abandoned during 
the trial. The Second Amended Counterqlaim identifies Richins 
as president of Richtron, Inc. and RFC. 
The first claim asserts Sampson acted as counsel for Richins 
as well as the corporate defendants. Thus Richins1 individual 
claim on this count is that as an individual party in any lawsuits 
in which Sampson is alleged to have dofte an actionable wrong, 
he has an individual claim against Sampson. The same is true 
in the second claim which is, in effect, based upon negligence 
of Sampson. The fourth claim asserts that Sampson interfered 
with and invaded Richins1 right to earn a livelihood. The fifth 
and sixth claims do not purport to assert a claim for relief 
for Richins individually. 
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100. RFC's role in the partnership matters is centered 
around the contracts to which it was a party. As to these RFC 
held dual roles. RFC appears as buyer of farm property from 
the original owner under a contract that set out a purchase 
price and terms of payment which involved a down payment, installment 
payments on the balance and the interest to be paid. After 
so buying a tract of farm land RFC would then become the seller 
of that particular tract to an individual limited partnership 
under a contract which set out the terms thereof. The sale 
price was always fixed at a higher price than that paid by RFC 
under its purchase contract from the owner. The difference 
is referred to frequently as the mark-up. The contract also 
fixed its own installment payments and usually, if not always, 
called for a higher interest rate. Details concerning the properties 
RFC so bought and sold are to be found in its bankruptcy schedules 
or other exhibits. RFC was a limited partner in Catlow Valley 
Farms 2 and 6^but had no other interest, powers or authority 
therein under the partnership agreements. It was entitled only 
to receive its payments due from each partnership to which it 
sold land upon which it had a corresponding obligation to make 
the contract payments due the original seller under what to 
RFC was a purchase contract. RFC's rights rested on such contracts 
and aside from its limited partnership interests, its profits 
lay in its marked-up selling prices to the partnerships and 
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higher interest rates and not to any profits from operations 
or a future resale. Its maximum profit that it could ever expect 
to achieve under these contracts was based upon a total payoff 
by the partnership to RFC under their contract less RFC's total 
payoff to the landowner from whom it had purchased the property. 
The financial problems RFC experienced at the time it filed 
its Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding all arose before Sampson 
became involved. 
101. The RFC bankruptcy was filed June 5, 1980. Finding 
of Fact 56 shows the execution on the same day by Richins as 
president of the general partners of the quit-claim deeds by 
which the partnerships named therein conveyed the partnership's 
interest in the land it had purchased from RFC back to RFC. 
Finding of Fact 57 also shows that on that same day Richins 
prepared and signed as president of the general partner 18 promissory 
notes which obligated each limited partnership listed therein 
for the amounts shown, or the total amount equal to the aggregate 
advances made to the named partnership as shown by the books 
and records. Each note made Richtron, Inc., Richtron General 
and RFC joint payees thereon. By what authority Richins did 
so was never established. The note provided that it was payable 
on demand but in no event no later than ten days after various 
occurrences, including the withdrawal of Richtron, Inc. as general 
partner. 
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Section 70A-3-802 of the Code provides that unless otherwise 
agreed where an instrument is taken for an underlying obligation, 
the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument is 
due or if it is payable on demand until its presentment. If 
the instrument is dishonored, action may be maintained on either 
the instrument or the obligation. Thus, under this statute 
the obligations claimed to have been owed on advances were suspended, 
being in effect replaced by the obligation created on the notes 
and remained so suspended until the notes (being demand notes) 
were presented for payment, or until ten days after the withdrawal 
of the general partner. They are partnership obligations whether 
asserted on the instrument or the obligation and neither the 
notes nor the advances are mentioned in the pleadings. They 
are not Sampson's obligations as such, but whether they fall 
within the scope of the allegation of each claim for relief 
as set forth in the Counterclaim of "injury and damages of a 
character and in an amount to be ascertained at the trial" is 
a matter to be resolved. 
102. I note from the pleadings that Richtron, Inc. was 
stated to have been organized in part for the purpose of acquiring 
real property in its own name for management, syndication, and 
resale to various third party limited partnerships. No such 
reason was stated in the pleadings as to such being a reason 
why RFC was incorporated. In any case where Richtron, Inc. occupied 
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a buyer-seller situation such as RFC occupied, its rights in 
that capacity would be identical to those described for RFC 
in Finding 100. However, its main role, and the only role of 
Richtron General, appearing from the evidence was serving as 
the general partner of most of the limited partnerships as shown 
elsewhere in these documents. 
As general partners the rights to Compensation of Richtron, 
Inc. and Richtron General in any of the partnerships to which 
one or the other was the general partner are to be determined 
from the partnership agreements. Those agreements set forth 
that the general partners are entitled, first, to a management 
fee during the first two years of the operation, and, secondly, 
to a 10% share of the final profits. 
The management fee was payable on the date of the agreement 
equal to 10% of the total consideration given for the property. 
It appears the management fee was paid immediately off the top 
of the down payment the limited partnership made on the property. 
No further management fee was to be paid but the general partner 
was to be reimbursed currently out of partnership assets for 
all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by it on behalf of 
the partnership. Also, the general partner was entitled under 
the partnership agreement to 10% of any profits realized out 
of the final disposition of the property and after the limited 
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partners had received cash or property in value to the amounts 
of their capital contributions. The other 90% of the profits 
were to go to the limited partners. Thus, the general partner 
was entitled to nothing from the partnership after the management 
fee and current expenses unless a profit remained upon the final 
disposition of the property. From thfe evidence it does not 
appear that defendants established a claim of any entitlement 
to damages for unreimbursed current expenses. Such is an important 
factor to be considered in determining what amount of damages, 
if any, the general partners would be entitled to recover and 
upon them, as I have stated, rests the burden of proof. 
103. Frontier Investment was incorporated and alleged in 
the Complaint to have been made the assignee and transferee 
of all right, title and interest of aljL defendants in any and 
all monetary proceeds received in this case. The allegation 
was denied by plaintiffs. It has no claim for relief that it 
can assert against plaintiffs for damages for no injury to it 
is attributable to plaintiffs. Because of its unique role for 
which it was incorporated, it was made a party defendant by 
Court Order. The record contains no evidence of such alleged 
assignment to it. 
104. Defendants undertook to prove damages by various financial 
schedules they placed into evidence. Exhibit 223 was a schedule 
showing that between June 27, 1980 and November 30, 1982, Sampson 
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received $645,101.38 from partnership sources and disbursed 
the whole thereof to various parties, including $60,182 in legal 
fees to himself and $78,184.18 for "general overhead." Richins 
in preparing this schedule did not show a further breakdown 
on the overhead expense item. This exhibit gives a complete 
detailed listing of some $491,873.82 ^s having been collected 
from named limited partners in the individual amounts shown 
and the dates such amounts were deposited in one of Sampson's 
bank trust accounts. Also listed are crop sales and rent money 
totaling $153,227.56 with a detailed breakdown of the source 
and amounts of such funds and the dates and bank accounts of 
Sampson's into which each amount went, with certain exceptions 
showing how some funds were handled without going through one 
of Sampson's bank accounts. 
The exhibit shows a detailed account of how these funds 
were spent summarized by Richins as follows: 
Payments to Richtron $ 32,500.00 
Property payments 146,551.03 
Sprinkler payments 29,117.15 
Legal fees - Joan O'Neil 2,000.00 
Purchase Richtron farm equip. 3,500.00 
Osborn Judgment purchase 65,000.00 
Valmont Credit Judgment purchase 15,000.00 
Murray First TD purchase 38,138.21 
Utah PCA RE Contract payment 10,000.00 
IRS Tax Sale payments 40,400.00 
Legal fees - Sampson 60,182.68 
Keith Blanch - wages & expenses 96,057.15 
Marilyn Brown - salary & expenses 28,470.48 
General overhead 78f184.18 
$ 6 4 5 , 1 0 1 . 3 8 
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The property payments of $146,551.03 primarily involved 
payments to the original owner-sellers and did not include payments 
by the partnerships to RFC as payments on those contracts. 
The payments to Marilyn Brown included $600.00 to settle a lawsuit 
in which she was defendant. The General Overhead remains a 
mystery as to specifics, but presumably covers Sampson's office 
expenses. The other expense items have been rather thoroughly 
considered in other findings. I note that this exhibit covers 
up to November 30, 198 2, which is about one month after the 
IRS tax sale and a week or so after »}udge Palmer put an end 
to Ag Management's role as general partner. 
105. Richins prepared various schedules of receipts and 
disbursements from various bank accounts that included entries 
after November 30, 1982. Exhibit 217 contained information 
relating to the John P. Sampson, Attorney at Law, Trust Account. 
It reflected receipts between December 20, 1982 to August 30, 
1983 totaling $11,574.50 and no disbursements. $11,000 were 
shown as deposits from Ag Management ($5,000) and Consolidated 
Farms ($6,000). Exhibit 218 relating to the John Sampson, PC 
Trust, purported to cover period from December 4, 1980 to November 
30, 1982 but shows one receipt of $1,517 on July 12, 1983 from 
Virgil Condon and four disbursements from July 12, 1983 to August 
10, 1984, totaling $1,035.36, three to Ag Management for expenses 
and one to Consolidated Farms for expense?. 
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Exhibit 219 related to the Ag Management Account for the 
period from February 16, 1982 to October 29, 1984. The first 
entry after November 30, 1982 was December 3, 1982. The last 
entry was October 29, 1984. During this period 75 deposits 
were entered to this account, 56 of which came from Consolidated 
Farms and totaled $143,000. The remaining deposits totaled 
$87,700, $20,000 from Snowville rent, $51,974 from Springfield 
grain and other miscellaneous sources. During this period 2 60 
disbursements were made from this accdunt, the total of which 
I did not compute, but for the total period covered by this 
account, as of October 29, 1984, there was a credit balance 
of $43,103. For the entire period covered by the schedule, 
receipts totaled $352,547 and disbursements totaled $309,444. 
One disbursement of $51,000 was made to Consolidated Farms; 
$32,460 was paid to Everingham on the Springfield properties; 
$16,119 to Utah Mortgage and Loan as a mortgage payment on Snowville; 
and $8,000 to Sampson for attorney's fe&s. Other disbursements 
ranged from nominal amounts to disbursements of several hundred 
or several thousand dollars. Numerous numbered checks were 
found to be missing so information with respect thereto was 
unavailable, but there was no evidence that any such checks 
had cleared the bank. 
106. Consolidated Farms, aka Consolidated Western Farms 
was incorporated by Sampson for the sole purpose to receive 
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the assets of all the limited partnerships. Exhibit 220 reflects 
that this account was opened on November 15, 1982 and the summary 
extended to October 29, 1984. Total receipts were $778,136 
and total disbursements were $632,539, leaving a balance of 
$145,597. An examination of the sources 4>f the receipts disclosed 
that they were all from contributions of named limited partners 
with a small part coming from various partnerships. As in the 
Ag Management account there were numerous missing checks. As 
to some the date, amount, payee and pi^ rpose was obtained from 
some source so that that information was included, but during 
19 84 the numbers of 96 checks were listed and shown as missing 
by Richins. The missing numbers appeared in groups of consecutive 
numbers. However, there was nothing In the schedule to show 
whether bank statements were examined or that any of the missing 
numbered checks had in fact cleared the account. I note that 
this account was opened four days prior io Judge Palmer's ruling 
declaring Ag Management was not the general partner in any partner-
ship. 
An examination of the listed checpks discloses that all 
but a few of the checks were disbursed either to Ag Management 
or to Keith Blanch or to one of his banH accounts. On or about 
October 14, 1983 $100,000 went to a law firm on "Randlett." 
Several checks went to Marilyn Brown for salary. $24,000 was 
paid to Sampson on legal fees, it appearing that beginning April 
9 ; VO 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -129- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
1, 1983 Sampson began drawing $3,000 petf month from this account 
for legal fees. Other checks went for miscellaneous expenses. 
Activity in the account following the federal court ruling in 
May, 1984, showed deposits totaled about 574,320 and disbursements 
of about $12,000, all of which went to Ag Management. 
107. Keith Blanch maintained two checking accounts upon 
which Richins submitted a schedule of receipts and disbursements. 
One was in the First Interstate Bank of Oregon, and Exhibit 
221 shows the period covered in this analysis was from November 
3, 1980 to May 10, 1983. The analysis of this account reflected 
receipts of $159,515 and disbursements of $219,981 or an excess 
of $60,4 65 of disbursements over receipts. The source of the 
receipts reflects they were almost totally transfers from the 
John Sampson PC Trust Account up to March 5, 1982 when the transfer 
of funds were made from the Ag Management account. It is difficult 
to distinguish the nature of the disbursements, but they appear 
to have been used to pay Blanch's petsonal expenses, as well 
as business expenses. How the apparent overdraft was handled 
is not answered by the exhibit but the dxhibit does not indicate 
that the account was opened on November 3, 1980, the date of 
the first entry on the schedule, and ma^ have had a substantial 
amount in deposit on that date. 
108. The second bank account that Blanch had was at the 
Idaho Bank & Trust. Richins1 summary (E^. 222) covers the period 
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of July 8, 1983 to December 31, 1983. Rdceipts during the period 
totaled $108,326 and the disbursements tbtaled $107,849, leaving 
a balance of $47 6. About half of the deposits are shown as 
being transfers from Consolidated Farms while the remaining 
are identified only by a deposit slip number reflected by the 
check register. Information concerning disbursements reflect 
many were personal and many business in nature. 
109. From the foregoing it appears that partnership funds 
and disbursements therefrom were accounted for up to October 
29, 1984, that date being the date of the last entries in the 
Ag Management and the Consolidated Farms accounts with the former 
leaving a credit balance of $43,103 afad the latter a credit 
balance of $145,597, both of which were active at the time the 
federal court ruled the IRS tax sale of October 29, 1983, invalid 
in May, 1984. 
110. Another exhibit (227) offered by defendants as evidence 
of damage was a balance sheet for RFC as of April 30, 1981. 
It listed assets and liabilities which contained both an "Historical" 
listing, which was based upon the assumption that no partnership 
real estate contracts had been forfeited, and a "Present Market" 
listing which was based upon the assumption that all partnership 
real estate contracts had been forfeited, the land repossessed 
by RFC and shown at estimated market Value. The Springfield 
and Moreland Properties were indicated as being included as 
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if they had not been sold and assigned. After listing assets 
and liabilities Richins included a MStockholders Equity," which 
under the "Historical" listing showed an equity of $1,368,025 
which consisted primarily of "retained earnings" of $1,158,958, 
and the balance in preferred ($30,000) aind common ($2,225) stock 
and additional paid in capital ($176,842) • Under the "Present 
Market" listing the equity was shown as $5,638,856.92, the total 
difference being attributed to an "Eqitiity Adjustment for Land 
Foreclosure" valued at $4,270,831.92. The source of market 
value data was not shown, but under 1|:he latter calculation, 
"Land buildings and irrigation equipment" was assigned a value 
of $8,206,000. No oral testimony was $iven to further explain 
this exhibit. 
111. Another schedule (228) datecfl. July 1, 1981 showing 
a status report for RFC of real estate contracts payable and 
equity showed an "Estimated Market Value" for some 20 partnerships 
of $9,900,120, real estate contracts payable of $3,889,864 with 
an equity of $5,582,205, it being remembeired that one year before, 
this company had filed for bankruptcy. 
112. During the summer of 1980 whil^ settlement negotiations 
were under consideration, Richins prepared a schedule to "give 
an idea of values." Richins testified he fixed such values 
based upon contacts with other realtors, his own experience, 
the purchase contracts and his recordb. The schedule showed 
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the acreage and land values of each partnership, the combined 
totals of which were $12,380,400 for 14,374 acres. Again — 
it was June, 1980 that RFC filed its bankruptcy. 
113. Richins prepared a consolidated balance sheet for 
Richtron, Inc., dated June 20, 1980 (226) footnoting that it 
was for management and internal purposes only as all computations 
were subject to audit. An asset for "£eal estate contract re-
ceivables" was given a value of $4,831,3t5 while the liabilities 
included an item of "real estate contracts payable" which was 
shown as $3,462,010. 
114. A final accounting was prepared by Richins just before 
or during the trial of this case. He de$cribed it as a "summary 
of partnership equities" which he testified fixed the values 
and amounts shown therein as of June 30, 1980. Richins began 
this schedule by using the same market values he had used in 
his schedule in the summer of 1980, but excluding Snowville, 
Grandview and Young Farms. His schedule Reflected a total market 
value of $11,214,400, total debts of $4,712,420, and a total 
equity of $6,411,980. A comparison of these market values was 
made to the market values for the sa^e properties listed on 
the bankruptcy schedules filed in the RF<$ bankruptcy proceedings 
on or about July 1, 1980. Snowville, Grandview and Young Farms 
are not included on either schedule. The bankruptcy schedules 
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did not include Blackfoot, North Bear lake, Pleasant Valley 
and Randlett. 
With these adjustments Richins estimated market value of 
the same properties listed in the bankruptcy schedules totaled 
$9,539,400, while the market value for the same properties as 
set out on the bankruptcy schedules was &3,937,357. Total debts 
owed on the farms listed on the bankruptcy schedule were shown 
on Richins1 schedule as being $4,034,t300, leaving a claimed 
net equity of $5,505,100 on these fanr(s on Richins1 schedule. 
As can be clearly seen, the market values of the farms shown 
on the bankruptcy schedules was less than the total obligations 
shown therefor on Richins1 schedule. The dates of these comparative 
values are noted — they are, in fact, one day apart. 
115. The schedules prepared by Richins, as considered in 
Findings 110 through 114, purport to be documents by which defendants 
are attempting to show damages in the millions of dollars as 
alleged in their Counterclaim. In doing so it is obvious that 
they are based upon the assumption that aljl partnership properties 
belonged to defendants, not to the partnerships, and that defendants 
are endeavoring to recover what Richins estimates their market 
values to be. Under the partnership agreements the two Richtron 
general partners got their management fees at the beginning 
of the partnership existence, and are ehtitled to nothing more 
than 10% of the profits, if any, remaining upon final sale of 
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the properties, with the remaining 90% going to the limited 
partners. There is in fact, no assurance, even disregarding 
the problems defendants and the partnerships were confronted 
with in May, 1980, that in the end after final sale of the properties 
that there would be profits remaining to be so divided. 
As already noted, the defendants have not proven anything 
owing on the ongoing operating expenses for which they were 
entitled to reimbursement under the agreement. The only other 
claim they can assert against the partnerships are the advances 
about which much has been said, the basis for return of which 
is likewise set forth in the agreement?. The values set forth 
in the schedule considered in Finding 114 are supposed to be 
fixed as of June 30, 1980. RFC is by that date already in the 
bankruptcy with its assets passing to the control of the bankruptcy 
court. It appears that by drafting and executing the quit-claim 
deeds on June 5, 1980, for all the partnership properties, Richins 
intended to ignore the effects of the bankruptcy and take from 
the partnerships their respective interests in their properties. 
The whole scenario presents this uiiusual picture. Richins 
is president of RFC and of the two Ri<Jhtron general partners. 
As president of RFC, he contracts to buy a farm property, and 
then contracts to sell it at a marked-up price to a limited 
partnership whose total affairs fall within the control of the 
general partner of which, as just stated, Rtlchins is also president. 
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He thus signs this partnership contract for both the buyer and 
the seller, fixing the terms thereof as he has chosen. He, 
as president of the general partner, is responsible for seeing 
that the partnership pays its annual installment to RFC, and 
also responsible for fixing the assessments and collecting the 
funds for making that payment. If he, as president of the general 
partner, defaults in making such payment for one reason or another, 
he then decides whether to have RFC declare the contract with 
the partnership in default and take whatever steps are necessary 
to foreclose out the partnership interest and have RFC take 
over the partnership property, subject of course to the annual 
payment due the original seller. It seems apparent to me that 
that is what he did when he executed the quit-claim deeds of 
June 5, 1980. 
What the real estate contracts between RFC and the individual 
partnerships provided is not found in the record and I do not 
know. Such real estate contracts usually include provisions 
setting out procedures to be followed to forfeit out a defaulting 
party. Such procedures would have to be followed and they usually 
do not allow a forfeiture without any notice. No one knew about 
these quit-claim deeds except Richins until he chose to make 
what he had done known, either by the recording of the deed 
or advising others of the use he intended to put them to. By 
his actions he had made preparations in his own way, thereby 
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putting them out of business without the consent of the limited 
partners in violation of Section 48-2-9. The provisions of 
Article V (4) of the agreement makes a general partner liable 
to limited partners for losses caused by the willful misconduct 
or gross negligence of the general partner. That provision 
is not an issue in this case. 
Richins recorded all the quit-claim deeds by January, 1981, 
and yet within the same time frame he has given formal written 
notice of the withdrawal of the general partners and of his 
intent to wind up the partnership affairs. The notice of such 
intent did not advise the limited partners that he had, by use 
of the quit-claim deeds, thereby deprived them of their 90% 
interests in any final profit realized upon sale. There is 
no evidence in this record which proves by a preponderance thereof 
that the quit-claim deeds executed by Richins were obtained 
by proper, legal procedures or that they were, for any other 
reason, valid and effective as a means of depriving each partnership 
of its interest in its property. Since the partnerships are 
not parties to this action, I need make no finding with respect 
to #how such actions affected them, but I do find that by use 
of the quit-claim deeds the defendants did not acquire the whole 
interest in the partnership farms to accord them a valid claim 
for damages at the market value thereof. Furthermore, I find 
the valuations Richins used in his schedules lack credibility. 
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In my opinion no reasonable foundation was laid to justify them. 
One day he values property at over 9-1/2 million dollars, while 
he is negotiating a settlement, but the next day values the 
same properties at $3,937,357 in his bankruptcy schedules. 
116. Another reason for questioning the credibility of 
his evaluations appears in the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, 
upon which both Richins and Sampson had agreed, which contained 
one provision that seems of significant relevance. That provision 
stated that the original purchase agreements more accurately 
reflected the present value — as of August 1, 1980 — of the 
raw land because the surplus of farm land on the then existing 
market. This agreement reflected the total contract equity 
on all partnership properties — defined as the original purchase 
price less the balance due from the partnership — was $1,184,065. 
This agreement was drafted by Richins1 attorney, David Day, 
agreed to by Richins and acceptable to Sampson. Although the 
agreement was never consummated and settlement negotiations 
are not generally admissible as evidence on values or damages, 
it does suggest a depressed farm real estate market existed 
at that time which would present a problem to any property owner 
seeking to sell his farm property. 
Furthermore, Richins was willing to settle and dispose 
of his Richtron assets for $700,000 at a time he now claims 
they had a net worth exceeding six million dollars. I find 
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the credibility of such evidence of net worth weighs heavily 
against such values as being a fair and reasonable measure of 
values and credible evidence of damages. 
117. Richins also undertook to shpw damages by use of a 
personal asset and liability statement dated March 15, 1978 
showing a net equity of $1,684,490, $1,528,464 of which was 
attributable to an equity in Richtron, Inc. The weight of this 
bit of evidence is substantially lost when I reflect upon the 
problems confronting the Richtron companies two years later 
in May, 1980. 
118. As noted at the outset the defendants assert in some 
of the claims set forth in their Counterclaim that Sampson's 
conduct had been actuated by malice and bad faith, thereby justifying 
an imposition of punitive damages for which in the first and 
fourth claims they assert an award of $1,000,000 in punitive 
damages should be granted. For many years our Supreme Court 
fixed "willful and malicious" conduct as the basis for awarding 
punitive damages. But in Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 
657 P. 2d 2 67, our Supreme Court stated that punitive damages 
may be awarded in cases where one acts in reckless indifference 
and disregard of the law and his felloW citizens. In Clayton 
v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (1982) our court 
cited a ruling by the Tenth Circuit Coutt of Appeals (439 F.2d 
1303) stating its approval of "such gross neglect of duty as 
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to evince a reckless indifference of the rights of others on 
the part of the wrongdoer, and an entire want of care so as 
to raise the presumption that the person at fault is conscious 
of the consequences of his carelessness," 
One wonders how much less proof is required to meet the 
standard as stated in these words than does "willful and malicious 
conduct." The easing of the requirements was, in my opinion, 
brought on by the facts and circumstances in cases where the 
conduct was considered so wrong as to justify punitive damages 
even though the long used "willful and malicious conduct" test 
could not be met. This requires a consideration of the existing 
facts and circumstances of the case which I have long and meticu-
lously dwelt upon and which I do not propose to repeat here 
at length. The case is an unusual cage and although I have 
had no trouble in finding liability on claims for relief asserted, 
particularly on the fourth claim, the burden remains with defendants 
of proving their entitlement to punitive damages as well as 
the amount thereof. The claim for punitive damages requires 
the Court to examine the evidence carefully in the light of 
the standards set by our Supreme Court for awarding them and 
to consider the conduct of Sampson in the l^ght of all the existing 
facts and circumstances. 
Sampson enters the picture as counsel if or two limited partners 
who have learned of and become disturbed by the financial problems 
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confronting Richins and his companies and the partnerships in 
May, 1980, the details of which have been stated and restated. 
At the May 29, 1980 meeting Richins offered to step aside and 
allow the Catlow Valley partnerships to select a new general 
partner. During June, 1980 Richins formally withdraws his geneal 
partner from three partnerships. By January, 1981, he has done 
so from all of them. He and Sampson agreed upon a settlement 
at the June 26, 1980 meeting. For the next four of five months 
they work together with Sampson getting involved in collecting 
funds from limited partners, some of whom refused to give them 
directly to Richins. When the settlement agreement fails of 
fruition, Sampson, by then heavily involved with limited partners 
in several partnerships, sees a need to get a new general partner. 
Sampson, using the powers of attorney he obtained as a 
voting proxy, votes first his PC and Later his Ag Management 
in as general partner while being contuonted continuously with 
Richins1 flood of correspondence with the partners challenging 
the validity of such action, but not doing much else about it. 
By the end of 1980 Sampson was pretty much in control of partnership 
affairs, and remains so for two years until Richins, through 
a motion for summary judgment (which could have been filed anytime, 
and brought to a hearing on ten days Notice) finally gets a 
ruling from Judge Palmer invalidating Ag's role as general partner. 
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Unfortunately for defendants, about two weeks before, the 
IRS has a tax sale for Richins1 failupe to file tax returns 
and pay taxes on partnership property, The IRS certificate 
of sale gives Sampson's group a color of title, at least, as 
the tax sale by the IRS is presumed valid. Twice Judge Cornaby 
rules the tax sale was valid and by courtt Order gives Sampson's 
group complete control. The partnership continues on under 
the sale and court orders until May, 1984 when an Order is issued 
by the federal court that the tax sale was in fact void. But 
the scratch of a pen does not undo and obscure from view all 
that has gone on for four years. 
Richins waited until January 5, ]i985, before obtaining 
an order from Judge Cornaby vacating his prior two orders. 
There is a suggestion in the record that Richins' counsel believed 
Judge Winder's Order took care of Judgfc Cornaby's last Order. 
The record further suggests that at a hearing before federal 
Judge Aldon Anderson in late 1984 that a suggestion was made 
that such was not the case, and that Cornaby's Order entered 
in July, 1983 placing Goff in complete charge of all partnership 
affairs might still be in effect. I haVe heretofore set forth 
the exact content of Judge Winder's Ordei* and what is provided. 
Its affect on Judge Cornaby's last Order is not relevant to 
the punitive damage question. If punitive damages are allowable, 
they would most certainly have to be based on events preceding 
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Judge Winder's ruling. The status of the 25 limited partnershps 
at the end of 1984 is not disclosed by the record. 
Though the Osborn judgment was acquired by Sampson in violation 
of statutory law relating specifically to lawyers, the judgment 
was entered because the defendants hejre had failed to pay an 
obligation owing to Osborn. Its acquisition, though in violation 
of law because Sampson was a lawyer, oould have been acquired 
in the same way by a non-lawyer without violating the law. 
The Osborn judgment began to effect the Richtron empire when 
and because it was entered, not when cind because this lawsuit 
got its start therefrom some nine months later. The fact that 
those who acquired it paid out $65,0010 for it enures to the 
benefit of defendants by reducing their liability for that amount 
as heretofore ruled. 
One wonders what Richins thought the partnerships were 
expected to do. The Richtron general partners1 withdrawal had 
left them with an uncertain future. Many limited partners had 
sought legal advice from Sampson and he gave it to them. The 
fact that he erred in the advice given them does not render 
his actions malicious. They, too, could read and write, and 
a simple sentence in the partnership (agreement gave them the 
authority by simple vote to remove the general partner, elect 
a new one and carry on the business of the partnerships. Or, 
they could have petitioned the Court to terminate the partnership 
& ± O O 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -143- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
and wind up its affairs. They did neither. They had Sampson. 
When this case was filed February 11, 1^81, Richins could have 
requested a restraining order against Sampson's interference 
with partnership affairs. Instead, no doubt influenced by continued 
settlement negotiations, he entered into a stipulation delaying 
the filing of any responsive pleading. An Answer and Counterclaim 
finally made it to the Court in July, 198$. 
By my comments in this Finding it is| not my intent to point 
the finger of blame at Richins and exonerate Sampson, for I 
have already made my findings of his wrongdoing, but I think 
it necessary to view Richins1 role in judging Sampson's conduct, 
in considering the claim for punitive damages, and in doing 
so, it is my opinion that as wrong as Sampson was in many of 
the things he did, I think he believed himself to be right in 
doing what he did and the way he did theirt. He should have known 
the law, but I do not believe he intemtionally violated it. 
For almost six months he worked amicably wit|h Richins on settlement. 
When that failed, by powers of attorney tie got proxies to vote 
the limited partner's interests. He d!id so, electing his PC 
general partner. When that was said to be contrary to law, 
he voted Ag Management in as general partner and so operated. 
By the time Judge Palmer ruled that illegal, Sampson was able 
to carry on under a color of authority by receipt of an IRS 
Certificate of Sale, followed by two favorable rulings by Judge 
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Cornaby until the IRS sale was voided in May, 1964, by a federal 
court order. 
The bitterness and contention that developed and existed 
between the two men was long and drawn out and led to prolonged 
controversies which had its roots in serious problems already 
existing before Sampson entered the ring. But I do not believe 
the evidence preponderates in establishing the type of willful 
and malicious conduct, nor the lessened type, required by our 
Supreme Court decisions to justify or support an award of punitive 
damages and I so find. 
119. There yet remains a consideration of any issues of 
fact raised by the affirmative defenses set forth in plaintiffs1 
Reply to defendants' Second Amended Cbunterclaim which have 
not yet been resolved. Those affirmative defenses were (1) 
defendants1 claims are barred by theit illegal, inequitable 
and malicious conduct; (2) laches; (3|) waiver; (4) estoppel; 
(5) breaches of duty and trust; (6) 4efendantsf combination 
and conspiracy to defraud the limited partners; (7) defendants 
have been unjustly enriched by the limited partners. 
These defenses have application only to the claims asserted 
against Sampson in the Counterclaim. (Questions as to whether 
Richins1 conduct gave rise to claims for relief by the limited 
partners or the partnerships against hita and/or the defendants 
are not to be answered in this lawsuit. Sampson represented 
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many limited partners, but in this case he made no effort to 
bring his clients in as third parties to assert claims. I have 
found from the evidence that Sampson intentionally interfered 
with defendants' existing economic relations with the partnerships 
for an improper purpose and by improper means causing injury 
to them. Factual questions yet to be answered relate to whether 
or not any of the alleged affirmative defenses constitute a 
defense to Sampson against liability for injury caused by his 
tortious conduct. There is no doubt that Sampson undertook 
to help his clients, but his tort of intentional interference 
with existing economic relations began to manifest itself the 
first day after the May 29, 1980 meeting when Sampson told Richins 
he and his clients wanted to buy Richins out and take over the 
partnerships. 
120. The affirmative defense that defendants1 claims are 
barred by their illegal, inequitable and malicious conduct are 
related to matters counsel for plaintiffs referred to in his 
opening statement. Counsel noted that Richins, acting for his 
companies, prepared quit-claim deeds about the first week in 
June, 1980, improperly conveying partnership properties from 
the partnership to his companies illegally and without consideration, 
and later used them by threatening to record them if the partnerships 
refused his request for help; that Richins hid facts on true 
conditions from the investors; that he improperly purused acts 
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to dissolve the partnerships prohibited by the statutes and 
improperly withdrew the general partner with no intention of 
winding up affairs; that from June to December, 1980, Richins 
tried to carve out what he considered tfc be his share of value 
in the partnerships which had no value; and that during June, 
July and August, 1980, a critical time, Richins refused to act 
or help the partnerships without stating a reason, but withdrew 
the general partner from three partnerships, completely abandoning 
them and left them adrift rather than td> extend service to them 
in winding up their affairs. 
I have already put my stamp of disapproval upon Richins1 
execution and use of the quit-claim deeds and set forth in sub-
stantial detail Richins1 failure to keep the investors informed 
and report as required in the agreement. I have considered 
his withdrawals of general partners and riiled that Section 48-2-20 
had no application thereto and have noted his failures to take 
steps to wind up the partnership affairs, but Article V (5) 
of the agreement states the general partner may at any time 
withdraw from the partnership so his doing so could not be declared 
improper. I have also noted the simple, cllear cut and conspicuous 
provision in the agreement that the limited partners by majority 
vote could remove a general partner and elect a new one. That 
was probably what Sampson thought he was doing by his proxy 
votes, but he failed to comply with statutory law. I have considered 
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Richins1 formal withdrawal of the general partner from three 
partnerships in June, 1980, which counsel says was done without 
stating a reason and refusing help, leaving them to drift without 
help. The evidence reflects that two of the withdrawals were 
sent the day after those partnerships held meetings at which 
both Sampson and Richins were in attendance and at which Sampson 
took the occasion to tell the limited partners that the markup 
was illegal, that the advances need not b£ repaid, and otherwise 
took Richins to task. As to the third partnership, the withdrawal 
followed a telephone call from Sampson reporting the limited 
partners of Snowville would no longer send contributions to 
Richins. I think the evidence shows these three partnerships 
wanted Richins out, not his help, and so showed it very early. 
If they were left adrift without help, one is left to wonder 
why Sampson was there at all. I do not view the settlement 
negotiations as an effort of Richins tp try to carve out his 
share of the value, when it was Sampson Who led the troops and 
put pressure on Richins to agree to the settlement reached. 
121. As to the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel 
and laches, these three defenses were considered by our Supreme 
Court in Angelos v. First Interstate Bftnk of Utah, 671 P.2d 
772 (1983), in which the court said: 
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To constitute waiver, one's actions 
or conduct must be distinctively made, must 
evince in some unequivocal manner an intent 
to waiver, and must be inconsistent with 
any other intent. 
As to estoppel, the court said: 
The doctrine of estoppel his application 
when one, by his acts, representations or 
conduct, or by his silence when he ought 
to speak, induces another to believe certain 
facts exist and such other relies thereon 
to his detriment. 
As to laches, the court said: 
Laches is not merely delay, but delay 
that works to the disadvantage of another. 
To constitute laches, two elements must 
be established: (1) The lack of diligence 
on the part of the plaintiff; and (2) An 
injury to defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence. 
As to these defenses plaintiffs1 counsel said estoppel 
was involved because Richins had consented to Sampson coming 
on board to help Catlow Valley and ovdrsee it and its funds. 
Such consent was in fact coerced by some Catlow Valley partners 
who unequivocally stated that they would no longer pay funds 
to Richins, so right at the May 29, 1380 meeting, Hansen was 
selected to supervise the funds and at the August 5, 1980 meeting 
Sampson was given that responsibility by vote of the limited 
partners who, under the agreement, had no such authority to 
control partnership affairs. Sampson very quickly became involved 
in other partnership affairs, such as taking $40,000 to Roosevelt 
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on July 18, 19 80, to pay the Pleasant Valley indebtedness to 
Murray First Thrift and did so. Furthermore, the compromise 
agreement was agreed to at the June 26, 1980 meeting and the 
fact that the compromise agreement was being drafted during 
this time, Richins didn't have much choice but to agree to Sampson's 
involvement with Catlow Valley partnerships funds. These facts, 
coupled with all other facts and circumstances, did not constitute 
an act or conduct by Richins which induced Sampson to believe 
that certain facts existed. Nor did they evince in any unequivocal 
manner an intent to waive control of th0 partnerships in favor 
of Sampson. They were both at that tim^ hoping the compromise 
settlement agreement would be accepted, but Sampson knew what 
he wanted and already had a hand on tfte controls should the 
agreement fail, as indeed it did. 
Counsel for plaintiffs did not press the defense of laches. 
This controversy turned into a prolonged paper battle between 
these two men over control of the partnerships. I think there 
was a lack of action on the part of Ricfrins in not seeking an 
expeditious wind up of partnership affairs, but that worked 
to Sampson's advantage, not to his injury. I also think there 
was some delay on the part of Richins in failing to challenge 
the alleged appointment of Sampson's corporations as new general 
partner. It was not until November, 1982, that Richins got 
before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment on which he 
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was successful in getting Judge Palmer to rule on the illegality 
of Ag Management's role as general partner in a case filed by 
Blackfoot Farms against defendants herein. But the reason for 
such delay in the case at bar is not clearly shown. That it 
was not due to a lack of diligence is apparent from an eight 
volume record. But, here too, this delay wgis to Sampson's advantage 
as it came after the IRS tax sale on October 29, 1982 by which 
Sampson and his group obtain another basis for claiming control 
of the partnerships and Richins' holdings. A challenge to the 
tax sale in federal court and obtaining £ ruling thereon within 
17 months hardly constitutes laches, particularly where, during 
a portion of the time and at Sampson's efforts, Richins was 
precluded by Judge Cornaby's Order from having the help of legal 
counsel and on his own behalf made a tremendous effort to move 
the case forward. 
122. As to the defense of breach of duty and trust. I 
recall hearing nothing in counsel's argument that Richins had 
a duty to Sampson which he breached or any evidence of breach 
of trust. Both men were at sword's points from the beginning 
with almost continuous and constant contention. I think the 
evidence shows there was a genuine effort made by both men to 
settle the controversies during the sujnmer and fall of 1980, 
during which time relations eased between the two, but several 
matters triggered a renewal of the conflicts in the latter part 
of 198 0, although notwithstanding what followed, I think the 
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evidence showed a renewal of settlement efforts in 1981 that 
carried on into 1982. The flood of correspondence from both 
men to the investors usually contained comments of distrust 
of one for the other. In my opinion each had a duty to the 
other to act in good faith in their joint efforts to effect 
a settlement and each endeavored to do so. I find no duty which 
Richins otherwise owed to Sampson which was breached, nor any 
obligation of trust that lends support to this alleged affirmative 
defense. 
123. The remaining two affirmative defenses are alike in 
nature, both alleging a defense based upon allegations as to 
what defendants did to the limited partners. One was that there 
was a combination and conspiracy to defraud the limited partners 
which was not pled with particularity. The other was that the 
defendants had been unjustly enriched by the limited partners. 
Fraud requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. But 
this is not a lawsuit between the partnerships and the defendants. 
At this point I am only concerned with whether or not either 
of these alleged affirmative defenses bar liability of Sampson 
for his tortious conduct. Sampson is supd in this Counterclaim 
for his individual conduct. He was not a limited partner in 
any partnership. He was president of two corporations which 
claimed to be general partners, but neither was legally so. 
Sampson thus had no rights under the partnership agreements. 
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What rights or defenses the partnerships may have in a controversy 
with defendants do not inure to Sampson's benefit. 
Up to the meeting of May 29, 1980 with Catlow Valley partners 
the evidence showed no acts of Richins that were alleged to 
have been fraudulent. One of the main reasons that the problems 
arose which confronted Richins in May, 1980, was not misuse 
of funds, but Richins1 failure to pre$s the limited partners 
to pay their assessments provided for in title agreements. Instead, 
defendants made advances to various partnerships to meet partnership 
obligations which probably totaled almost $400,000. Richins 
did not want to press the non-payers and "stir up" trouble and 
said he thought the problems could be worked out. The complaint 
of the limited partners when the problems surfaced was directed 
more towards Richins1 failures to collect assessments from all 
partners or treat their capital accounts as provided in the 
agreements. Richins1 failed to make the annual audited reports 
called for in the agreements, but no evfidence was tendered by 
Sampson that such audit was made or requested by any limited 
partner during the period prior to May, 1980. It was, however, 
clear from the evidence that Richins1 (tPA - Hurd - found his 
records poorly kept. But such problems, as elsewhere noted, 
arose before Sampson's involvement. 
The execution of the quit-claim deeds, heretofore considered 
at length, constitute one questionable action on the part of 
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Richins, but I do not see that it and what followed with respect 
thereto affords Sampson any defense for his tortious conduct. 
The probability is that the deeds constituted a means by which 
to combat the tortious acts of Sampson in taking over control 
of the partnerships. As to the claim of unjust enrichment from 
the limited partners, the evidence established that as to each 
partnership there was a 10% management fee, based upon the selling 
price of the property, that went to the general partner at the 
time the partnership agreement was executed. As to several 
of the partnerships, the 10% management fee represented several 
years of effort on the part of Richins and his general partners. 
I believe the management fees were used in part in making advances 
to various partnerships. No further fee was payable and the 
agreement provided for the general partner to get 10% of any 
profits upon final sale. That percentage was never paid on 
any partnership. There was a mark-up on the resale price of 
the property to the partnership that Would have been profit 
to defendants had the contracts paid out. None did and default 
on payments due on the real estate contracts, both buyer and 
seller, became an early problem. Sampson always maintained 
that the mark-ups were void but no legal authority was ever 
cited by Sampson in support of that contention. No specific 
evidence was offered by Sampson either as to the source or the 
amount of the alleged unjust enrichment. 
2197 
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124. During the trial evidence was received that tended 
to show an alteration in one or more partnership agreements 
which increased the maximum amount of capital assessment limited 
partners could be required to pay on an annual basis. There 
was substantial discussion about this alleged alteration during 
closing argument with plaintiffs1 counsel contending that the 
alteration led to Valmont Corporation changing its mind on a 
sale of sprinkling equipment and agreeing to a sale which imposed 
a $750,000 obligation on the Catlow Valley Farms. Counsel contends 
that without such alteration the Catlow Valley partnerships 
would not have been burdened by such an obligation on property 
worth only $250,000. Counsel for defendants took exception 
to such contention, stating Valmont extended $750,000 credit 
for its own reasons, that there was no evidence in the record 
as to what Valmont relied on, and opposing counsel's contentions 
constituted pure speculation. On December 31, 1980 Valmont 
took a $714,000 default judgment, a case Sampson allegedly repre-
sented defendants upon, but let go to default judgment. Defense 
counsel points out that Sampson made a $15,000 payment to Valmont 
on the judgment, but Richins employed other counsel and had 
the default judgment vacated for which Richins paid an attorney's 
fee. Defense counsel further argued that if such alleged change 
was made as alleged, "so what," it had no relevance to this 
case and Sampson's alleged 
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interference with the Richtron companies trying to wind up part-
nership affairs. 
I agree the Valmont obligation created a very heavy financial 
obligation to the Catlow Valley partnerships, but it put a sprinkler 
system on their properties. I agree also with defense counsel's 
contention that no matter for what reason Valmont extended credit 
and sold the sprinkler system to those farms, it constitutes 
no defense to Sampson's liability on the Counterclaim for his 
own tortious conduct. 
125. In his opening statement counsel for plaintiffs stated 
that a vital issue was who had the rights to run the farms. 
From the evidence Sampson's asserted right lay in his use of 
powers of attorney as voting proxies to replace the Richtron 
general partners with first his PC and then Ag Management. 
This asserted right prevailed until Judge Palmer declared Sampson's 
general partner had no legal right to control. But then his 
asserted right continued by reason of the IRS sale on October 
29, 1982 and the two orders of Judge Cornaby confirming the 
validity of the tax sale. But the sale turned out to be void 
as determined by Judge Winder in May, 1984. Sampson thus had 
control and possession for four years, but under circumstances 
that were determined as lacking in legality. 
Richins' right to run the farms lay in his creation of 
the partnerships, the agreement for which made a Richtron company 
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general partner from the beginning, gave said general partner 
complete control, and although withdrawals took place, the law 
gave them the right to retain possession and control to wind 
up the affairs and terminate the partnership's existence. 
One answer to counsel's stated issue is to be found in 
the Court's ruling that Sampson's intentional interference with 
defendants' existing economic relations was tortious. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ftN 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
1. Richtron, Inc. as general partner upon the Catlow 
Valley limited partnerships 1-7, was liable to Osborn for the 
drilling work done by him on those farms. 
2. Richins and RFC were liable to Osborn as the guarantors 
of that obligation for Richtron, Inc., the general partner. 
3. None of the limited partners of the Catlow Valley 
limited partnerships 1-7, nor the limited partnerships had any 
liability to Osborn for the well drilling work he did on their 
farms. (Comment: In Evans v. Galardi, 546 P.2d 313 (Calif,) 
the court said: "A limited partnership can generally be described 
as a type of partnership comprised of one Or more general partners 
who manage the business and are personally liable for partnership 
debts, and one or more limited partners who contribute capital 
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and share in the profits, but who take no part in running the 
business and incur no liability with respect to partnership 
obligations beyond their capital contributions.") 
4. With Osborn having failed to record a mechanics lien 
for his unpaid labors, his judgment did not create a judgment 
lien against the farm property the limited partnerships were 
then buying. 
5. There was no improper dealing, misrepresentation, 
or deceit in satisfaction of the obligation that gave rise to 
the judgment as Richins was in full dontrol and allowed the 
obligation to Osborn to go unpaid and thui the alleged affirmative 
defense of estoppel as applied to that contention has no merit 
as against any claimant on the Complaint. 
6. Under the partnership agreements capital contributions 
were added to a partner's capital account and such funds when 
paid were within the control of the general partner for whatever 
use the general partner should determine. Sampson had no legal 
authority to collect and spend such funcfts including the payment 
of $20,000 to Osborn upon the judgment assignment transaction. 
7. Furthermore, Sampson's action in obtaining the assignment 
was void as being contrary to statutory law. Section 78-51-27 
of the Utah Code provided that "an attorney shall not: Directly 
or indirectly, buy, or be in any manner interested in buying 
or having assigned to him, for the purpose of collection, a 
u *J ^ JL 
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bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book, debt, or other 
thing in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing 
an action thereon." This statute further provides that any 
attorney who violates this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and shall be punished accordingly, and his license to practice 
may be revoked or suspended. 
8. Sampson's purpose in acquiring the assignment was 
to bring an action thereon, such being filed on February 11, 
1981, and in doing so he violated this statute. (Comment: 
As shall be set forth later, such action was also alleged to 
have been a violation of professional ethics) 
9. The revocation of the assignment by Osborn for failure 
of consideration renders moot the illegality of Sampson's action 
in obtaining the assignment in January, 1981. 
10. Sampson's actions in paying the $45,000 following 
Osborn's purchase of defendants' property interests at the sheriff's 
sale and acquiring the new assignment of the judgment was a 
violation of the second portion of Section 78-51,27 which states 
that an attorney shall not "(2) by himself, or by or in the 
name of another person, either before or after action brought, 
promise or give, or procure to be promised or given, a valuable 
consideration to any person as an inducement to placing, or 
in consideration of having placed, in his hands or the hands 
of another person, a demand of any kind for the purpose of bringing 
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action thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit 
of any civil remedy for the recovery thereof." 
11. This statute is a prohibition against actions by an 
attorney only in obtaining such a claim anld provides for punishment 
of the attorney, but is silent upon the validity of any claim 
thus acquired. It does not bar non-4ttorneys from acquiring 
such claims for the purposes forbidden by the statute to a lawyer. 
While Sampson was again subject to the penalties or punishments 
provided in the statute, the limited partners listed in Finding 
17 who put up the amounts indicated to make the purchase from 
Osborn did not violate the statute or otherwise act illegally 
in doing so. 
12. The $50,000 bid Osborn made at the sherifffs sale 
gave him all the property rights the three defendants then owned 
or had an interest in in the Catlow Galley Farms property. 
He acquired a quid pro quo for his bid and by his doing so he 
received assets which entitled the judgment debtors to a $50,000 
credit as a payment on the judgment. Osborn passed those assets 
on to Goff as trustee in the warranty1 deed Osborn gave Goff 
and although the assignment recited a $65,000 consideration 
was paid therefor, the assignment of the judgment gave to Goff 
only the deficiency remaining in the judgment after all proper 
credits were deducted therefrom. The fact that Osborn accepted 
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CONCLUSIONS Of LAW 
ON COUNTERCLAIM 
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an attorney/client relationship existed between Sampson, Richins 
and Richtron companies in which Sampson represented said parties 
as clients and was not merely acting as counsel for limited 
partners who, for some reason, may have had an interest in the 
lawsuits involved. 
22. Sampson's conduct in representing interests adverse 
to those of defendants after once establishing the attorney/client 
relationship constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by a lawyer 
to his clients and of trust and in doing so violated ethical 
standards adopted by the bar association relating to attorney/client 
relationships, duties and responsibilities. Such conduct is 
a part of the overall conduct of Sampson concluded to be tortious 
in the conclusions that follow. But defendants1 evidence did 
not establish by a preponderance thereof that such conduct proxi-
mately caused identifiable damages specifically arising out 
of such conduct. 
23. The claims asserted by Richins and RFC against the 
plaintiffs for whom Goff was trustee have no merit and they 
are entitled to no damages thereon and thus no offset against 
the plaintiffs1 award of damages as set forth in the findings. 
24. Sampson's acceptance of the representation of defendants 
in various lawsuits as set forth in the findings and his failure 
to answer or otherwise respond, or to take steps for defendants 
to obtain other counsel and thereby avoid defaults, constituted 
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negligence and a failure to measure up to the standard of care 
to be expected of members of the legal profession. However, 
as to such negligence defendants proved damages only in the 
total amount of $2188.70 which consisted of attorneys fees paid 
Gary Kennedy for work done to set aside the default judgments 
in the Valmont and Interlake Thrift cases for which amount defendants 
are entitled to a judgment against Sampson on their second claim 
for relief, Richins in the amount of $2027.40 and Richtron, 
Inc. in the full amount of $2188.70. 
25. Under the Certificate of Limited Partnership the general 
partner had the authority to assess, without limitation, the 
limited partners for partnership obligations such as installment 
payments due on land purchases, costs of irrigation equipment 
and other necessary expenses. The general partner did not have 
authority, upon failure of a limited partner to pay such assessment, 
to sue the limited partner for the unpaid assessment, but did 
have authority under the agreement to reduce the limited partners1 
interest in the partnership as well as to reduce his capital 
account. 
26. The General Partner could not make capital investments 
in any partnership, but did, under express provisions of the 
partnership agreements, have the discretion to advance monies 
to the partnerships for use in the operations. The aggregate 
amount of such advances to any partnership became an obligation 
of the partnership to the general partner making those advances 
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to be repaid in accordance with the loan instrument or the agree-
ment. Any such advances to any partnership established by the 
evidence was a debt repayable to the general partner. (Article 
V (1) (c) and ARticle VII (13)). Sampson's statements to the 
contrary to the limited partners did not} alter such obligations. 
While as counsel for ^ ji^ -J-imited partners, he was free to give 
them advice and his own legal thinking on all issues, he could 
not by giving such legal advice alter obligations created under 
legal relationships, nor can he escape personal responsibility 
for injuries he may have caused thereby simply because he was 
a lawyer giving advice to clients. Injuries he may have caused 
to his own clients by wrongful advice gire not relevant to this 
case. 
27. Richins, as president of the general partners, and 
in complete control along with members of his family, had been 
the guiding light of each partnership in whom the investors 
had placed their confidence. He knew as the one drafting the 
partnership agreements and the person responsible for putting 
all the partnerships together, that he as president was the 
agent for each general partner and th^ tt such general partners 
could act only through him. Richins1 acts were the acts of 
the general partners and the general partners were bound by 
Richins1 acts or failures to act, for whatever fell therefrom 
upon the general partners under the partnership agreements and 
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the law. Thus his conduct as established by the evidence plays 
a significant role in examining claimed injuries and damages, 
if any, allegedly resulting therefrom. 
28. The undisclosed execution by Richins as president 
of the general partner of the quit-claim deeds on or about June 
2 and 5, 1980, which deeds purported t0 convey all partnership 
properties to RFC of the partnerships named in Finding of Fact 
56, was contrary to law and therefor^ void. While the farm 
properties were being purchased by tfye partnerships under a 
contract with RFC, the legal effect Of the quit-claim deeds 
was to deprive the partnership of its main if not its only, 
asset which would make it impossible for the partnership to 
carry on its ordinary business. Section 48-2-9 (2) specifically 
states that the general partner has no authority to do this 
without the written consent or ratification of all the limited 
partners. While a general partner has full charge of the management, 
conduct and operation of partnership affairs (Article V (1)), 
Article VII (6) states that in the eVent the general partner 
desires to take any action which is subject to the consent of 
the limited partners, the general partner shall give each limited 
partner notice of the proposed action. Such notice was not 
given and precluded limited partners from objecting thereto 
within the fourteen days allowed in said Article. Section 
48-2-10(1)(b) states limited partners shall have a formal account 
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of partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just 
and reasonable. It is difficult to conceive of any circumstance 
falling more closely into this statutory provision than the 
secretive conveyance of the partnership farms to a third party. 
Finally and most importantly, there is a need some place along 
the line for a winding up of the affairs of the partnership, 
foremost among which is to provide for payment to the creditors. 
This could not be successfully done if the general partner has 
first disposed of the assets of the partnership. Any claim 
by defendants that the recording of $uch deeds six or seven 
months later gave defendants complete ownership interest for 
which they appear to assert the fair market value thereof as 
a measure of damages is, in my opinion, without merit and I 
so conclude. 
29. On June 5, 1980 Richins prepared and executed the 
eighteen promissory notes set out in Finding of Fact 57. The 
content of the notes shows they were intended to cover the obli-
gations owed by the various partnerships for advances of monies 
Richins claims were made to the partnership. The content also 
shows that such notes were not made at the time an advance was 
made, which Article V(l) (c) seems to imply should be the time 
when the "terms of the loan instrument" should have been estab-
lished. However, I do not conclude that delay in executing 
such loan instrument rendered the obligations for advances void. 
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Such delay certainly left all concerned without any guidelines 
for repaying the advances out of gross receipts of a partnership 
as set forth in that Article. That Article states that such 
advances shall not be deemed a capital contribution, but also 
that such advances shall become immediately due and payable 
upon the sale of the property or the termination or dissolution 
of the partnership. Article VII (a) stated that the partnership 
shall "terminate" upon the "withdrawal0 of the general partner 
and that upon termination, the partnership affairs shall be 
wound up, its liabilities and obligations to creditors paid, 
all remaining assets shall be distributed as provided in Article 
IV and the partnership shall then be dissolved. Under these 
terms of the agreement the "withdrawal" of the general partner 
effected a termination which would have rendered the advances 
immediately due and payable. Sampson's repeated admonitions 
to the investors and his repeated contentions to Richins that 
the advances did not have to be repaid are factors to be considered 
in determining the tortiousness of his conduct. 
30. As to Findings of Fact 59, 60, 61 and 62, Richins1 
instructions on one hand to the limited partners of Blackfoot, 
Snowville and Kanosh in June, 1980, that the Richtron general 
partner had withdrawn and that they wer£ to go ahead and elect 
a new general partner, while on the other hand telling them 
that the partnership was then terminated and its affairs were 
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to be wound up, debts paid, the assets distributed and the partner-
ship would be dissolved, did in my mind, raise confusion in 
the minds of the investors in those partnerships as to what 
they were to do or what they could expect. The suggestion to 
elect a new general partner implies that the business of the 
partnerships was to continue. The statement that the partnership 
was terminated and its affairs would be wound up puts the burden 
to do so on the Richtron general partider and renders needless 
the election of a new general partners. He appeared, as did 
Sampson later on, to place his own erroneous interpretation 
on what the law allowed him to do. As elsewhere considered, 
it is my opinion Richins misinterpreted Section 48-2-20. 
31. Finding of Fact 63 notes that at the meeting of June 
26, 1980, discussions resulted in Sampson first becoming involved 
in the receipt and disbursement of partnership funds. This 
function began because investors at tl}e meeting insisted that 
Richins alone was to no longer handle su<ph funds. While Richins 
consented, the authority of the limited partners to direct such 
action without thereby becoming active in partnership affairs 
did not exist. The partnership agreement^  placed the full charge 
of the management, conduct and operation of the partnerships 
in all respects and in all matters upon the general partner 
and specifically provided that no limited partner shall take 
part in the conduct or control of the affairs of the partnership. 
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The settlement agreement tentatively reached at the meeting 
undoubtedly influenced this course of action. Article V(l) (b) 
authorizes the general partner to employ on behalf of the partner-
ships persons, such as attorneys, to render the type of extraordinary 
services not generally rendered by owners and operators of property. 
Collecting partnership funds and disbursing them are not "extra-
ordinary services," but are in fact the services generally rendered 
by the general partner of a limited partnership. I question 
Richins1 authority to consent to Sampson's role in the collection 
of funds and I do not believe limited partners can hire a lawyer 
to represent them and direct him to participate in partnership 
affairs that are within the exclusive control of the general 
partner. But what was done, was done — probably because all 
concerned believed the settlement agreement would resolve the 
existing problems and, pending execution thereof, obligations 
of the partnerships had to be met and funds to do so had to 
be collected. However, this tentative arrangement pending the 
drafting and consummation of the settlement agreement is not, 
in my opinion, a factor to be given much weight in weighing 
the legality of what Sampson did in the months that followed. 
32. As mentioned in Finding of Fact 64, and as elsewhere 
frequently referred to, Sampson made repeated contentions that 
the limited partners or the partnerships had no obligation to 
repay advances made to the partnership by the general partner. 
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As noted elsewhere, Section 48-2-1 and Article VI(1) clearly 
provide that limited partners shall riot be personally liable 
for the debts of the partnership or any of the losses thereof. 
But this freedom from liability extended to the partners does 
not extend to the partnerships and to pay partnership liabilities, 
limited partners are subject to assessments at the will of the 
general partner. In such contentions I believe and so conclude 
that Sampson as a lawyer had a responsibility to make clear 
that under the partnership agreements advances were subject 
to repayment as provided in the agreement and I find nothing 
in the evidence that suggests Sampson ever fulfilled that respon-
sibility. While Sampson may have believed this opinion he expressed 
so often, it did not make it so and is a part of his conduct 
to be examined in determining whether tort liability was proven. 
33. With respect to what is stated in Finding of Fact 
65, I note that Richins did frequently stress the fact that 
by his withdrawal of his companies as general partners, such 
withdrawal legally terminated the partnership under Section 
48-2-20 of the Code and set the course for its dissolution. 
I have reflected upon that contention at considerable length 
and concluded the section needed consideration. It provides 
that the "retirement, death or insanity of a general partner 
dissolves the partnership, unless the business is continued 
by the remaining general partners (a) under a right to do so 
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stated in the certificate, or (b) with the consent of all members.M 
I have concluded that both (a) and (b) are premised upon the 
existence of more than one general partner in the limited partnership 
as it then exists. 
As I read this statute, if one general partner retires, 
dies or becomes insane, a surviving general partner, if there 
be one, can continue the business under this section only if 
his right to do so is so stated in the certificate, or such 
surviving general partner obtains the consent of all members 
to continue the business. Unless the requirements of (a) and 
(b) are met, a remaining general partner has no authority under 
the statute to prevent the statutory dissolutionment that is 
triggered by the prevailing conditions at the time. Where there 
is no "remaining general partner" to continue the business under 
Section 48-2-20, the provisions of Section 48-2-24(2)(e) would 
have no application with respect to amendment of the certificate, 
nor would the selection of a new general partner cure the defect. 
The phrase "retirement, death or insanity," of a general 
partner also appears in Section 48-2-9 which states that without 
the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all 
the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general 
partners shall have no authority to, among other prohibitions, 
continue the business with partnership property on the death, 
retirement, or insanity of a general partner unless the right 
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to do so is given in the certificate. My conclusion is that 
this statute also supports the conclusion I came to regarding 
Section 48-2-20 as set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 
34. As I have reflected upon the issues of this case and 
the contentions made therein, I have pondered over the meaning 
and scope of the word "retirement" ap used in the statute. 
I note that the word "retirement" is not used in the Certificate 
of Partnership Agreement. The word used in the Certificate 
that seems to approach it in use and purpose is the word "with-
drawal," a word not found in Utahs Limited Partnership Act. 
The word "retirement" has no applicable definition in the Code. 
Upon research I found Dickson v. Hansman, 413 P.2d 378 
(Wash.), which case considered a contract using the words "death, 
permanent disability or retirement of" and discussed the meaning 
of "retirement." The court noted that both sides cited many 
definitions bearing upon some phase of the meaning of "retirement." 
That court determined that the circumstances existing relating 
to the choice of that word, with no definition being added, 
were significant and concluded the parties did not intend it 
to mean resignation, quitting or withdrawal from the business 
at any time or in any manner. Under the "ejusdem generis" canon 
of statutory construction where words follow the enumeration 
of particular classes of things, the general word will be construed 
as applying only to things of the same general class as those 
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enumerated. (Black's Law Dictionary - 5th Edition, p. 464). 
Both death and insanity have application only to persons and 
not to legal entities and connote a permanent incapacity to 
perform. Thus, it seems to me, that the legislature intended 
the language of Section 48-2-2 0 to apply to general partners 
who were real people having the capacity of experiencing death, 
insanity, or retirement, and as to the latter, reaching that 
stage in life where one by age or physical ailments is unable 
to continue on in the normal course of events. I do not believe, 
and so conclude, that the word "retirement" as used in the statute 
and the word "withdrawal" as used by Richins are synonymous. 
Neither death, insanity or retirement has any reasonable or 
literal application to a corporation, yet Richins repeatedly 
relied upon Section 42-2-20 as including a voluntary withdrawal 
by his corporations as general partner, at any time, for any 
reason, and using any means, as a basis for his authority for 
the dissolution and termination of his partnerships. He should 
have relied upon the partnership agreements he drafted. 
Section 48-1-3 provides that provisions of this chapter 
(which relates to general partnerships) shall apply to limited 
partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to such 
partnerships are inconsistent herewith. Chapter 2 does not 
define "dissolution." Chapter 1, Section 26, states: 
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The dissolution of a partnership is 
the change in the relation of the partners 
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated 
in the carrying on, as distinguished from 
the winding up, of the business. 
Section 48-1-27 provides that "On dissolution a partnership 
is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the 
partnership affairs is completed." Dissolution is thus not 
termination, but is rather the opening of the door for winding 
up the affairs of the partnership business that has leads to 
termination. 
35. From the foregoing it is my conclusion and I so rule, 
that Section 48-2-20 is not applicable to the issues of this 
case and Richins1 repeated referral to that section as a basis 
for his authority to follow the course he took was an erroneous 
application of and reliance on the statute in question. Thus, 
I think we must look to the Certificate of Partnership Agreement 
and the provisions relating thereto to determine rights and 
responsibilities arising out of the "Withdrawal" of a general 
partner. 
Relevant provisions of the partnership agreements have 
been noted (Finding 65) and further merttion will be made here. 
Article V (5) provides that the general partner may at any time 
withdraw from the partnership, sell or assign all or any part 
of its interest as a general partner to a qualified party, by 
giving notice to all limited partners,, and such notice shall 
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be effective upon the receipt by the la^t partner of such notice 
of withdrawal, sale or assignment. $ection VII (2) requires 
that all notices to be given under the agreement shall be in 
writing. Another provision (Article VI]}) states the partnership 
shall terminate 22 years from the date thereof or upon the prior 
occurrence of any one of certain listed events, included among 
which is by the "withdrawal," of the general partner, or by 
the affirmative vote of not less than a majority in interest 
of the limited partners as provided in Article VI, paragraph 
6(b), which states that the limited partners have the right, 
by vote of a majority interest to terminate the partnership 
and order the distribution of assets. Paragraph 6(a) thereof 
gives to the limited partners the rigl}t to remove the present 
general partner and elect a new one. Sihce the general partner's 
"withdrawal" does not become effective until receipt of the 
written notice by the last partner of the partnership, in that 
interval of time -- until the effective moment of the notice 
— the limited partners could by majority vote remove the general 
partner and elect a new one. Such action would avoid the termination 
which the withdrawal of the general partner would othewise effect. 
In this case there is no evidence that the limited partners 
of any partnership did so after Richins sent out his notices 
of withdrawal, nor was any evidence presented that any limited 
partner failed to receive such notice of Withdrawal. 
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38. Article VII sets forth the steps to be taken upon 
termination by such withdrawal to effect a wind up of the partnership 
affairs — the payment of the partnership's liabilities and 
obligations to creditors and the distribution of all remaining 
assets as provided in Article IV of the agreement, which states 
that after receipt by the limited partners of payment in value 
of the amounts of their capital contributions, the remainder 
is divided 9 0% to the limited partners and 10% to the general 
partner. 
Again I mention that the agreement makes it clear that 
all unpaid advances made by the general partner to the partnership 
are due and payable upon the sale of the property or the termination 
and dissolution of the partnership. I also note that Section 
48-2-23 of our Code sets out the order in which the liabilities 
of the partnership shall be paid in Settling accounts after 
"dissolution," which as I have noted before, is a proceeding 
that leads to "termination" under our Code. 
39. But the claims for relief in the Counterclaim are 
not based upon what did not happen, but rather upon the alleged 
intentional interference of Sampson with respect to partnership 
affairs; whether injuries occured; an$ if so, what injuries 
and what damages, if any, were proximately caused thereby. 
This requires a careful examination of ^hat Sampson did or did 
not do as required by law. Sampson's de$ire, if not his intent, 
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to take over control of all the partnerships was manifested 
by him to Richins the first day after the May 29, 1980 meeting 
of the Catlow Valley partnerships. Sampson!s acts and course 
of conduct are set out in Finding of Fact 67 through 75. As 
can be seen therein Sampson endeavored to remove the Richtron 
general partners and elect first his PC ahd later his Ag Management 
corporation as general partners in each partnership by utilizing 
the voting authority he claimed was granted to him under the 
powers of attorney. The partnership agreements gave him an 
easy way to achieve his goal and incredibly he did not use it 
— the majority vote by the limited partners when properly used 
as required by law. 
The provisions of our statutes state a limited partnership 
can be formed by two or more persons, who desire to form a limited 
partnership, signing and swearing to a certificate, which signing 
and swearing are both mandatory as tcj) each member under the 
statute. The statute sets forth what such certificate shall 
state (Section 48-2-2) . Section 48-2-24 provides that a certificate 
shall be amended when a person is admitted as a general partner, 
or if a general partner retires, diei or becomes insane and 
the business is continued under Section 48-2-20, which section 
I have heretofore considered at length. Section 48-2-25 states 
the writnig to amend a certificate shall conform to the requirements 
of Section 48-2-2(1) as far as necessary to set forth clearly 
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the change in the certificate which it is desired to make and 
be signed and sworn to by all memberb. In my opinion these 
statutory requirements are explicit in requiring each member 
of a limited partnership to sign and swear to any amended certi-
ficate, and in no sense of the word could Sampson's purported 
voting proxies represented by powers of attorney allow him or 
the limited partners to ignore the specific requirements of 
these statutes and allege compliance therewith by use of only 
his own signature under such powers of attorney. 
The partnership agreements mentioned certain voting rights 
the limited partners had — to remove the general partner by 
vote of a majority in interest and eledt a new one, or to vote 
to terminate the partnership and order the distribution of assets. 
Sampson may have read the agreement so as to lead him to think 
that all he needed was authority to vote the interest of each 
limited partner, that such authority could be obtained by use 
of a power of attorney, and that once having obtained such powers 
of attorney, he was authorized under the agreement to sit alone 
in his own office, hold a partnership meeting, and cast the 
votes to remove the Richtron general partner and vote his own 
corporation in. But, as stated, Section 48-2-24(d) states that 
a certificate shall be amended when a, person is admitted as 
a general partner and the statutes cited i^i the preceding paragraph 
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require such amended certificate to bq signed and sworn to bv 
all the members. 
Section 48-2-25 also states that a certificate is amended 
when there is filed for record in the office of the county clerk 
where the certificate is recorded a writing in conformity with 
the provisions of paragraph 1 thereof. Also Article VII (9) 
touches generally upon amending the Agreement by stating it 
may be amended from time to time witty the written consent of 
the general partner and all of the limited partners. 
40. I thus conclude under the ^acts and circumstances 
of this case that in attempting to substitute his own corporation 
(PC) as general partner, the amended certificate reflecting 
such change was not signed and sworn to by each member of the 
partnership as required by law, and thus the amended certificate 
filed as to the substitution of Sampson's PC was invalid ab 
initio as not being in conformity witih law and had no force 
or effect in removing the Richtron general partners. 
41. As to Sampson's effort to substitute Ag Management 
as general partner wherein no amended certificate was even filed, 
I conclude that that effort also was invalid as not being in 
conformity with law and had no force and effect in removing 
the Richtron general partners. I also Conclude that a document 
entitled "Notice of Substitution" of a new general partner did 
not constitute an amendment to the certificate, but that if 
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it could liberally be said that it wfrs, and so intended, it 
still lacked the required formalities of law. 
42. In closing argument counsel for plaintiffs' counsel 
cited Rond v. Yeamons. et al., 681 P.id 1240, as holding that 
the failure to file a certificate of limited partnership did 
not affect liability thereunder and that the argument raised 
against Sampson with failure to property file was a straw man 
argument and not in conformity with what the Supreme Court said 
in that case. A reading of that case does not, in my opinion, 
support counsel's contention. In th^t case the partnership 
certificate was signed but not recorded. The plaintiff asserted 
that the failure to file as required by Section 48-2-2(1) (b) 
rendered the defendants' statement that it was a limited partnership 
under the laws of Utah was a false statement and the failure 
to record was not a substantial compliance with the statute. 
Our court noted the issue had not beeri presented in the court 
before, but that the Supreme Court of New Mexico had directly 
addressed the problem in Hoefer v. Hall^ , 411 P.2d 230. There, 
though the limited partnership agreement had been executed by 
the parties, it had never been recorded under New Mexico statutes. 
Our court said: "The Court held that \^ here neither the rights 
of third parties, .... failure to record the certificate cannot 
affect the existence of a limited partnership insofar as the 
parties, inter se, are concerned." Our cpurt then stated: 
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We conclude that the failure to file 
the certificate of limited partnership does 
not affect the existence of the limited 
partnership as an entity, in a controversy 
between the partners themselves, where...the 
interests of third parties...." is not invovled. 
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable on the facts 
as the interests of third parties are involved and the case 
is not authority for saying the amended certificates Sampson 
purported to use and file were valid and binding even though 
not in compliance with state law. 
43. Finding of Fact 73 mentions Judge Palmer's ruling 
that Ag Management was not the general partner of any partnership, 
and Finding of Fact 74 sets forth facts concerning an IRS sale 
of defendants1 property interests on October 29, 1982, which 
preceded Judge Palmer's ruling by about two weeks. The tax 
sale was made to Goff as trustee and gave him at least a color 
of title to continue the take over of whatever Richtron interests 
were sold at the tax sale. The IRS issued a Certificate of 
Sale and its validity was confirmed by Judge Cornaby's rulings 
which gave Goff control until Judge Winder's ruling in May, 
19 84, declared the sale void and set aside all claim of rights 
asserted by Sampson and his group under that tax sale. From 
Finding of Fact 76 it is apparent that by the time Judge Winder 
entered his ruling, all partnership foreclosures had occurred 
except East Taber, which was foreclosed on August 8, 1984. 
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The evidence lacks any details as to what the foreclosures involved, 
whether they resulted in a complete loss of partnership property 
without any return to the partnership, and what, if anything, 
was done as far as winding up partnership affairs, including 
information as to what was done about e&ch partnership's debts, 
assets, liabilities or profits remaining, if any. From the 
evidence the only information the court has is that as of the 
date Judge Winder made his ruling, the Ag Management account 
had a balance of about $28,7 00 which fay October 29, 1984 had 
increased to over $43,000, while the account balance of Consolidated 
Farms as of October 29, 1984 was $245,997, with $74,320 having 
been received since Judge Winder's ruling and $12,000 having 
been disbursed, all to Ag Management, more details of which 
accounts are set forth in Conclusions of Law 64 and 65 that 
follow. 
44. Judge Palmer's ruling that Ag Management was not under 
the law a validly elected general partner of the partnerships 
brought the Sampson's group's control oft that basis to an end, 
but the prior IRS tax sale of October 29, 1982, followed by 
Judge Cornaby's two orders, authorized the Sampson group to 
continue its control of the property interests acquired by that 
rule until Judge Winder entered his Order on May 16, 1984, which, 
among other things, ruled as follows: 
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Ordered that that certain United States 
Internal Revenue Service public auction 
conducted on October 29, 1982, in Ogden, 
Utah, for the purpose of liquidating certain 
tax liabilities of Plaintiff Richtron, Inc. shall 
be, and the same hereby is, declared void 
and of absolutely no force or effect; and 
it is accordingly 
Ordered that any and all Certificates 
of Sale of Seized Property issued by the 
United States Internal Revenue Service to 
Goff or Goff's nominees or agents, shall 
be, and the same hereby are, declared void 
and of absolutely no force Or effect; and 
it is further 
Ordered that neither Goff nor his nominees 
or agents have any right, title or interest 
in and to (1) the capital stock of the plaintiff 
corporations; (2) the right of the plaintiff 
corporations to liquidate, wind-up, terminate 
and render an accounting respecting the 
affairs of any limited partnership of which 
they are the liquidating general partners; 
(3) the right of the plaintiff corporations 
to institute or maintain causes of action 
for or on behalf of themselves; and (4) 
any of the real estate contracts described 
in the notices of seizure at issue in this 
proceeding. 
From Judge Winder's ruling it is apparent that as of the date 
thereof neither Goff nor his agents o|r nominees received any 
valid rights from the IRS sale of defendants1 interests in the 
partnership; and specifically no right, title or interest in 
the capital stock of defendants1 corporations, the defendants1 
rights to wind up the affairs of any limited partnership of 
which they were the liquidating general partners, or in any 
of the real estate contracts described in the notices of seizure. 
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In my opinion Judge Winder's Order ended then and there Goff 
or his agents1 or nominees1 right to take any further steps 
in the wind up of any affairs of any jpartnerhsip in which the 
Richtron companies remained as general partners, and I so conclude. 
From Finding of Fact 7 6 it appears that notwithstanding 
Judge Winder's ruling, Sampson by his letter of August 28, 1984 
continued to assert rights in the properties, alleging as a 
reason therefore that he and his group had repurchased some 
of the farm properties after they had been foreclosed upon, 
but giving no information as to which properties they had so 
purchased, or when, or any information as to what partnership 
interests may have passed back to the control of Richtron general 
partners by reason of Judge Winder's ruling. Whether defendants 
should be granted an accounting from Sapipson after he took over 
control of all partnerships at the beginning of 1981 will await 
completion of further Conclusions of Law4 
45. Sampson's telephone call, considered in Finding of 
Fact 78, to John Anderson, counsel fcjr defendants, "warning" 
him that unless he ceased all representations of the various 
Richtron entities, including a federal court case recently filed 
and appeals to modify recent District Court rulings, he would 
seen "sanctions" and "other relief" against him, was not a limitation 
put upon Anderson by Judge Cornaby's Orcfter of February 3, 1983. 
Sampson's action in so stating to Andertson was, in my opinion, 
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unprofessional conduct and I so conclude as I examine the facts 
of this case bearing upon Sampson's conduct. 
46. From what is stated in the findings up through Finding 
of Fact 75, I conclude that Richins has not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Sampson's conduct interfered 
with and invaded, as alleged "his ricfot" to earn a livelihood 
as a syndicator of limited partnership interests, as distinguished 
from an alleged intentional interference with existing or potential 
economic relatinos, nor with anticipated opportunities for employment 
as alleged. As to Richins1 claims for relief on these two limited, 
but specific grounds, I conclude that they should be and are 
denied. 
47. In Utah a claim for relief for intentional interference 
with existing or prospective economic relations states a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, and imposes upon the claimant 
the burden of proving the three elements of that tort as set 
forth in Finding of Fact 80. I conclude that such a claim for 
relief is set forth in the fourth claim, note that the other 
claims for relief are realleged as a part of the fourth claim, 
and so evidence received with respect to other claims has a 
part in defendants' meeting their burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence the three essential elements of that 
tort. 
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48. As to Finding of Fact 84, I do not believe and so 
conclude that, as repeatedly contended by Sampson, a markup 
in the contract price for which RFC or Richtron, Inc. sold farm 
property to a partnership by contract w£s a breach of fiduciary 
duty which rendered such contract, or the mark-up therein contained, 
illegal and void. 
49. Sampson, as also considered in Finding 84, by instructing 
Richins to send him any complaint and summons served upon him 
on any lawsuit, and stating that he would answer it, and doing 
so when such was sent, created a lawyer/client relationship 
between them, and did so likewise as tjo cases sent to Sampson 
in which he failed to answer the Complaint and let a default 
judgment be entered. 
50. The limited partners had no authority to vote Sampson 
in as attorney for the Richtron companies, yhen and if the settlement 
agreement was consummated, as Sampson requested and allowed 
them to do at the June 26, 1980 meeting. 
51. Finding of Fact 84 also considers facts relating to 
the ongoing conflict between Richins afld Sampson over advances 
made to the partnerships by defendants or members of Richins1 
family. The partnership agreements recognized that it would 
probably become necessary for monies to be advanced to a partnership 
to meet expenses, and specifically provided that the general 
partner could make such advances periodically which would constitute 
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loans to the partnership to be repaid by the means provided 
for therein. 
I conclude from the information in Finding 84 that the 
Richtron general partners made such advances to twelve named 
partnerships which advances became and were loan obligations 
of the particular partnership receiving them to be repaid as 
provided in the partnership agreements. From the same information 
I find that defendants received advances from eight limited 
partnerships as set forth and how these advances were handled 
by the defendants I have not gleaned from the evidence. The 
advances included money furnished by the Leo H. Richins Family 
Trust and by Shari Richins. 
I further conclude that the oft repeated statements by 
Sampson that the advances did not have to be repaid which he 
made to investors, with no explanation a£ to what the agreements 
provided with respect thereto, were erroneous, and in my opinion 
such repeated statements had the effect of convincing some limited 
partners that the partnerships had no obligation to repay the 
advances to the general partner and constituted a factor in 
the failure to have the settlement agreement consummated; and 
such was an improper means used in hi|s interference with the 
economic relations existing between the partnerships and the 
general partners. 
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52. Sampson had no authority to use partnership funds 
to pay off Murray First Thrift at a foreclosure sale on July 
18, 1980, or to refuse to turn over the reconveyance deed made 
out to the general partner to Richins. Such act was an intentional 
interference in partnership affairs. 
53. As set out in Finding of Fact 87, the written solicitation 
of powers of attorney giving Sampson the right to vote for the 
limited partner, contained the written stated purpose that they 
must remove Richins and his organizations as general partners 
and to thereafter commence legal action to retain the properties, 
roll back the contract prices and pursue other legal means. 
Such request, together with his written instruction that all 
contributions to the partnerships were to be sent to him, was 
an intentional interference with the defendants' existing economic 
relations and was done for an improper purpose of taking over 
complete control of the partnerships. iSuch affirmative actions 
were certainly more than mere advice of a lawyer to his clients. 
54. Sampson's election of his PC as general partner (Finding 
of Fact 87) for each partnership, voting under the powers of 
attorney, and his failure to have the amended certificate reflecting 
such change personally signed and sworn to by each limited partner 
before filing, but instead signing such amended certificate 
individually and as president of the PC, was in direct violation 
of provisions of Utah's Limited Partnership Act and rendered 
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the amended certificate null and void and negated his PC holding 
the position of general manager. 
55. As to Finding 88, Sampson's obtaining of an assignment 
of the Osborn judgment to himself for t|he purpose of commencing 
an action thereon was a direct violation of Section 78-51-27, 
which is in a chapter of Title 78 that contains statutes relating 
only to attorneys, and which section makes such action a misdemeanor, 
punishable as such as well as subjectting him to a suspension 
or revocation of his license. A violation of law is an improper 
means of interfering with existing economic relations and was 
in this case. His use of partnership funds for such purpose 
was unauthorized as Richtron, Inc. rqmained general partner 
with complete control over partnership affairs. 
Sampson's similar action a year latfer (set forth in Finding 
88) in obtaining an assignment of the Osborn judgment to maintain 
an action thereon was a separate such violation of law and a 
further use of an improper means. 
56. Sampson's attempted substitution of Ag Management 
as general partner of each partnership in place of Sampson's 
PC, as set forth in Finding 89, without even filing an amended 
certificate showing such change, was contrary to law, a nullity 
and gave Ag Management no authority to act as such. This too 
constituted an intentional interference with existing economic 
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relations by an improper means, namely, the violation of state 
law. 
57. From all the Findings of Fact up to and including 
Finding 95, I conclude that the evidence clearly preponderates 
in establishing that Sampson intentionally interfered with the 
existing economic relations defendants had with some 25 limited 
partnerships, and that he did so for an improper purpose and 
by improper means. 
58. Based upon the summary of facts set forth in Findings 
of Fact 96 and 97 I conclude that Sampson by his tortious conduct 
caused injury to the defendants. 
59. Defendants are separate parties, different entities 
and must assert and prove their own claims for relief which 
are based upon different rights. (See bindings 99 through 103) 
However, they each assert jointly the same claims for relief, 
with one or two exceptions, so the pleadings are deemed amended 
to consider the legal bases on which each claims relief. 
Richms appears as an individual with no interest in the 
partnerships either as a limited or general partner. His office 
as president of the Richtron companies does not add to his rights 
or claims for relief. He asserts he and Sampson had an attorney-
client relation and in any action in which Sampson was negligent 
or wrongful in what he did, he individually can and does assert 
a claim for relief. The evidence suppotts the contention that 
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in certain cases Sampson appeared as cpunsel for Richins named 
individually as a party therein. But Ricljiins, as do his companies 
asserting the same claims of attorney/Client relationship, has 
the burden of proving that whatever Siampson did proximately 
caused injury and damages thereby. while Sampson's conduct 
in these claims have relevance to the Intentional interference 
claim, and will be considered therein, to prove a right to recover 
on the first and second claims and the amount of damages recoverable 
each defendant has its own stated burdens of proof. In this 
case it was proven that in some actions in which he appeared 
as counsel for defendants, he allowed default judgments to be 
taken against them. As to the default judgments entered in 
the Valmont and Interlake Thrift case$ there was evidence to 
show damages resulting from the injury of said default judgments, 
as set out in Conclusion #24 for which Richins and Richtron, 
Inc. are entitled to judgments against Sampson as set out in 
that Conclusion. Recognizing that the alleged wrong doing of 
Sampson asserted as claims in the first and second claims for 
relief is related and relevant to the claim under the fourth 
count, I conclude as to the first claim the defendants have 
individually proven the wrongful conduct but each failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of damages, 
if any, they sustained as a proximate result of the alleged 
wrongful conduct. 
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60. In this case RFC did not assert! a specific claim against 
Sampson as a limited partner in Richfield Farms and in Catlow 
Valley #2 and #6, but Sampson totally ignored RFC's role as 
a limited partner and did nothing to protect RFC's interest 
as a limited partner in those three partnerships. Sampson by 
his conduct certainly interfered with RFC's existing economic 
relations it had in these partnerships, causing the loss of 
its invested interests as a limited partner therein. 
RFC's entitlement to other damages must be determined from 
ascertaining its losses, if any, in not receiving its share 
of any payments made by the partnership on the land it was buying. 
RFC had not been receiving payments from the general partner, 
whose duty it was to pay, on the partnership's obligation on 
its land purchase contract, and had thus itself defaulted upon 
payments owed to the original seller$. As noted, it was in 
fact confronted with a foreclosure said on one of its contract 
properties on June 6, 1980. Upon filing bankruptcy, its rights 
and obligations passed to the control of the trustee in the 
bankruptcy court. No evidence was presented to the court as 
to what, if anything, the bankruptcy court ever did with respect 
to RFC's interest in the properties. It appears it did not 
stop or delay the foreclosure sale set for June 6, 1980. Counsel 
advised the court that someplace along the line the bankruptcy 
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proceedings were dismissed and the automatic stay in this case 
as far as RFC was concerned was terminated. 
In December, 1980 Sampson purported to elect his PC as 
general partner replacing the Richtrofc general partner. He 
took over and retained control of the partnerships. How RFC's 
bankruptcy affected his control was not disclosed by any evidence. 
He retained control until they were reportedly foreclosed upon 
by the original owner. Evidence with Respect to what happened 
in such foreclosure was not presented to the Court. Apparently 
Sampson, like Richins, was unable to save the partnerships, 
or to wind them up or to terminate their existence. From December, 
1980, or earlier, Sampson held the pu|rse strings, receiving 
and disbursing hundreds of thousands of dollars. Sampson as 
the president of the purported general partner, had the responsi-
bility of seeing that the partnership paid its installments 
to RFC on the purchase contract. He had no authority to declare 
a contract between RFC and the partnership terminated or void. 
He always contended that the mark-up on the resale of the land 
was a breach of someone's fiduciary duty — without saying who's 
— and was invalid. I do not agree. 
If he used money contributed by the partners to make payments 
on the property directly to the original owner, he omitted paying 
RFC its share of the installment due. Defendants have undertaken 
to show how much was paid out as appears with findings beginning 
2340 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -197- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
with Finding 104. What use Sampson made of money not already 
accounted for may indeed require an accounting, but defendants 
still have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
what amount, if any, they were thus deprived of. 
One exhibit defendants presented was 158, which, among 
other things, set forth a "Net Contract Equity," which the exhibit 
defined as the equity differences betyeen the Richtron real 
estate contracts and the partnership teal estate contracts, 
which, as of April 30, 1981, was declared therein to be 
$1,306,574.69, most, if not all, of Which would probably be 
mark-up. This amount was not then due fcFC and does not afford 
to us a measure of damages. If adjusted for prior payments 
made by the partnerships to RFC, it would probably reflect a 
total mark-up which amount could be used as a measure of damages 
only if defendants could prove that but for Sampson's conduct, 
all partnership contracts would have been paid off in full. 
This they have not done and could not do. 
The financial problems which confronted the defendants 
and partnerships in May, 1980 included defaults in land contract 
payments by the partnerships to RFC (or Richtron, Inc.) over 
which partnerships Richins, as president of the general partner, 
had complete control. Richins also had control over the defaults 
in RFC's payments to the original sellers as RFC also then was 
completely controlled by Richins. As previously set forth the 
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Richtron general partners had formally withdrawn as such from 
all partnerships by January, 1981, but they still had the obligation 
to wind up partnership affairs, and although Sampson was a stumbling 
block, defendants could have but did not seek court assistance 
in effecting such wind-up responsibilities. As I have elsewhere 
stated, I think it appropriate here to note that although this 
lawsuit was filed February 11, 1981, the defendants filed no 
responsive pleading until July, 1982. 
While I have concluded that Sampson by his tortious conduct 
intentionally interfered with the existing economic relations 
defendants had with each individual partnership, both for an 
improper purpose and by improper means, thereby causing injury 
to defendants, I am at this point ready to state, and so conclude, 
that each general partner has failed to prove damages, or any 
amount thereof, with respect to the general partner being deprived 
by such conduct of unpaid current expenses — which phrase does 
not include "advances11 -- nor of its 10% of profits for any 
partnership allowable to the general partner by the certificate 
of limited partnerships upon termination if such profits then 
existed. Whether any partnership, if wound up as provided by 
law and the agreement, would have had profits is pure speculation 
based upon the evidentiary record in this case. 
61. Paragraph 3 of the General Averments of the defendants1 
Second Amended Counterclaim states that Frontier Investments 
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is the assignee and transferee of all right, title and interest 
of all defendants in any and all monetary proceeds recovered 
from the plaintiffs in this case. Said allegation was denied 
by plaintiffs in their reply to the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
As stated in Finding 103 the court found no evidence in the 
record of any such alleged assignment or transfer and thus concludes 
that its right to such monetary proceeds, if any, was not proven 
during the trial. 
62. As shown in Finding 104, Exhibit 223, contains evidence 
as to Sampson's receipts and disbursements of $645,103.38 during 
the period from June 27, 1980 and Novepiber 30, 1982, included 
among which were disbursements of $146,551,03 which primarily 
involved payments to the original owners^-sellers of the various 
farm properties which Sampson made without paying those amounts 
to RFC and/or Richtron, Inc. as requited in the real estate 
contracts they had with the individual partnerships. 
About one month prior to the ending date of this accounting 
period, the IRS sale took place, and one w^ek before Judge Palmer's 
ruling ended Ag Management's role as general partner. Sampson's 
claimed authority to continue control of the limited partnerships 
after Judge Palmer's ruling was based upon whatever rights therein 
were received under the IRS sale and the validity of that sale. 
63. As of August 30, 19 8 3 the Jo^ in P. Sampson, Attorney 
at Law, Trust Account contained $11,574.50,, which included deposits 
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since December 20, 1982 of $5,000 from Ag Management and $6,000 
from Consolidated Farms (Finding 105). 
64. As found in Finding 105, Exhibit 219 related to the 
Ag Management Account for the period Of February 16, 1982 to 
October 29, 1984. Seventy five deposits made to this account 
after November 30, 1982 totaled $230,1^00, $143,000 of which 
came from Consolidated Farms, $20,000 from Snowville rent and 
$51,974 from Springfield grain. During the same period 260 
disbursements were made. As of October 29, 1984, the account 
showed a credit balance of $43,103. itmong disbursements were 
one to Everingham of $32,460 on the Springfield property, one 
of $16,119 to Utah Mortgage on Snowville, and $8,000 to Sampson 
as attorneys fees. Following the federal court's ruling in 
May, 1984 that the IRS sale was void, abotit $14,300 was deposited 
to this account from Consolidated Farms and some named limited 
partners and $1,000 on Snowville rental. Only one $100 disbursement 
was made after that ruling. 
65. Consolidated Farms was incorporated by Sampson for 
the sole purpose of receiving the assets of all limited partner-
ships. The account was opened on November 15, 1982 and a summary 
thereof by Richins extended to October 29, 1984 on which date 
a credit balance of $145,597 remained from deposits totaling 
$778,136 consisting almost entirely of contributions from limited 
partners. One is left to wonder whether any of such payments 
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by the limited partners would have b^en made to Richins had 
he retained or remained in control. (See Finding 106) From 
an analysis of disbursements almost all wete checks to Ag Management 
or to Keith Blanch, or to one of his two bank accounts. On 
or about October 13, 1983 $100,000 wgs paid out on Randlett. 
$24,000 was paid to Sampson on attorney's fees. Following the 
federal court ruling in May, 1984, receipts totaled about $74,320, 
and disbursements about $12,000. 
66. Keith Blanch had two bank accounts, one in Oregon 
and one in Idaho. Between November 3, 1980 and May 10, 1983, 
$159,515 was deposited in the Oregon account which consisted 
almost entirely of transfers from the John Sampson PC Trust 
Account prior to March 5, 1982 and from tjie Ag Management account 
after that date. Disbursements therefrom appeared to be for 
Blanch's personal as well as partnership business purposes. 
The Idaho account covered a period of July 8, 1983 to December 
31, 1983 during which receipts totaled $108,326 and disbursements 
$107,849. The source of receipts appeared to be transfers from 
Consolidated Farms. (Findings 107 and 108) 
67. No evidence of receipts or disbursements after October 
29, 1984 was received, but Richins1 schedules appear to substantially 
cover all receipts and disbursements to that date. 
68. It appears from Finding of Fact 110 that the Springfield 
and Moreland properties had been sold pripr to April 30, 1981. 
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69. A balance sheet for RFC as of April 30, 1981, offered 
as evidence of damage contained unexplained amounts based upon 
assumptions that did not exist, including a "present market" 
list of values, the source of which appears to have been opinions 
of Richins. I conclude this exhibit offers no credible evidence 
of damages other than a possible source of determining markup 
on resale of properties to the partnerships of about 40%. (Finding 
110) 
70. A status report of RFC dated July 1, 1981 offered 
as evidence of value contained as a fc}asis for use therein of 
an "estimated market value" of some 20 partnerships of $9,900,120, 
which company one year before had filed bankruptcy proceedings. 
I conclude that this exhibit offers no credible evidence on 
damages. It did reflect a total of $3,889,364 payable on real 
estate contracts. (Finding 111) 
71. While settlement negotiations were under way and RFC 
had just filed bankruptcy, Richins prepared a schedule "to give 
an idea on values" showing, based upo^ i his opinion, a total 
combined real estate value for all partnerships of $12,380,400 
on 14,374 acres, which "idea on valuels" I conclude lacks any 
foundational basis or credibility on damages. (Finding 112) 
72. A consolidated balance sheet for Richtron, Inc., dated 
June 20, 1980, was prepared by Richins for "internal use only" 
with all computations subject to auditj. For all partnerships 
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it listed real estate contract receivables as valued at $4,831,315 
while those payable totaled $3,462,j010 or a difference of 
$1,396,305. I have searched the mass of exhibits in vain for 
evidence as to what the total original purchase price was for 
all property purchased by RFC or Richtron, Inc. from original 
owners and what the total prices were for those same properties 
when resold to the partnerships. This ba|lance sheet (226) though 
dated June 20, 1980, in my opinion, coirtes closer to reflecting 
that ratio of those totals than any other exhibits. Copies 
of the original buy and resale contracts were never placed into 
evidence. Using this schedule, it reflects an average markup 
upon resale to the partnership was about 28.35%. (Finding 113) 
73. Just prior to trial Richins prepared a "final accounting" 
which he described as a "summary of partnership equities" determined 
by him as of June 30, 1980. Using values Affixed to the properties 
in the schedule mentioned in Conclusion 6f Law 71, but excluding 
Snowville, Grandview and Young Farms, this schedule showed a 
total equity of $6,410,980. This schedule, when compared to 
the schedule of properties contained in the bankruptcy schedule 
for RFC, which did not include the abbve three partnerships, 
nor Blackfoot, North Bear Lake, Pleasant Valley and Randlett, 
and when adjusted for those not included on the bankruptcy schedules, 
showed an estimated market value of the properties that were 
listed on the bankruptcy schedules to total $9,539,400, while 
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the "market value" for those same properties as valued in the 
bankruptcy schedules was $3,937,357, which reflects a value 
less that the total indebtedness on those same properties which 
was shown on Richins' schedule as $4,034,300. These values 
were selected by Richins for the two purposes indicated for 
dates that were one day apart. The purposes of the two evaluations 
are evident. Richins1 schedule showing a high valuation was 
to try to furnish a yardstick for measuring damages in this 
lawsuit, while the low values set out in the bankruptcy schedules 
reduced valuations to a point, less than obligations, (Finding 
114) , thus showing no real equity for the bankruptcy court to 
administer. 
74. The defenants' rights to 10% of the profits upon the 
wind up of partnership affairs and final resale of the land 
is fixed by the Certificate of Limited Partnership. The Richtron 
general partners, even after withdrawal, had the duty and obligation 
under the law to wind up the partnership affairs and terminate 
the partnerships, when there had been no valid exercise of the 
partners1 right to remove by majority vote the general partner 
and elect a new one. Richins continuously challenged the validity 
of Sampson's actions with respect to installing a new general 
partner, yet delayed in seeking help from the court to rule 
on his challenge when prompt action seemed indicated. The defendants 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any 
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final profits, of which they were entitled to 10%, existed as 
to any partnership and the Court so concludes. (Finding 115) 
(See also Conclusion 60) 
75. The facts set forth in Finding of Fact 116 have credibility 
as to true value, but not with respect td proving damages. 
76. Based upon the facts considered in Finding of Fact 
118, it is my opinion that the defendants did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence an entitlement to punitive damages 
in this case and I so conclude. 
77. Based upon the facts set forth in Finding of Fact 
12 0, it is my opinion that the affirmative defense raised by 
Sampson and considered therein has no merit, for Sampson did 
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that facts existed 
which established this alleged affirmative defense as a defense 
to and an excuse for Sampson's tortious conduct, and I so conclude. 
78. As to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver 
and laches, it is my opinion that Sampson did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Richins1 actions at any time 
induced Sampson to believe certain facts existed that led to 
Sampson's detriment; or by his actions evince in any unequivocal 
manner an intent to waive his control over the partnerships 
and step aside in favor of Sampson; nor did Richins' actions 
at any time constitute a lack of diligence which brought injury 
to Sampson; and I so conclude. 
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79. In Finding of Fact 122, the affirmative defense of 
breach of duty and trust is considered and from the findings 
made I conclude that the alleged defense is without merit or 
factual support. 
80. Finding of Fact 123 touches upon two final affirmative 
defenses noted in Finding 119 and comments upon certain facts 
relating thereto. Based thereon I find n0 merit to either defense 
and so conclude. 
81. As to the dispute set forth in Finding 124, I conclude 
that while the alleged actions may be relevant in another lawsuit 
between parties having an interest therein, such contentions, 
even if assumed to be true, would not constitute a defense to 
Sampson on the Counterclaim which is based on Sampson's tortious 
conduct beginning a substantial period of time after the Valmont 
obligation was incurred.
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Dated this /V day of t»ap, 19861. 
BRYANT R. CROFT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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VERDICT ON PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on plaintiffs1 Complaint against the defendants, Paul H. Richins, 
Richtron, Inc., and RFC, the Court renders its Verdict thereon 
as follows: 
1. As to defendant Richtron, Inc./ the Court finds the 
issues on the Complaint in favor of the defendant, Richtron, 
Inc. , and against the plaintiffs Milton R. Goff as trustee for 
Virgil R. Condon, Paul D. Huber, 0 & M Plumbing and Heating, 
Earl V. Gritton, Philip 0. Boyer, Tofjfie Sawaya, and Russell 
Smuin of no cause of action. 
2. As to defendants Paul H. Richins and RFC, the Court 
finds the issues on the Complaint in fkvor of Milton R. Goff, 
as trustee for the plaintiffs named in paragraph 1, and against 
defendants Richins and RFC and renders a verdict thereon in 
the amount of $5,683.16, together with interest thereon as provided 
in the judgment and in the amounts (subject to correction for 
error) determined and as set forth in Finding of Fact #21. 
3 . As to the plaintiffsf Complaint I rule that John P. Sampson 
is not a plaintiff with respect thereto and the verdicts set 
forth above do not apply to him. 
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Judgment shall be entered accordingly with a formal judgment 
to be prepared and submitted to the Court by counsel for the 
plaintiffs upon receipt of written notice of the signing and 
filing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating 
to the Complaint. 
ON DEFENDNTS' COUNTERCLAIM 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on defendants1 Counterclaim against John P. Sampson and the 
named plaintiffs for whom Milton R. Goff sues as trustee, the 
Court renders a decision and its verdict^ thereon as hereinafter 
set forth. 
On their second claim for relief Richins is entitled to 
a judgment against Sampson for $2027.40 and Richtron, Inc. is 
enitled to a judgment against Sampson $2188.70. (Payment of 
one would constitute a credit for payment of the other.) 
The ultimate issue in this case is as to what damages, 
if any, defendants are entitled to against Sampson for the injuries 
he caused to defendants or any one of them by his tortious conduct 
of intentionally interfering with existing economic relations 
they had with the limited partnerships or any other party. 
Counsel for defendants provided a reference to Torts Second, 
Chapter 13, relating to Interference with Contract, which, under 
Section 766(g), states: 
0 o ^  9 
<V N*> O >$ 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -209- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
A similar situation (to voidable contracts) 
exists with a contract that/ by its terms 
or otherwise, permits the third person to 
terminate the agreement at will. Until 
he has so terminated it, the contract is 
valid and subsisting, and the defendant 
may not properly interfere with it. The 
fact that the contract is terminable at 
will, however, is to be taken into account 
in determining the damages the plaintiff 
has suffered by reason of its breach. 
In this case the partnership agreements provided that the 
contract was terminable at the will of either the general partner 
or the limited partners. The general partner could withdraw 
at will and terminate the partnership while the limited partners 
could either by majority vote remove the general partner and 
elect a new general partner (which method could not affect the 
general partner's right to share in partnership profits and 
distributions as provided in the agreement) , or terminate the 
partnership and order the disposition of assets. In either 
event, upon termination the affairs were to be wound up as provided 
in the agreement. 
Section 774A of Torts Second relates to damages for liability 
in cases involving interference with contract cases. It provides: 
(1) One who is liable to another for 
interference with a contract or prospective 
contractual relation is liable for damages 
for 
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits 
of the contract or the prospective relation; 
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(b) consequential losses for which 
the interference is the legal causes; and 
(c) emotional distress or actual harm 
to reputation, if they are reasonably to 
be expected to result from the interference. 
The Second Amended Complaint contained a claim for relief 
by Richins for slander. During the trial counsel for defendants 
stated Richins would not present any evidence upon this claim 
and it was dismissed. No evidence was presented of emotional 
distress and I thus rule that damages under (c) in the preceding 
paragraph will not be considered or allowed. 
In the Comment it is stated this section applies only to 
the recovery of compensatory damages and that one who becomes 
liable for interference is liable for the pecuniary loss of 
the contract or the relation. In the case in which a third 
person (the partnership here) is prevented from performing a 
contract with the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover for the 
loss of profits from the contract. When it is the plaintiff 
himself who is prevented from performance of his contract with 
a third person, he may recover for expense to which he is put 
or for other pecuniary losses incurred in making his performance 
good. In the case at bar it is apparent that both situations 
existed. Sampson prevented the partnerships from performing 
their contracts with defendants by his taking over complete 
control of the partnerships and thereby prevented the defendants 
from completing performance on the agreements with the partnerships. 
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The Restatement in its comments under damages spotlights 
the Court's problem with the comment that: 
A major problem with damages of this 
sort is whether they can be proved with 
a reasonable degree of certainty. 
It goes on to say that sometimes, when the court is convinced 
that damages have been incurred, but the amount cannot be proved 
with reasonable certainty, it awards nominal damages. 
Another important principle stated is that the action for 
interference with contract is one in tbrt and damages are not 
based on the contract rules, and it is not required that the 
loss incurred be one within the contemplation of the parties 
to the contract itself at the time it was made. The plaintiff 
can also recover for consequential harms, provided they were 
legally caused by the defendant's interference. 
I have ruled that Sampson's conduct constituted a tortious 
intentional interference with existing economic relations causing 
injury to defendants, or some of them, and have examined and 
considered the evidence to determine whether defendants proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence facts sufficient to establish 
damages with a reasonable degree of certainty from a tort, not 
a contract, point of view. I have done so with respect to Richins 
individually; with respect to the general partner of each partnership 
which as to most partnerships was Richtron, Inc., and was Richtron 
General as to the others; and with respect to the contract seller 
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of the farm properties to each partnership, which in most partner-
ships was RFC and was Richtron, Inc. as to the others. I note 
that RFC was also a limited partner in two (#2 and #6) Cat low 
Valley partnerships with a capital account of $7,911 in #2 and 
of $2,103 in #6, and in Richfield Farms with a capital account 
of $20,960.00. Also, Richtron, Inc. had a limited partner interest 
in Pleasant Valley of $4222.50. 
During the trial defendant Frontier investments was identified 
as a corporation organized by Richins to which each of the other 
defendants had assigned whatever funds were received as damages 
in the trial of this case. I thus se$ no need for the Court 
to undertake any attempt to divide whatever damages may be awarded 
the general partner between Richtron, Inc., and Richtron General, 
nor to the contract seller between RFC and Richtron, Inc. Facts 
which I consider proven by a preponderance of the evidence and 
relevant to the question as to whether damages were proven with 
a reasonable degree of certainty are being set forth in what 
follows. 
In May, 1980, the Richtron companies with Richins as the 
owner and president of each have agreements with 2 5 limited 
partnerships going, though not without serious problems at that 
time, and within seven months thereafter Sampson, a lawyer, 
has in his own way obtained and taken over control of all partner-
ships and retained it over the next four years. 
His control was so complete that he precluded defendants 
from having the general partner control and manage the affairs 
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of each partnership and from winding up the affairs of each 
partnership. The "winding up" process involved the sale of 
assets; the payment of each partnership's liabilities and obligations 
to creditors (or adequately providing therefor); the distribution 
of all remaining assets as provided in Article IV which first 
required the repayment to all limited partners the amounts of 
their capital contributions, and then distributing 90% of the 
remainder to the limited partners and 10% to the general partner; 
and as the final step in the liquidation process the cancellation 
of the Certificate of Limited Partnerships in the manner provided 
in Section 48-2-25 of the Code. 
The general partner was a party to each partnership agreement. 
Upon execution it received its management fee. It was entitled 
to no further compensation for its management services, and 
had to await final dissolution and termination to receive its 
10% mentioned in the previous paragraph, with no assurance that 
upon wind-up there would be any final remainder or profits from 
which its 10% was to come. Ongoing expenses incurred in management 
were payable, but I have ruled there was no proof that any such 
expenses were due. The only remaining claim the general partner 
asserted during the trial was the repayment of advances it made 
to various partnerships prior to May, 1980. I have made mention 
several times of Sampson's repeated declarations to the limited 
partners that any advances by the general partner to any partnership 
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need not be repaid, both orally and in writing. Sampson even 
questioned that any advances had been made, but I have found 
the evidence shows otherwise, and note here that in May, 1980, 
Hurd mentioned in one of his memoranda that no more advances 
could be made because the creation and sale 0f additional partnership 
properties had been stopped because of the state securities 
commission's stop order. I have already ruled that Sampson's 
declarations regarding the advances were erroneous and that 
they were obligations owed by the partnership to the general 
partner. 
In this case the uncertainty lies in the amount thereof 
and what damages, if any, should be allowed. The evidence estab-
lished that the Leo H. Richins Family Trust put up $100,000 
for advance purposes and that Shari Richins put up $32,000. 
The total of such advances was not specifically proven with 
one exhibit (160) produced thereon, an exhibit attached to the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, approved by both Richins 
and Sampson, showing net advances of $393,840, not including 
interest and subject to audit for completeness as of August 
1, 1980. An uncertainty appears here because it appears to 
be a net figure, not explained, which showed about $535,000 
in advances to 12 partnerships remaining unpaid with about $142,000 
being deducted which appears to have been advances or loans 
by eight partnerships to the general partner. No oral testimony 
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was given to explain these amounts. A logical inference is 
that Richins used funds received from the limited partners of 
the eight partnerships for purposes other than their own obligations, 
such as advances to the other twelve partnerships to pay their 
obligations, or possibly to pay some general partner obligations. 
Reference is made here to the eighteen promissory notes 
executed on June 5, 1980, by Richins as president of the general 
partner of each partnership. Eleven of these notes were in 
various round figure amounts totaling $529,000, while the notes 
for the seven Catlow Valley partnerships recited that they were 
for $100 or "the total amount equal to the aggregate advances" 
made to the partnerships as shown by "the financial records 
and accounting books." All the notes recited that they were 
for advances in the amounts shown or as disclosed by such records. 
One other exhibit fixed the amount owed by the partnership on 
advances at $600,000, including accrued interest. 
The partnership agreements contained a provision that any 
and all advances, together with accrued and unpaid interest, 
became immediately due and payable upon the sale of the property 
or the termination and dissolution of the partnership "unless 
otherwise agreed upon." It is apparent from the evidence that 
Richins had not made known to the limited partners that obligations 
for such advances were owed to the general partner by the partner-
ships until May, 1980, when information concerning partnership 
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and Richtron problems began to surface. It is thus apparent 
that repayment of the advances was conditional upon the end 
results of each partnership. 
Section 48-2-23 of the Code states that in settling accounts 
after dissolution the liabilities of a limited partnership shall 
be entitled to payment in the order fixed therein, which is, 
first, payments to creditors (excluding the general partners); 
second, to limited partners in respect to their share of the 
profits and other compensation by way of income on their contri-
butions; third, to limited partners in respect to the capital 
of their contributions; and fourth obligations to general partners. 
Here too, it is apparent that repayment of the advances to the 
general partners was conditional upon the end results of each 
partnership, which leaves no assurance that any partnership, 
if properly wound up, as provided by law and the partnership 
agreements, would have been able to repay any of the obligations 
owed by it to the general partner for such advances. 
But it is clear from the evidence that Sampson's control 
blocked any winding up and dissolution of the partnerships by 
the general partners. While, as I have repeated elsewhere, 
help from the court was always available with respect thereto, 
and noting again that defendants did not file a responsive pleading 
to plaintiffs1 Complaint for almost eighteen months (probably 
because of settlement negotiations) it is clear that with Sampson's 
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repeated contention that such advances did not have to be repaid, 
there would be no effort in his control of the partnerships 
to repay any of said advances or to take proper steps to wind 
up the affairs of any partnership and thereby determine if the 
sale of any partnership property would produce funds sufficient 
to repay any advances, or part thereof, or produce any profits. 
But the problem here is not to determine the debts of the 
partnerships, including what each may have owed on advances, 
but rather it is to determine what damages, if any, can with 
reasonable certainty be attributed to Sampson's tortious conduct 
either for pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contracts, 
or the consequential losses for which his interference was the 
legal cause. Consequential damages may be defined as such damages, 
loss or injury as does not flow directly and immediately from 
the act of the party, but only from some of the consequences 
or results of such act. (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 
p. 352). 
Defendants contend that one other area must be considered 
in determining damages to the general partners and that is the 
alleged unauthorized receipts and disbursements by Sampson of 
partnership funds. Evidence offered in support thereof is found 
in the summaries Richins made of Sampson's financial records 
and accounts, which were finally made available to him by discovery 
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process and court order. Evidence contained in such summaries 
may be summarized as follows: 
The John P. Sampson trust and business accounts showed 
receipts by Sampson of $645,101.58 from limited partners and 
farm receipts between June 27, 198 0 and November, 1982. The 
total of such receipts was disbursed by Sampson during this 
period for various listed purposes, included among which were 
payments of $146,551 on partnership properties to the original 
owner; $96,057 to Blanch for salary and expenses; $28,770 to 
Marilyn Brown, secretary to Sampson; $60,182 to Sampson for 
legas fees; and $7 8,18 4 to "general overhead", the details of 
which sum was not included in the analysis. 
Between December 20, 1982 and August 30, 1983, Sampson 
deposited $11,574.00 into his "attorney at law trust account", 
$5,000 of which came from Ag Management and $6,000 from Consolidated 
Farms. As of August 30, 1983, these funds remained in this 
account. 
Between February 16, 1982 and October 29, 1984 the sum 
of $352,547 was deposited in the Ag Management account. Of 
that amount $230,700 was deposited after November 30, 1982, 
the ending period for the $645,101.58 summary, (supra). Of 
the latter amount, $143,000 were transfers from the Consolidated 
Farms account, $20,000 came from Snowville rentals, $51,974 
from Springfield grain and the balance from miscellaneous sources. 
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Disbursements from this account for the entire period was $309,444, 
leaving a credit balance of $43,103 at the end of that period. 
Each disbursement was indentified, the court noting that $51,000 
went to Consolidated Farms, $32,460 to Everingham (the original 
property owner) on Springfield, $16,119 to Utah Mortgage on 
Snowville and $8,000 to Sampson on attorney's fees. 
Between November 15, 198 2, and October 29, 1984, the sum 
of $778,13 6 was deposited in the Consolidated Farms account. 
Most of the deposits came from limited partners, farm income, 
and Ag Management, with minor amounts from miscellaneous sources. 
Deposits of $74,320 were made to this account after Judge Winder's 
ruling in May, 1984 voiding the IRS tax sale to Goff, trustee, 
with about all of these deposits coming from limited partners. 
Disbursements from this account during that period totaled $632,539, 
leaving a credit balance of $145,597 on the last date of the 
summary period. Most of these disbursements went to Ag Management 
and the Keith Blanch accounts, although $100,000 were paid to 
attorneys for Randlett and $24,000 went to Sampson for legal 
fees. After Judge Winder's ruling, $12,000 was withdrawn, all 
of which went to Ag Management. 
As set forth in the Findings Keith Blanch had two bank 
accounts, one in Oregon and one in Idaho. Between November 
3, 1980 and May 10, 1983, the sum of $159,515 was deposited 
in the Oregon account. The initial deposit included a check 
2 > ^  ^  
<w >v JO 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -220- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
for $10,713.68 which David Gillette gave to Sampson on August 
27, 1980, stating by letter that such funds were to be used 
exclusively for Catlow Valley Farms and were to be released 
to the general partner of the Catlow Valley partnerships after 
Sampson and Richins "had finalized their arrangements to work 
together". Sampson endorsed this check and sent it to Blanch 
before its deposit in the Oregon account on November 3, 1980, 
doing so contrary to Gillette's instructions and without any 
legal authority to do so. The other sources of these deposits 
were all from the John P. Sampson PC Trust account up to March 
5, 1982, after which date the balance of the deposits came from 
Ag Management. Withdrawals from this account during that period 
totaled $219,981, which is an unexplained overdraft of $60,465 
above deposits. Checks to "Cash" or to Blanch or his wife (as 
wages) totaled about $31,000. The balance went for various 
itemized expenses, the checks for which suggest that many of 
such disbursements were probably for Blanch1 s personal obligations. 
On July 8, 1983, a check for $2,476.70 payable to the Idaho 
Bank closed this account. 
Between July 8, 1983 and December 31, 1983 there was deposited 
in Blanch's Idaho bank account the sum of $108,326, the initial 
deposit of which was the $2,476.70 from the Oregon bank account. 
All of these deposits came from Consolidated Farms. Disbursements 
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from this account during that period totaled $107,489, the pattern 
of which was similar to disbursements from the Oregon account. 
From the foregoing it appears that from June 27, 1980 to 
October 29, 1984, approximately $1,522,000 of unduplicated funds 
were deposited in the various accounts over which Sampson had 
control. The last date of any of Richins accountings was October 
29, 1984, on which date the accounts (if we include the account 
with $11,574 deposited therein) had $200,474 remaining on deposit. 
From disbursement it appears that Sampson took out $103,000 
for attorney's fees, with $78,184 being withdrawn from his trust 
accounts as general overhead during the period of June 27, 1980 
and November 30, 1982. Even after Judge Winder's ruling in 
May, 1984, some limited partners contributed $74,320 which went 
into the Consolidated Farms account. There is no evidence as 
to the purpose for which some limited partners continued to 
give Sampson funds after that ruling, but it is apparent that 
with all but one farm foreclosure completed before Judge Winder's 
ruling Sampson and said limited partners were doing something 
with respect to partnership property affairs. 
Upon closing argument counsel for defendants stated that 
Sampson and twelve people ended up with all the "Richtron assets". 
He probably meant partnership assets, but as I noted in my findings 
and conclusions, no evidence was placed in the record establishing 
that such was in fact the case, but if so, absent any such evidence, 
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I cannot consider this statement as a factor upon which this 
decision can be made. I have repeatedly noted the absence of 
evidence as to what finally happened to the partnerships and 
their properties other than a schedule showing only the dates 
upon which foreclosures presumably took place. 
Also, upon closing argument counsel for defendants suggested 
that the schedule (Ex. 223) showing the receipts and disbursements 
of some $645,000 was a basis for determining changes, suggesting 
an interest award on each payment from the date received should 
be computed and allowed, together with the $645,000 expenditures, 
since Sampson's use of these funds did the partnerships no good 
and made it impossible for Richins to liquidate the partnerships. 
He made no reference to the $877,000 collected by Sampson, inde-
pendent of the $645,000, nor the uses made thereof. An unknown 
answer remains to the question as to how much, if any, the limited 
partners would have contributed to Richins had the course of 
events left him in complete control and receipt thereof. But, 
as stated before, in May, 1980, Richins had 25 limited partnerships 
he was administering as president of the general partners over 
which Sampson had in seven months1 time assumed and taken control 
and in a manner which proved to be illegal and contrary to law. 
I think it is clear from the evidence that most of the 
funds that passed through Sampson's hands were paid out on partner-
ship expenses. He, of course, took out over $100,000 as attorney's 
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fees, paid thousands of dollars to Marilyn Brown, and sent Blanch 
over $556,000. At closing argument defense counsel mentioned 
two lines of cases discussing the question as to whether funds 
were used or converted by a volunteer which were disbursed for 
partnership obligations should be giveh an offsetting credit. 
He stated one line said a volunteer was not entitled to any 
credit while the other line held a converter was entitled to 
credit to the extent he applied funds to pay outstanding debts. 
The case book authority referred to said ofce line of cases appears 
to hold that where the converter's possession is "wrongful from 
the beginning" statutes in some states precludes him from taking 
credit for reducing the plaintiff's debt by the conversion. 
The other line says even if the converter is at fault and acts 
in bad faith, damages ought to be reduced where the converted 
property is used to discharge the plaintiff's debt to a third 
party. This case with its mass of convolute^ facts and circumstances 
cannot be so simply categorized, but if any decision is such 
as to require the application of either ruling, I would say 
that credit must be given as to all funds used to apply on legitimate 
partnership obligations. 
Turning now to RFC's claims for relief, I note that in 
Sampson's initial meeting with Richins in May, 1980, and at 
the May 29, 1980 meeting of Catlow Val|ley partners, Sampson 
immediately, and thereafter repeatedly4 said mark-ups on the 
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sale price by which RFC (or Richtron, Inc.) resold the farm 
properties to the partnerships involved a breach of fiduciary 
duty and rendered them void. The resale contracts were not 
themselves placed into evidence, but thQ record shows they all 
contained a markup (disclosed in the prospectus), a down payment 
and periodic installment payments with an increased interest 
over what was to be paid as interest upon the original contracts 
of purchase. From Exhibit 227 I note a Suggested total mark-up 
for all partnerships of about $1,466,000, and from Exhibit 226 
one of about $1,369,000. 
Problems causing and resulting in defaults on contract 
payments due RFC by the partnerships have heretofore been noted, 
as well as RFC' s own defaults on its purchase contracts. One 
subject discussed at the May 29, 1980 meeiing was that the fore-
closure sale set for June 6, 1980, was confronting RFC. Even 
if a true value of RFC's equity in eac^ h partnership property 
under its resale contracts could be established, circumstances 
existing in May, 1980, created a strong probability that some, 
if not all, of such contracts would nev£r be paid out. Thus, 
exhibits 226 and 227 do not prove damages to RFC to any reasonable 
degree of certainty. 
Other factors affecting RFC's damages from Sampson's actions 
are present. About June 1, 1980, RFC filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding, brought on by Sampson's suggestion and the unauthorized 
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vote of a few Catlow Valley limited partners at the May 29, 
19 8 0 meeting. This proceeding presumably brought all of RFC's 
assets and liabilities under control of the bankruptcy court, 
prior to the dismissal of those proceedings. The record contains 
no evidence of what happened to RFC under control of the bankruptcy 
court. It appears the foreclosure sale on June 6, 1980 was 
not stayed. It does not appear that during the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings any installment payments due RFC on the partnership 
purchase agreements were ever paid into the bankruptcy court, 
although evidence showed Sampson made a $100,000 payment to 
attorneys for Randlett on October 13, 1983; a $32,460 payment 
to Everingham on February 28, 1983 on Snowville; property payments 
of about $146,000 direct to owners prior to November, 1982; 
and a suggestion, but with no other facts with respect thereto, 
that Springfield and Moreland were sold before April 30, 1981 
(Finding 110) . The bankruptcy schedules filed by RFC did show 
a total equity in its contracts of a value less than its total 
debts. 
At the May 29, 1980, meeting Sampson, although in attendance 
as counsel for only two Catlow Valley partners, took it upon 
himself to tell all in attendance that the mark up on the price 
of each property upon its resale by RFC to the partnership was 
a breach of fiduciary duty and unenforceable. Sampson's attitude 
and repeated statements thereafter made to this effect makes 
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certain that Sampson at no time had any intent to honor the 
partnership's obligations in their respective contracts with 
RFC. I note here that even had the limited partners, with or 
without Sampson's guidance, properly and legally removed the 
Richtron general partner and elected a new one, such new general 
partner would have had no power or authority to declare the 
RFC contracts void and no longer in force and effect. Such 
new general partner may have said the partnerships would no 
longer make payments to RFC, only to thereafter meet the consequences 
that probably would have followed, but could not have ruled 
them void and unenforceable. But with RFC in bankruptcy and 
the Richtron general partners still in control of the partnerships, 
one is hard put to point to any act of Sampson that up to that 
point had caused any damage to RFC. I note also that at the 
May 29, 1980 meeting the limited partners there voiced a strong 
reluctance to make any further assessment payments to Richins 
without any controls thereon. Even Richins suggested there 
that funds needed to meet pressing Catlow Valley obligations 
be placed in Hansen's hands to handle to which those in attendance 
agreed. 
But the very next day Sampson disclosed to Richins the 
desire of himself and others (who, he did not say) to take over 
all the partnerships and buy out defendants' interests. This 
started a snowball rolling which unfortunately did not stop. 
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Sampson's employment as counsel spread immediately to other 
partners or partnerships. Such quick developments may well 
have influenced Richins to do what he did on June 5, 1980 when 
he executed guit-claim deeds by which he purported to convey 
back to RFC all of each partnership's intelrest in their respective 
farm properties. Richins1 actions in later recording those 
guit-claim deeds, done about the same time Sampson was taking 
steps to collect proxy powers of attorney to vote in his PC 
to replace the Richtron general partner, ijiay thereby have created 
an excuse for Sampson, while exercising Ian illegal control over 
the partnerships as president of the presumably newly elected 
general partner, for not making any future payments to RFC on 
its contracts, and all this without regard to the control of 
the bankruptcy court at this time over RFCt matters. 
At the time Richins executed thos£ quit-claim deeds, any 
partnership default on installment payments to RFC was Richins' 
responsibility, as it was under his control as president of 
all the Richtron companies that those payments were not made. 
It appears from the evidence that Richins had the idea that 
once he conveyed legal title to the f^rm properties back to 
RFC by the use of these deeds, the partnership interests in 
the farm properties was gone, perhaps aloiig with the 90% interest 
in any profits that the limited partners were entitled to upon 
resale of the properties and termination of the partnerships. 
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He further appears to have concluded that upon repossesion of 
the properties by the former owners, he could assert and fix 
damages by the market value he personally placed upon the farm 
properties. As I set forth in the Findings and Conclusions, 
the validity of those deeds were questionable to say the least. 
But RFC is here asserting a claim for damages it alleges occurred 
by the conduct of Sampson. Aside from its interest as a limited 
partner in Catlow Valley partnerships 2 and 6, which totaled 
$10,014, and in Richfield which totaled $20,760.50, RFC's claim 
for relief lies in its claim that Sampson's tortious conduct 
constituted an intentional interference with its existing economic 
relations with each partnership, resulting in injury. Sampson's 
conduct certainly constituted an intentional interfernce with 
RFC's existing contract relations with each partnership. RFC 
had to look to complete pay off on its contracts to realize 
its fully hoped for profits on the contracts. With conditions 
as they were RFC' s only reasonable expectancy for gain on its 
contract could be found only in dissolution of each partnership 
in accordance with law and the agreements with the hope that 
sufficient funds would be realized through the dissolution to 
pay it something for its equity. Before such hope could be 
achieved any dissolution would have required the receipt of 
sufficient funds to first pay off all obligations remaining 
due to the original owners, or sold under circumstances by which 
the buyer was willing to pay off the balance owed to the original 
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owner in a manner acceptable to such owner. Sampson by his 
conduct precluded any such circumstances tfrom occurring. 
But Sampson alone was not responsible for RFC's losses 
on its economic relations with the partnerships. By May, 1980, 
Richins had so mismanaged partnership affairs that they did 
not have funds to pay installments owe|d to RFC, so RFC could 
not pay its installment obligations to the contract sellers. 
Substantial judgments were obtained for failure to pay partnership 
obligations. .Fartners were angry because of Richins1 failure 
to follow the partnership agreements upon assessments and failure 
to pay; to give an annual audited report to each; to have the 
properties appraised by a qualified appraiser and give the partners 
a report on the value of their holdings; to advise them regarding 
advances and obligations with respect thereto; and to keep them 
advised of the problems that developed. Richins agreed that 
RFC should be taken into bankruptcy and 4id so, yet he executed 
the quit-claim deeds and had them recorded; and apparently gave 
no consideration to his obligation to ladvise the bankruptcy 
court that such had been done. Finally, and of great importance, 
was Richins1 failure to himself undertake efforts to wind up 
partnership affairs and bring about dissolution and termination 
with any resulting benefits to all concerned. The courts were 
there to help him do so but he never used them for that purpose. 
I recall that in the Blackstone suit against defendants, they 
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counterclaimed seeking dissolution; but when Judge Palmer ruled 
in their favor that Ag Management was not legally elected general 
partner, any further efforts in that case on their Counterclaim 
was not brought out in this trial. Even in the case at bar, 
Richins did not seek a wind-up and dissolution by this Court, 
From the acts of both Richins and Sampson and the consequences 
that followed, this Court is hard pressed to find evidence that 
establishes to a reasonable degree of certainty the amount of 
damages caused by Sampson's tortious conduct respecting the 
RFC contracts. Even if Sampson had never appeared on the scene, 
it does not appear probable that Richins and RFC could have 
prevented foreclosure of the original purchase contracts, based 
upon the existing facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. 
1 do find that Sampson gave no recognition to RFC's limited 
partnership interests in Richfield Farms and Catlow Valley Farms 
2 and 6, nor to Richtron, Inc.'s limited partnership interest 
in Pleasant Valley, that he ignored its rights as such limited 
partners, sent no notices to either, offered no evidence as 
to what in fact happened to the interests of the Pleasant Valley, 
Richfield and Catlow Valley limited partners, and thereby caused 
a loss to RFC and Richtron, Inc. in the amounts of their respective 
capital interests in those partnerships. 
As to Richins individually, I have already ruled that his 
claim against Sampson under the first claim lacked proof of 
damages and that his claim for an alleged interference with 
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his making a living or obtaining future Economic benefits failed 
for lack of proof. On Richins1 second cl^im, damages of $2027.40 
for attorneys fees paid Gary Kennedy fdr vacating the default 
judgment, granted to Valmont against Richins and Richtron, Inc. 
because Sampson failed to file a responslive pleading, have been 
allowed. 
Upon closing argument the thrust of plaintiffs1 counsel 
regarding damages was that Richins1 mismanagement, resulting 
in all the problems existing in May, 1980, coupled with the 
alleged unsconscionable markups on the resale contracts, caused 
his own demise. He argued that the stop order of the state 
securities commission prevented the sale of more partnerships 
and Richins had no funds of his own that could keep the partnerships 
going. The payment of all assessments might have helped. But, 
as repeatedly considered, a substantial part of the Richtron 
funds were loaned back to partnerships as advances and never 
repaid, with Sampson doing nothing to s^ e that they were, but, 
on the contrary, repeatedly saying that tftey need not be. 
It was problems created by Richins1 mismanagement followed 
by Sampson's tortious conduct that brought this case to court 
for a decision as to whether any damages are recoverable upon 
the Counterclaim. As floundering as the partnerships were, 
Sampson saw value there and spent what now totals six years 
in achieving what he now has, whatever it may be, leaving Richins 
and his companies with no tangible assets or values. Even after 
9 r> ;%f x 
SAMPSON V. RICHTRON -232- FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Judge Winder ruled the IRS sale of Richtron assets to Goff as 
trustee void and of no force and effedt, Sampson undauntingly 
went forward, collected $74,320 from certain limited partners, 
undoubtedly using such funds for purposes he saw fit, together 
with the $200,000 remaining in his bank accounts as of October 
29, 1984, doing so presumably upon th£ theory that existing 
new relationships put his actions beyond the control of the 
courts. 
As stated before, damages are in tort, not in contract, 
rendering liability for damages for either the pecuniary loss 
of the benefits of the contract or consequential for which the 
tortious interference is the legal cau^e. I think that as to 
some claims for relief damages, of at least a consequential 
nature, have been shown with a reasonable degree of certainty 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
As I noted at the outset, defendants seek an accounting 
from plaintiffs on their fifth claim. I have at times in my 
findings and conclusions noted that perhaps certain aspects 
of the case then under consideration suggested that an accounting 
may be called for. However, at the end of all my Findings and 
Conclusions, and giving due consideration to the detailed schedules 
prepared by Richins from Sampson's records, I have concluded 
that any further accounting would not add to the certainty of 
the evidence as I now see it; that it is time a decision was 
rendered in this case, and that such request should be and is 
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denied. I have been told in the evidence that foreclosures 
occurred on all partnership properties and the dates thereof, 
but nothing else. I have often made reference to the fact that 
the record contained no evidence as to what happened to the 
partnerships and their properties, but I shall not allow my 
curiosity in that regard to further prolong a decision in this 
case. 
It is thus the verdicts of the Court ithat: 
1. I find the issues as to Richiins1 individual claims 
against the plaintiffs, excluding Sampson, and all of them in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against Richin^ of no cause of action. 
As against Sampson Richins is entitled to a judgment for $2027.40 
2. I find the issues as to RFC as ftollows: 
In favor of RFC and against the plaintiff Sampson in the 
sum of $30,974.50. Since the date of such loss cannot be determined, 
no interest thereon is granted. 
In favor of RFC and against Sampson for his tortious conduct 
in intentionally interfering with its existing economic relations 
with the partnerships, but for which I can allow only nominal 
damages because, although convinced that damages have been incurred, 
there has been no proof with reasonable certainty of the kind 
or amount thereof, nor by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Nominal damages in the sum of $100 are granted. 
3. I find the issues as to the Richtron general partners 
in favor of Richtron, Inc. and Richtron General and against 
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the plaintiff Sampson and grant a verdict thereon in the sum 
of $250,000. 
Richtron, Inc. , as a limited partner in Pleasant Valley, 
is granted a judgment against Sampson in the sum of $4222.50 
4. As to any claims asserted by defendants against plaintiffs 
Milton R. Goff, trustee for Virgil R. Condon, Paul D. Huber, 
0 & M Plumbing and Heating, Earl V. Gritton, Philip R. Boyer, 
Toffie Sawaya, and Russell Smuin, I find the issues in favor 
of said plaintiffs and against the defendants and render a verdict 
of no cause of action. 
5. As to the claims asserted by defendants and against 
Sampson for an accounting and injunctive relief I find the issues 
in favor of Sampson and against the defendants and render a 
verdict of no cause of action. 
Judgment shall be entered accordingly with a formal judgment 
to be prepared and submitted to the Court by counsel for defendants 
upon receipt of written notice of the signing and filing of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to the 
Counterclaim. 
The signing of this verdict, too, shall await the final 
entry of the Findings and Conclusions. 
Dated this / / day of September, 1986. 
DISTJB1CT COURT JUDGE 
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